


# *Southern Academic Review*

*A Student Journal of Scholarship*

No. 7  
Spring 1993

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## The Synod of Whitby: Context and Rejoinder

*John Mark Allen*

In the year 664, King Oswiu of all Northumbria and his son, Alchfrith, the under-king of Deira, called a council of their clergy to resolve what the Venerable Bede described as a "serious controversy . . . about Easter and the rules of Church discipline."<sup>1</sup> For several years Britain had been evangelized by clerics from two parties, the usages of which differed: the Roman from the south and Celtic from the north. The immediate matters at issue were the proper observance of Easter and the monastic tonsure. They met at the monastery of Whitby (then "Streaneshalch"), which is about 45 miles northeast of York.

In the ensuing debate, Colman, the bishop of Lindisfarne, defended the Celtic usages while Wilfrid, the young Romanist abbot of Ripon, assaulted them. Oswiu, despite his having been taught by Irish monks as a child and his membership in the Celtic Church, ruled in favor of the Roman cause. For fear that he would jeopardize his salvation by favoring St. Columba over St. Peter, Oswiu set the fortunes of the Northumbrian Church with those of Rome. If the results of this council had been nothing more than a new Easter reckoning and monastic coiffure for the North of England, then its significance would be rivaled

by other Church councils that decided similar issues on a much larger scale. To the contrary, the Synod did much more, for it set the tone for the manner in which Christianity would inhabit Britain. This paper seeks to provide not only an overview of the context, causation, and significance of the Synod of Whitby, but a rejoinder to Richard Abel's novel viewpoint in "The Council of Whitby: A Study in Early Anglo-Saxon Politics," *Journal of British Studies* 23 (Fall 1983): 1-25.

### **Christianity in Early Britain and the Celtic Church**

Unfortunately, yet understandably, the origin of the Christian religion in Britain is a mystery. There are the usual smattering of legends here--some from more reliable sources than others. One legend makes Britain the edge of Paul's journeys. Another relates that Joseph of Arimathea came to Glastonbury in the first century with the Holy Grail in his possession.<sup>2</sup> Bede himself helped foster a sixth-century tradition by including the story of King Lucius in his *Ecclesiastical History*. Bede states that in either 156 or 167, Lucius, king of the Britons, requested of the bishop of Rome that he be made a Christian. Thereafter, Christianity was supposedly held in the land until the time of the Emperor Diocletian (284-305). The problem is that there was no such Lucius in Britain with such kingly power. It seems that Bede's source, the *Liber Pontificalis*, had confused Britain with Edessa and King Lucius (Abgar) of that city (modern Urfa, Turkey).<sup>3</sup>

Reliable historical evidence begins to be available from the beginning of the third century. Vague, but serious statements are made of British Christianity by Tertullian and Origen. Bede and Gildas give an account of St. Alban, a martyr during the Diocletian persecution. The years after Constantine's edict of toleration (313) provide

us with archaeological evidence in the form of churches and grave sites. We know that bishops from Britain participated in some of the Church councils of the fourth century. It is also significant that so important a heresy as Pelagianism should have come from a British monk in the fifth century. Throughout the evidence, Roman influences (perhaps especially via neighboring Gaul) are paramount.<sup>4</sup> What is more, after the *militem* marched out of Britain in the early fifth century, the Christian religion proved to be the most indelible mark the Romans left upon the island.<sup>5</sup>

As the Germanic tribes known as Angles, Saxons, and Jutes made their invasion/settlement of Britain over the better part of the fifth century, they killed many of the native Britons. The majority, however, were either subjugated or pushed into the corners of the island. Many even went over to the part of Gaul called Armorica that subsequently took on the name Brittany.<sup>6</sup>

The extent to which "England" was vacated of Britons seems to be confirmed by the near disappearance of Christianity within the German-settled areas. The Church of Britain was now implicitly separated into a Church of Wales and of Ireland. The Church in Wales was the remnant of the Romano-British Church. It had been neatly organized in dioceses, painstakingly orthodox, and congregational. The Irish Church, on the other hand, never took to organization. Its tribal culture was far less acclimated than Romanized Britain to such organization. When monasticism made its way to this corner of the West, they embraced it more fully than any other people before them. For some reason, monasticism's odd mix of ascetic discipline and missionary adventurism, communal living and individualism, appealed to the Celtic peoples. Without regard for the way in which churches had "universally" been organized, they channeled their fervor into monastic

vows and scholarship. (The Christians of Wales and Cornwall, to a lesser but significant extent, were also monastically-inclined). British Christianity (especially the Irish variant) had been set adrift from the rest of Christendom after the invasions. The result was that it evolved into a church still fundamentally Catholic, yet with its own substantially unique traditions and goals.<sup>7</sup>

The Celtic Church, dominated as it was by monasticism, felt no want for scholars and missionaries. Their monastic schools so excelled at producing both that they attracted more than just British or Irish students. Beginning in the sixth century, these schools began to draw a steady stream of students from the continent, where scholarship had been on the decline since the fall of Rome. Columba, the sixth-century priest and abbot, was, however, a brilliant native product of an Irish school. After founding several monasteries and churches in Ireland, he went into exile in Scotland because of a controversy with the Irish king. He subsequently founded a monastery on the isle of Iona and began to claim the land for Christ (or perhaps reclaim given the work of Ninnian and others). His mission there met with much success, and by the time he died in 597, Columba had provided Christianity with a permanent foothold in the North.<sup>8</sup>

### **The Roman Mission**

In that same year, a mission sent from Rome by Pope Gregory arrived in Kent. Its leader, Augustine, was under instructions to convert the heathens and establish an orderly system of dioceses. Early on, they met with near-miraculous advancement. Within the first year, Aethelberht, the king of Kent, was converted. (His wife was a Christian princess from Gaul). A second mission arrived in 601 bearing a pallium for Augustine and papal

authority to make him archbishop. Soon afterwards, bishoprics were established in Rochester and London. But as historian Peter Blair states, at that time "all depended on the attitude of the royal families, and both in Essex and in Kent the following generations turned away from the example which had been set by their fathers."<sup>9</sup> After the death of Augustine (somewhere between 604 and 609), and the death of Aethelberht in 616, the Roman mission did well to survive. When Edwin, king of Northumbria, married one of Aethelberht's daughters in 625, he allowed her to bring her religion and its attendants north. Bede relates that after much consideration and several signs, Edwin allowed himself to be baptized.<sup>10</sup> Once again, there followed another period of many conversions.<sup>11</sup> Things were going so well again that Pope Honorius sent a pallium for Paulinus, so that he might be made archbishop of York. All such considerations were swept away, however, when in 633 Edwin was killed in battle (against a combined force of Cadwallon, king of Wales, and Penda, king of Mercia). Paulinus, Edwin's widow, their daughter, and retinue all fled to Kent. The only exception was a deacon named James who stayed to make what he could of the ruins. As before, however, each bad turn was met with a good one. Simultaneously, the East Angles under King Sigeberht were being converted in a lasting manner, and a missionary named Birinus was at work in Wessex. He converted the King of Wessex, Cynegils, and established a bishopric at Dorchester.<sup>12</sup> In the South, only Sussex and the Isle of Wight remained untouched by missionary work.<sup>13</sup>

### The Celtic Mission

When Edwin had taken the Northumbrian throne, Aethelfrith's sons Oswald and Oswiu had been forced to live in exile among the Scots and Picts. (Aethelfrith was

king before Edwin, and their two families competed for the throne). They grew up among the Christians there, and spent several years at Iona itself. After Edwin, two apostate successors, and Cadwallon all died in one year, Oswald came back to Northumbria and became king. Oswald, having been raised a Christian, was probably the most sincerely Christian English king to this point. He turned to Iona for help in making his land permanently Christian, and they sent a Scot named Aidan in 634. Oswald gave Aidan and his company of monks an island named Lindisfarne very near his own fortress of Bamburgh. At low tide, monks would walk over to the mainland and then spread out to preach to the people of Bernicia and Deira.<sup>14</sup>

Celtic missionaries were very successful wherever they travelled. Three reasons for this are especially notable. First, they left no souls unturned. In the Irish tradition, monks and priests were free to wander and to go where they felt called. This meant that they came into contact with more people and covered more ground than the Romans. For the Roman missionaries, organization was always the primary concern.<sup>15</sup> Their means of spreading Christianity was to convert the king and establish bishoprics. The Celts, in contrast, put their chief thrust behind converting the people. (Of course the position of the king was still a factor. Without at least their favored position in Northumbria, they could not have made the gains that they did). Second, from Aidan on down they were very simple-living men. While being no less holy or devout than the Romans, they were also unpretentious and ascetic. When one considers the lot of the average peasant in seventh-century Britain, their appeal to the masses becomes evident. Lastly, their missionaries came as volunteers. They were not "sent forth" as by a papal

directive. What is more, they came in sizable numbers--there was no shortage of their clergy.

Aidan and Oswald worked very well together, and even after their deaths, the Church stayed solidly entrenched in Northumbria. Oswiu was then king, and he too had been made firmly Christian as a child. Aidan's pupils carried on his work by preaching in Mercia and Essex in the 650s. When Oswiu defeated the Mercians and Penda was killed at the battle of the Winwaed in 655, the conversion process was expedited. He was now *bretwalda*<sup>16</sup> of all England as well as king of all Northumbria. More importantly, paganism was in its death throes.<sup>17</sup>

### The Differences between the Two Churches

Christianity, then, was now on the eve of victory against paganism in England. But as often happens among allies, the destruction of the common foe soon leads to dissension amongst themselves. The Roman and Celtic Churches had always been uneasy allies at best and the attitude between the Welsh and the Romans was, in fact, often antipathy. Soon after his arrival, Augustine had arranged a meeting with the Welsh bishops so as to pool their forces in converting the heathens. The Welsh, however, could never bring themselves to forgive the hated invaders, and thus could not share their faith. More immediately, they were unwilling to give up their traditions, and they found Augustine to be arrogant.<sup>18</sup> As seen, it was the Irish branch of the Celtic Church that was willing to carry the Word.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, it should be deducible that the two parties were now at close range with one another, and that given their differing characteristics, their proximity would not be mutually agreeable.

Not only did the two parties differ in their capacity

as missionaries but their forms of organization also differed significantly. The Romans could not fathom the Celts' antiorganizational concept of wandering bishops, priests, and monks. Furthermore, they found what organizational traditions the Celtic Church **did** have quite odd. Perhaps foremost among these traditions was that bishops were subordinate and responsible to abbots. In this manner, the abbot of Iona stood as a pseudo-archbishop over all the mission posts of England. It was, however, in the area of ceremony and symbolic tradition that the Celts differed most with their Roman counterparts. This is not surprising when one recalls their two centuries of isolation from continental Christianity, and that traditions such as these are usually the most changeable in ecclesiastical usage. Among these deviations were a different rite for administering the sacrament of baptism and for consecrating bishops, a different style of monastic tonsure (haircut), and an outmoded method of determining the date of Easter. The first of these was likely just a variation in wording and the use of the holy water. The second, reflecting the more casual Celtic attitude toward organization and episcopacy, was most likely the use of abbots or too few bishops to make a new bishop. The next of these is the one most likely to seem ridiculously trivial to the modern reader. The Celtic custom was to shave the head from ear to ear with a small amount of hair in front and much in the back. The Romans, on the other hand, shaved a cleared circle on the top of their heads, supposedly in commemoration of Christ's crown of thorns. The Romans claimed that the Celtic style was either an old Druidic custom or the way of Simon Magus, a New Testament heretic. The last of these issues, the observance of Easter, was the most serious. The reason for this was that the issue was an ancient matter of dispute in the

Church.<sup>20</sup> As such, it presented the Romanists with a polemic around which they could make charges of heresy.<sup>21</sup>

The reckoning of Easter is a complicated enterprise. Easter, like the Passover, was calculated according to the cycle of the full moons. Since the moon's phases are not synchronous with the Earth's rotation or its revolution around the sun, these lunar-based dates fall on different solar-based dates each year. In keeping with the Bible, it became an established rule that the number of possible days for Easter should be narrowed to only Sundays. At the Council of Nicaea in 325, this rule was upheld, and rules were adopted to prevent Easter from falling on Passover and establishing March 21 as the vernal equinox. Passover is celebrated on Nisan 14, the day of the full moon in that first Jewish month. The rule of Nicaea meant that even if that Passover day fell on an otherwise proper Sunday for Easter (after March 21), Easter would not be celebrated on that day. Orthodox Christians would instead wait for the next Sunday. Easter, then, would be the first Sunday after the full moon (Passover) occurring after March 21. The **lunar** days were limited between the fifteenth and twenty-first. Though at the time of Nicaea, the Roman Church obstinately held on to the incorrect lunar limits of sixteen to twenty-two, by the time of their conflict with the Celts they had adopted the Nicæan limits.<sup>22</sup> In the interest of uniformity, tables were created that pre-calculated the proper date for Easter. They were based on cycles of years that were numerically convenient for reconciling the lunar and solar calendars. By this time, the Romans were using the tables calculated by a certain Dionysius Exiguus in the sixth century. These tables were based on a cycle of 19 years that fit within a larger cycle of 582 years. It held to the proper lunar limits, and significantly, its calendar

years were reckoned by the Christian era or *Annus Domini*.<sup>23</sup>

With the exception of southern Ireland, the Celtic Church still used an ante-Nicaean method of Easter reckoning in the middle of the seventh century.<sup>24</sup> They used an outmoded 84-year cycle that they probably brought back from the Council of Arles in 314. For them, the vernal equinox was March 25. Most importantly, they held the lunar limits to be the fourteenth to the twentieth. In other words, they would allow Easter to fall on Passover periodically. Because of this, the Romanists incorrectly charged them with the Quartodeciman heresy. This second-century heresy, however, had involved not only celebrating Easter on Passover, but also not limiting the festival to Sundays. In short, the Celts were not guilty of this heresy.<sup>25</sup>

While these differences--perhaps even including the major issue of Easter reckoning--may appear trivial in retrospect, one must not interject modern views upon the partisans. For as John McNeill has noted, "Matters which in the abstract may seem trifles often assume central importance when they are bound up with the sacred traditions of a people, or become the symbols of a certain ecclesiastical attachment."<sup>26</sup> Certainly, however, there was a deeper issue at stake as the course of events led to that fateful meeting at Whitby. Behind their immediate differences, even that most fundamental one of monastic versus diocesan organization, was the question of who could control the path of Christianity in Britain. For all its qualities, Roman Catholicism has rarely exhibited the beatitude of meekness in the realm of exercise of authority. In this case, their cause was aided by the fact that some of the Celts wanted their place again within the universal church.<sup>27</sup>

### Bede's Causation

The matters of variance first became critical in the area where the Celtic mission had originally taken root: Northumbria. Aidan's successors were faced with a growing Romanist party and sentiment against the Celtic usages. Finan, Aidan's first successor, had a dispute with an Irishman named Ronan who had studied in Gaul and Italy. The dispute concentrated on the observance of Easter. Although nothing came of the controversy while Finan lived (until 661), it seems to have raised the consciousness of the court and people to the possibility of a problem. When Finan was succeeded by Colman, the controversy arose again, stronger than ever.<sup>28</sup> The Romanist party had most likely grown over the past ten years. Wilfrid, a young Northumbrian noble in orders, was now at the head of the movement. Alchfrith<sup>29</sup> had converted to Romanist usages around 660, and thereafter he became Wilfrid's patron and ally. Alchfrith had even forced the Celts out of the abbey of Ripon so as to give it to Wilfrid and some Romanist monks. Though Wilfrid had studied at Lindisfarne as a boy, he had grown tired of their colorless ways and set out for the fabled city of Rome. He was deeply impressed by the Church throughout the continent, acquiring a taste for sophisticated art and ritual, as well as learning the latest method for calculating Easter.<sup>30</sup> When he arrived back in Northumbria, he made it his life-long mission to rid the English Church of what he considered Celtic backwardness.<sup>31</sup> It was in 664,<sup>32</sup> probably in the summer, that an opportunity presented itself to achieve this goal.

As would be expected, sources for an event that took place more than 1300 years ago are rather limited. Britain is, however, fortunate in that this and many other early events are discussed in the work of the Venerable Bede.<sup>33</sup>

His account of the Synod of Whitby, along with that of Eddius Stephanus within his *Life of Wilfrid*, provide the only near-contemporary sources.<sup>34</sup> As Bede tells the story, the Synod resulted because of a mixture of the agitation previously described and a conflict within the royal household. Oswiu was married to Eanfleda, and she, being that daughter that Edwin's widow brought to Kent in 633, was a firm believer in the Roman customs.<sup>35</sup> Of course, the consequence of having two ways to reckon Easter is often (but not always) having two different days to celebrate, and this was just the case in the Northumbrian court. Bede states it this way: "It is said that the confusion in those days was such that Easter was kept twice in one year, so that when the King had ended Lent and was keeping Easter, the Queen and her attendants were still fasting and keeping Palm Sunday."<sup>36</sup>

This is the sort of thing that could cause domestic squabbles and a scandal around court. Furthermore, given that royal opinion seemed to function equally well as a barometer of mass religious practice at this time, people probably **were** "troubled" that their religion was contradictory. The picture that emerges from Bede's account, then, is that of a king being reluctantly pushed into action by his wife, his son (as Wilfrid's ally), and perhaps a sizable minority of his subjects.

### The Synod

Oswiu and Alchrith, therefore, called a council to be held at the mixed monastery of Whitby, that was under the care of the Abbess Hilda.<sup>37</sup> Representing the Celtic Church were Colman, the bishop of Lindisfarne (thus actually of all Northumbria), Cedd, the Bishop of the East Saxons, the Abbess Hilda, and probably several monks. On the Roman side were Wilfrid, the abbot of Ripon,

Romanus, the queen's chaplain, and James the Deacon, who had been waiting for this moment for some thirty years. Also on that side were Agilbert, a Gaulish bishop who had formerly been bishop of Wessex, and a priest with him named Agatho. Agilbert was a friend of both Alchfrith and Wilfrid, and he had made Wilfrid a priest at Alchfrith's request before the council was called.<sup>38</sup> Cedd served as the interpreter, and Oswiu the final arbiter of the dispute.

The king directed Colman to explain his position first. He claimed the authority of his forefathers, and said that their method of observing Easter had originated with St. John. When he concluded his opening statement, Oswiu directed Agilbert to speak for the Roman cause, as he was the highest-ranking member of their group. With the king's permission, Agilbert had Wilfrid speak in his place, because he spoke the English language better. Wilfrid used the argument of universality,<sup>39</sup> saying that their method was used "throughout the world wherever the Church of Christ had spread." He then contrasted **the** Church with what he considered the provincial Celtic Church: "The only people who are stupid enough to disagree with the whole world are these Scots and their obstinate adherents the Picts and Britons, who inhabit only a portion of these two islands in the remote ocean."<sup>40</sup> Colman once again invoked the authority of St. John. Wilfrid retorted that during the Church's fledgling years, Jewish traditions were still an important part of the religion. Because of this, for example, St. Paul offered sacrifice at the Temple of Jerusalem, and St. John allowed Easter to fall upon the same day as Passover. Thereafter he explained how St. John and St. Peter came to what he considered the orthodox method, and he accused Colman and his Church of following neither.<sup>41</sup> Colman next

invoked the authority of Anatolius of Laodicea<sup>42</sup> and his revered St. Columba. First, Wilfrid attempted to set Colman straight on Anatolius's position. Second, he made a condescending summary judgement of the fathers of the Celtic Church, saying that they had no doubt loved God "in primitive simplicity." In the end, he again put forth the question of universality. No matter how saintly Columba may have been, it is St. Peter who holds the keys to heaven.<sup>43</sup>

King Oswiu seems to have been moved to decision by Wilfrid's comments. According to Eddius, he smiled as he asked Colman whether his Columba had been given such authority.<sup>44</sup> Colman, of course, had to say no. He could only agree with Wilfrid that St. Peter had indeed been given such authority. Thereupon, Oswiu concluded:

Then, I tell you, Peter is guardian of the gates of heaven, and I shall not contradict him. I shall obey his commands in everything to the best of my knowledge and ability; otherwise, when I come to the gates of heaven, he who holds the keys may not be willing to open them.<sup>45</sup>

Bede concludes his description of the event by saying that all "signified their agreement with the King" and thereafter abandoned "their imperfect customs."<sup>46</sup>

### **A Better Account?**

This traditional historical account of the Synod relies heavily on Bede. The story is one of Romanist agitation, a domestic squabble, and the importance in everyone's mind that Easter be celebrated on the proper day. To this, most historians have added a healthy measure of critical insight, perceiving that the "computist" Bede perhaps overemphasized the issue of Easter and the Synod's finality, and left untouched the deeper contention

for ecclesiastical sovereignty.<sup>47</sup> Historian Richard Abels has, however, recently raised more serious objections to Bede's account.<sup>48</sup> He is, quite plainly, unwilling to accept Bede even with the usual corrective footnotes. His point of departure--that the Easter Controversy is entirely blown out of proportion in Bede--is not in itself earth shattering. The analysis with which he follows up this conclusion, however, is very novel. His basic premise is that if the Easter question fails as the immediate cause of the Synod, something else must replace it. In his opinion, there are certain political factors that fit the puzzle. The most important of these, he states were "Alhfrith's aspirations to his father's throne; Oswiu's fading position as *bretwalda* . . . the growing challenge to Oswiu's supremacy from Mercia; and, finally, the recent death of Deusdedit, Archbishop of Canterbury."<sup>49</sup>

Abels first sets out to brush aside the traditional account so as to provide his own theory with a clear playing field. He makes two main points. First, why would a domestic squabble, etc. come in the "unexceptional" year of 664 when such clashes had often taken place since Oswiu's marriage to Eanfleda in 643? Since Easter would be the same for both Celtic and Roman in 665, he finds no necessity for reconciling the two cycles in 664. There are two problems with this assertion: In the first place, Abels has passed over the implications of D. J. O'Connell's table of Easter dates. If the two parties celebrated Easter on the same day nine times from 643 to 665, then there were only **three** times which they did not. If this is true, the idea of Eanfleda and other Romanists becoming **gradually** offended at the difference is quite believable. Furthermore, it would present no difficulties for Bede's account. The other problem is that the prospect of identical dates in 665 can be interpreted differently.

Kenneth Harrison, after observing the same point remarks, "Thus a synod in 664 would prepare for harmony a year later."<sup>50</sup> In other words, why not iron out their differences in a year after which the transition could be made more painlessly?

Abels's second point against the traditional account is also a chronological one. He rightly asks why the "controversy" took so long to come to a head. How or why did the "distraught" Northumbrians wait from 651 (death of Aidan) to 664? The answer is one that keeps the substance of what Bede said while admitting he was capable of false emphasis. In short, Bede exaggerated the distress of the Northumbrians at the beginning of that period although he perhaps rightly marked that time as a feeble start to a future controversy. Thus, a picture emerges of a question first raised at the death of Aidan and building to the rank of a "controversy" by 664; and of Celtic Christianity moving from its utter dominance under Oswald and Aidan to being only a sizable majority by 664. The factors described in the traditional account came into play along the way. Even if this theory is incorrect, there is still the fact that Oswiu was a very busy man from the beginning of his reign in 642. He had other more pressing matters of state to attend to (Mercia being always near the top of the list). The only hole in this latter argument would be the years 655 to 658, when Oswiu was unquestionably *bretwalda* and thus at greater leisure for non-military business. Then the question becomes not "why 664?" but "why not 655 to 658?" The answer takes us back to what I stated before--namely, that the controversy was yet to be a controversy at that time. All in all, it is not difficult to hypothesize reasons for the Synod's slow arrival.

Despite the fact that Abels does not successfully pull

apart the traditional account, his addition of political motives to the causality mix is admirable. He is on relatively strong ground in his analysis of Alchfrith. We know from Bede that he revolted against his father,<sup>51</sup> and the absence of his name from any record after the Synod of Whitby would seem to place his revolt shortly thereafter. In other words, Abels's theory that Alchfrith converted to Roman usages to challenge his father and better his chances at the throne is an attractive one. Once again, however, this excellent theory does not threaten the traditional version of Bede's account as it has been modified by historians. On the contrary, Wilfrid and Agilbert's close relationship to Alchfrith provides a perfect place for welding this new theory to the existing causal mechanism.

Abels next connects his theory about Alchfrith to Oswiu's decision. Given that the compromising situation he describes is true, Oswiu had no choice but to rule for the Roman usage so as to neutralize his son's opposition. He mentions Stenton's judgement on "the smile," affirming that he too believes that Oswiu had already made up his mind. Here Abels seeks to shore up his argument by adding further reasons why Oswiu had to decide for the Romans, and this is where some problems again arise. He notes correctly that Oswiu emerged from the battle of Winwaed (655) as *bretwalda* and gives the threatening of this position as a reason for his judgement at Whitby. Abels goes on to recommend that it was the death of Deusdedit, Archbishop of Canterbury, that forced Oswiu to act. If he were to keep his *bretwaldaship* from "slipping away," he had to exercise *principatus* over the church. In this case, that would mean being able to choose the next archbishop. To do so, however, he would have to have the support of the **Roman** pope.

Although the chess game which Abels constructs is

not unbelievable, and in fact, partially very insightful, the situation may not have been as he depicts it. Oswiu's authority as *bretwalda* was complete only from 655 to 658. Wulfhere rebelled and took control of Mercia in 658 and thenceforth began to exert more influence on the southern kingdoms. As Hodgkin shows, Wulfhere was probably considered overlord of all the South except for Kent by 664.<sup>52</sup> While Abels, interestingly enough, admits this (with the important exception of Wessex), he does not arrive at what appears to be an obvious conclusion. Having only a "nominal" influence in Kent, it is unlikely that Oswiu could have been considered *bretwalda*. Furthermore, if this is going to be used as a more plausible immediate cause for the calling of the Synod, then why did Oswiu not call it back in 658, 659, or perhaps 660 (about the time Alchfrith converted to Romanist usage and **before** his authority had already slipped away)? In fairness to Abels, Oswiu would still have been keen to preserve what authority he did have in 664, and Kent does include Canterbury. Nonetheless, this motive must be reduced in importance.

In addition, Abels's theories on the death of Deusdedit and the communication between Oswiu and Pope Vitalian are questionable. First of all, the chronological problem with Deusdedit's death, Ceadda's ignorance of the death, and the matter of Wilfrid's trip to Gaul is completely resolved if it is allowed that Wilfrid went thinking that the archbishop still lived. Given what we know of Wilfrid's personality, he would have been very keen to enjoy the pomp and circumstance that could only be provided on the continent. Moreover, his friend Agilbert was involved and could have encouraged him to make this highly indecorous move. By denying this possibility, Abels puts Bede's narrative at an impasse: in

each possible placement of Deusdedit's death, Ceadda inexplicably journeys to see a prelate that he should know is dead. Rather than abandon Bede for the biased Eddius as Abels does, there is another possible detour. In Stenton's account, both Wilfrid and Ceadda know of his death, and Wilfrid, therefore, goes abroad to be consecrated by "catholics" rather than by the simoniacal Bishop Wine. Stenton, then, has implicitly made the choice to say that Bede was mistaken, but that his mistake was the way in which he reported Ceadda's trip to Kent.<sup>53</sup> Note that this version works as well as Abels's does with Eddius's account. What is more, since Stenton places the death after the Synod of Whitby, this reveals some faulty logic in Abels's argument. In short, it is not necessary to place Deusdedit's death before the Synod to solve the problem of why Wilfrid went to Gaul. Accepting that Deusdedit died before Whitby only makes matters "far clearer" for Abels's thesis. "Bede's account is vague about the temporal relationship between the death of the archbishop and the convoking of the council" because Bede saw no connection between the two.<sup>54</sup>

As far as Abels's theory concerning Oswiu and the pope is concerned, it is quite likely that Oswiu should court favor with such a powerful figure and, once again, that he wanted to recover his influence in the South. The contents of their communications, however, have no necessary connection to the Synod. Whether Abels's thesis is correct or not, the pope's letter would be one of a happy pontiff on the conversion of an important monarch. Furthermore, it is not terribly odd that it should be addressed incorrectly. Vitalian, perhaps like Gregory, did not know the situation in England. He would, therefore, make references such as "king of the Saxons" and "your island." As Abels points out, Oswiu wanted him to think this way, and had probably

tried to that effect in his own letter. The upshot is that the fact that Vitalian thought Oswiu was the overlord of all England does not mean that he was. This political maneuvering on the part of Oswiu could or could not be attached to the Synod of Whitby.

Abels finishes his article with an excellent and novel view of the controversy between Wilfrid and Ceadda. He also contributes a solid appendix on the proper dating of the Synod. In essence, though much of his thesis's defensive structure is unbalanced, his theories on Alchfrith's influence are a lasting contribution to the study of this period.

### Back to Bede

Bede had ended his telling of the Synod with a note of finality. He undoubtedly wanted this chapter to mark the triumph of Rome and convey a vision of a unified English Church. His comments on agreement and unity were not entirely exaggerated. The Abbess Hilda and Bishop Cedd conformed to Roman usages. Furthermore, most of the North accepted the Roman methods for Easter and the tonsure.<sup>55</sup> The reaction of Bishop Colman and many of his followers, however, presents the other path taken after the Synod. In the next chapter of *Historia Ecclesiastica*, Bede relates how Colman went back to Iona after the decision, taking "with him all who still dissented from the Catholic Easter and tonsure . . ."<sup>56</sup> His departure meant the end of Celtic control of the Northumbrian Church and its missions to the South, but Roman organization did not appear overnight. It was the work of the next archbishop, Theodore of Tarsus, that won the nation and its clergy for the Apostolic See. He created many new bishoprics, and in a manner of tolerance and moderation that gained him the respect of a still divergent

clergy.<sup>57</sup>

By no means, however, were the Celts out of the picture.<sup>58</sup> Though their usages bid a retreat to Ireland and Wales measurable in decades, their influence culturally is still visible in English life. Up to the end of the seventh century, Ireland was still a prominent place to get an education. With their last generation of outstanding pupils, they passed on their missionary and intellectual zeal to monasteries such as Bede's Jarrow, where Irish and Benedictine spirit met and flowered.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, the brilliance of the Anglo-Saxon Church in the following centuries is attributable, in large part, to what they had learned from the Celts.<sup>60</sup> Down through the centuries, an intangible Celtic element remained with the English Church, often wishing to be a free spirit again. This, together with geographical distance, perhaps made the eventual separation from Rome that much more inescapable.<sup>61</sup>

The Synod of Whitby, then, was a turning point, but not the end of Celtic influence. As R. H. Hodgkin put it:

Thenceforth . . . the Churches of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms were to have the advantage of the unity, the organization, and the discipline, which the Roman Church had inherited from the Roman Empire. But while they were thus to escape the dangerous liberty of Celtic Christianity they were long to retain the spiritual fervour, the originality, the zeal for learning and preaching, which the Scots had brought with them.<sup>62</sup>

Like any major historical event the Synod of Whitby was the product of a complex set of causative factors. Uncontrollable events (e.g., the withdrawal of the Romans from Britain), revolutionary modes of thought or action

(e.g., Christianity), and the reactions of individuals to their environment (e.g., the missionary work of St. Columba) combine to yield the facts known in retrospect as history.<sup>63</sup> In the course of 1300 years, unfortunately, many facts which would clarify the causation and circumstances of the Synod of Whitby have been lost. Conversely, the facts that are available for such ancient events have long since been refined by modern historians into traditional accounts. Two of the paths that remain open are re-approaching the event via its broader historical context and attempting constructive conjecture. I have attempted both of these here--the latter by dialectic with Abels's theories. In general, I have found the traditional account (Bede augmented) to be consistent and believable, albeit improvable by the creativity lent by Abels or the cultural understanding given by authorities such as Lehané. In the final analysis, historians must unavoidably rely heavily on Bede. For this reason, barring any new archaeological or written evidence, the retranslation and scrutiny of his *Historia Ecclesiastica* will be the source of any new data on the Synod of Whitby.<sup>64</sup>

## Notes

1. Bede, *A History of the English Church and People*, trans. Leo Sherley-Price (Edinburgh: Penguin, 1955) III, xxv, 183.
2. John Godfrey, *The Church in Anglo-Saxon England*, (London, Cambridge U. P., 1962) 9.
3. Ibid., 10. The story is told in (I, iv, p. 42) of Bede's work. Cf. John T. McNeill, *The Celtic Churches*, (Chicago, U. of Chicago P., 1974), 18. and W. Levison, *Bede, his Life, Times, and Writings*, ed. A. H. Thompson (London, Oxford U. P., 1935) 135 n. Godfrey and McNeill seem to have drawn this analysis from the last work. Levison, however, notes that Adolf Harnack was the first to voice this opinion. It should be noted that in Godfrey, Abjar is misspelled, and that McNeill mistakenly calls him king of Ephesus. While this might seem to be minutia, Abgar deserves better remembrance. Abgar was the first Christian king and is believed to have built the first permanent Christian church building.
4. McNeill, 18-22, 28-32; H. H. Scullard, *Roman Britain: Outpost of the Empire*, (London, Thames and Hudson, 1979) 165-69.
5. For a detailed analysis, see Charles Thomas, *Christianity in Roman Britain to A. D. 500*, (Los Angeles, U. of California P., 1981).
6. Godfrey, 36-38.

7.Ibid., 34-58; McNeill, 69-86. For a detailed study of why monasticism and the Church developed as they did in Ireland, see Kathleen Hughes, *The Church in Early Irish Society*, (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell U. P., 1966).

8.Brendan Lehane, *The Quest of Three Abbots*, (London, John Murray, 1968) 112-36.

9.Peter Hunter Blair, *An Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England*, (Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1977) 118.

10.Bede gives an account of the council in (II, xiii) of the *Ecclesiastical History*.

11.It should be remembered, however, that the farther north the Roman mission went, the more likely it is that they were meeting people already exposed to Christianity by the Celts.

12.Bede claims that Birinus was sent by Pope Honorius in (III, vii) of *HE*, but the fact that he acted completely independently of Canterbury makes this appear dubious. J. L. Gough Meissner suggested that what we know of Birinus makes him sound much more like an Irishman than a Roman. The fact that Oswald, the king of Northumbria, was both a strong adherent to the Celtic Church and a factor in Cynegils's conversion might lend credence to this argument. See Meissner, *The Celtic Church in England after the Synod of Whitby*, (London, Hopkinson, 1929) 172.

13.Blair, 116-120.

14. These two former kingdoms had been combined to make Northumbria. Bernicia ran from the Forth to the Tees, and Deira from there to the Humber.

15. Note, for example, the popes' wishes to establish archbishoprics at London and York when neither was feasible.

16. In short, this was a status of "overlord."

17. R. H. Hodgkin, *A History of the Anglo-Saxons*, Vol. I, (London, Oxford U. P., 1967) 286-93.

18. Godfrey, 87-89. See Bede's account of their meeting at (II,ii) of *HE*.

19. But without cooperating with the Roman mission. The letter of Archbishop Laurentius that Bede records in (II, iv) of *HE* shows no shortage of ill-feeling between Irish and Roman as well.

20. McNeill, 109; Lehan, 189-202.

21. One can only imagine the ferocity of the dispute if the Pelagian heresy had come in this century instead of the fifth.

22. Kenneth Harrison, *The Framework of Anglo-Saxon History, to A. D. 900*, (Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1976) 30-37.

23. *Ibid.*, 31-38.

24. The Roman Easter was adopted at the synod of Leighlin in 636. It seems that a few of their abbots took more seriously the need for catholicity.

25. McNeill, 109-12.

26. Ibid., 109.

27. Blair, 129; see Lehane's chapter on the "trial" for some interesting psychological and cultural reasons for the conflict.

28. Bede III, xxv.

29. See page one above.

30. Note that his knowledge in this particular matter may have been part of the reason why the ensuing debate focused on what it did. See Harrison 52-75.

31. Godfrey, 114-16.

32. In sticking to the traditional date, I implicitly deny F. M. Stenton's theory that it occurred in October 663. See Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (London, Oxford U. P., 1965) 129. This theory is swept away by Harrison's convincing argument that Bede began the year according to Dionysius Exiguus's rule (January 1), not according to the Indiction (September 1). See Harrison, or for further arguments against Stenton's theory, Richard Abels, "The Council of Whitby: A Study in Early Anglo-Saxon Politics," *Journal of British Studies* 23 (Fall 1983): 20-25.

33. His *History of the English Church and People* or *Historia Ecclesiastica* was completed in 731.

34. Eddius was a chanter who came into Wilfrid's company in 669. He wrote the *Vita Wilfridi* c. 710. Although this work is a good source for comparison, it should be looked at more critically than Bede's *HE*. While Bede is not above some error or bias, Eddius is blatantly partisan for Wilfrid. This partisanship leads to falsehoods that were either intended or a result of his overzealousness. Two examples are prominent. He accused archbishop Theodore of accepting a bribe on one occasion when he demoted Wilfrid. This accusation is diametrically opposed to all other accounts we have of Theodore's character. (See Hodgkin I, 307, 342). In chapter 14 of *VW*, he calls the Celts "Quartodecimans" so that Wilfrid's dispute against them will assume the stature of an anti-heretical mission. As noted before, the charge is incorrect.

35. McNeill notes that she was born and baptized by Paulinus on the Roman Easter day in 627, and that therefore the date of Easter may have been especially important to her (112).

36. Or vice versa; Bede III, xxv, 182.

37. These are two more Celtic practices of which the Romans would have disapproved: first, that a monastery could hold men and women at once; second, that a woman would have leadership over male monks--much less, that a woman should wield the kind of power that a Celtic abbot or abbess possessed.

38. Note the disrespect this shows for the Celtic clergy in the area who were capable of raising him to the priesthood.

39. He also claimed the authority of St. Paul and St. Peter. That Wilfrid was a clever debater is evident throughout the synod's discussion. Here he "calls" Colman's disciple and "raises" him another.

40. Bede III, xxv, 185.

41. Though his account of the emergence of orthodoxy is entirely too simplistic, his notions about the Jewish element in the early Church are insightful.

42. The document supposedly written by Anatolius was a forgery. Wilfrid, however, was also incorrect to ascribe use of a nineteen-year cycle to him.

43. This is all a strict condensation of Bede III, xxv, 182-88.

44. Eddius Stephanus, *Vita Wilfridi*, trans. B. Colgrave (Cambridge, 1927) x, rpt. in *English Historical Documents: c. 500-1042*, ed. Dorothy Whitelock (New York, Oxford U. P., 1979) 753. Much has been made of the smile that Eddius ascribed to Oswiu. F. M. Stenton even went so far as to say that "the appeal to St. Peter's authority allowed the king to close the debate in a way which suggests that his own decision had been made before it began" (123). I might suggest instead that Oswiu, after having listened to talk of Anatolius, Easter reckoning, etc. was happy to find an argument he could come to grips with.

45. Bede III, xxv, 188.

46. Ibid. Note that he did not mention the issue of the tonsure or any of the other Celtic deviations. According to Bede, the debate at the Synod of Whitby dealt explicitly with the Easter question. One may imagine, however, that the other issues lay just below the surface.

47. Stenton (122-25), Godfrey (112-20), McNeill (109-15), Blair (129-31), and Hodgkin (294-302) all more or less follow this *via media*, accepting Bede's account, albeit with a grain of salt.

48. "The Council of Whitby: A Study in Early Anglo-Saxon Politics," *Journal of British Studies* 23 (Fall 1983): 1-25.

49. Ibid., 2.

50. Harrison, 93.

51. Bede III, xiv.

52. Hodgkin, Vol. I, 285-86.

53. Stenton, 124.

54. Abels, 13, 12. It is odd that Abels did not notice this since he comments directly on Stenton and this matter after correcting Stenton's dating of the Synod (22). Note that since Stenton shifted both that date and the date of the death equally in his system, my earlier denial of that system can still stand while accepting Stenton's conclusion about the death. To be honest, Abels's argument here is as confusing as the primary sources. I

am assuming that he is saying Oswiu and the Northumbrian clergy knew about the death before the Synod. Otherwise, how could this be considered a cause or factor dealing with the calling or decision of the Synod? Abels's later statement (23): "Hence, it would seem that the Northumbrians were aware of Deusdedit's death soon after the Council of Whitby had concluded," is then presumably a typographical error.

33. McNeill, 114.

34. Bede III, xxvi, 189.

35. It is ironic that one of his biggest troublemakers was Wilfrid, who did not want his power in Northumbria reduced.

36. See John L. Gough Meissner, *The Celtic Church in England: After the Synod of Whitby*, (London, Hopkinson, 1929). He presents plenary evidence that Celtic culture and even usages lingered, especially in Northumbria. Also see Joseph F. Kelly, "Irish Influence in England After the Synod of Whitby: Some New Literary Evidence," *Eire: A Journal of Irish Studies*, Irish American Cultural Institute, (1975): 35-40.

37. Lehane, 211-12, 215.

38. S. J. Crawford, *Anglo-Saxon Influence on Western Christendom: 600-800*, (Cambridge: Speculum Historiale, 1966) 31.

39. Lehane, 213.

40. Hodgkin, 301-302.

63. This scheme is adapted from a lecture by Dr. J. David Fraley, Birmingham-Southern College.

64. We do, however, have legitimate reason to hope for such developments give the strides that continue to be made in archaeology.

## World War I and the Origins of Nazi Propaganda

*John Allison*

The word "propaganda" brings to the contemporary mind thoughts of deliberate deception, hatemongering, and the debasement of intelligent analysis. For many, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Propaganda Minister for Hitler's Third Reich, is the archetypical propagandist. The techniques of Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry are well known. Goebbels used the impressive powers of his position ruthlessly to control a number of media in an effort to sway the opinions of his audience. What is not quite so well-known are the precedents for these activities. Although Hitler and his Propaganda Minister were at times creative in their efforts to influence the masses, they were not truly original in their thinking. The goals, content, and methods of Nazi propaganda were in fact remarkably similar to those of the Allied propagandists of World War I, particularly those in British and American agencies.

The extent to which the Nazis deliberately copied these earlier propagandists is difficult to determine. In the diaries of Joseph Goebbels, little information can be gathered concerning the origins of Nazi propaganda techniques. However, Hitler revealed through Mein Kampf and through speeches his conviction that the Allied victory in 1918 was largely due to its formidable propaganda

programs at home and abroad. In fact, two entire chapters of Mein Kampf are devoted to the subject of propaganda. In a speech given in 1923, Hitler explained how the "Jewish-democratic press of America" drove "a great peace-loving people" to war with "atrocious propaganda" (Hitler, My New Order 52). It is not unreasonable to assume, given such pronouncements, that Hitler considered the propaganda programs of the World War I Allies to be models of efficacy which set standards for the Nazi propagandists.

It is necessary, of course, to acknowledge certain fundamental differences between the Allied and Nazi propaganda machines. First of all, they had different goals. Whereas the Allies' primary goal was to facilitate victory in the war, Nazi propaganda was geared before 1933 towards the Kampfzeit, their effort to achieve political power through a direct appeal to the masses. After 1933, Nazi propaganda aimed at creating the widest possible base of support for the new regime while at the same time promoting Nazi ideals and values for the "New Order." It was not until 1939 that Nazi war propaganda began in earnest (Zeman 181-184). It is also important to keep in mind that German political and social traditions were quite different from those of England and the United States. Still, if propaganda is in fact little more than advertising, it can be said that Nazi propaganda simply had a different product to sell to a different market. The means of advertisement, however, remained similar (Doob 155).

## GOALS AND STRATEGIES

The most important development in the use of propaganda during World War I was the shift of its target audience from elites to the masses. The British were reluctant to aim propaganda towards the masses, especially

in foreign countries, until later in the war. Early efforts of the British propaganda agencies were directed toward the "opinion makers"--journalists, publishers, politicians, government officials, teachers, etc. An official of the War Propaganda Office (better known by the name of its location, Wellington House, in London), stated that "mass activity is the easiest and that which appeals most to those who wish to produce an effect, but it is in fact the most useless as regards its results upon the population intended to be affected" (Sanders and Taylor 101). However, in the latter years of the war, "scholarly" pamphlets were abandoned by the British in favor of the production of pictorial magazines and other "popular" media, and mass appeal became the prime concern of the British agencies for propaganda abroad as well as at home.

Unlike the British, President Woodrow Wilson quickly acknowledged the need to gain mass support for the war effort. Wilson had, in fact, based his political power on mass appeal. As author David M. Kennedy explains,

In the progressive era, under the press of necessity and in the absence of more formal alternatives [i.e., Congressional support], the manipulation of mass opinion for political purposes was becoming a highly refined art--and Woodrow Wilson was its consummate practitioner. (47)

Wilson, like his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, had made use of the press, the "muckrakers," to stir up popular opinion, hoping to force Congress to pass reform legislation. As a relative newcomer to politics who lacked traditional connections, Wilson relied on wide public support. As Kennedy states, "Wilson had a single master strategy: appeal directly to the people, unify their convictions, awaken their emotional energy, and turn this

great massed force on his recalcitrant foes" (48).

The European nations had already discovered that the massive mobilization of public opinion was necessary to wage a total war, and the United States took this lesson to heart. Wilson was influenced by men like journalist Arthur Bullard, who told him that the War could be won only if the people of the United States were driven by "an inward, spiritual mobilization," because any citizen not committed to the war effort was "dead weight" (Vaughn 13). Such feelings were also expressed by Goebbels during World War II. As Louis Lochner, editor and translator of the Goebbels Diaries, states, "he, more conspicuously than any other Nazi leader, advocated 'total war' . . . insisting that the civilian should fare no better than the soldier" (Goebbels 28). To create in the masses a desire to sacrifice for victory was the most important task of the propagandist.

An important element of the new mass propaganda was simplicity. George Creel, head of the CPI, began his work with the conviction that public opinion "has its base in reason, and that it expresses slow-formed convictions rather than any temporary excitement or any passing passion of the moment" (Vaughn 20). However, others in the CPI held less lofty opinions of the masses. The CPI's activities more often expressed a distrust of the common man's intellect. Walter Lippmann, one of the founders of the CPI, stated in his book, Public Opinion, that modern society had grown "too big, too complex, and too fleeting" for mankind's feeble powers of understanding. Most citizens, he believed, "are mentally children or barbarians. . . . The stream of public opinion is stopped by them in little eddies of misunderstanding, where it is discolored with prejudices and far-fetched analogy" (qtd. Kennedy 91). These are precisely the views expressed by Hitler in Mein

Kampf. The masses, Hitler believed, were simple, uninformed, and fickle (Mein Kampf 180). Their sentiment could be swayed by the skillful use of emotional appeal and by presenting arguments in simple, black and white terms. Goebbels was reported to have said that "Our propaganda is primitive because the people think primitively. We speak the language the people understand" (Goebbels 13).

The simplification of complex political realities was used by the British and Americans in their efforts to portray Germany as the sole culprit for war. This was accomplished through a relentless campaign to thoroughly vilify the Germans. The "Belgian atrocity stories," like most propaganda, were based (however weakly) in fact. The German invasion of Belgium demonstrated a brutal disregard for a neutral nation's integrity. Furthermore, documentation does support claims that widespread looting of Belgian homes and businesses and an appalling number of executions did occur under German occupation. However, stories of soldiers cutting off the hands of children, brutalizing the elderly and women, and committing other "sexual-sadistic outrages" were also spread. A government committee was appointed in England to "investigate" the stories by reviewing the depositions of expatriated Belgians and British soldiers who claimed to have knowledge of the atrocities. Diaries taken from dead or captured German soldiers were also to be used in the investigation. The committee was headed by Lord Bryce, a well-respected politician who had spent time in Germany and who was believed to have held no unreasonable prejudices toward the German people. The committee confirmed the atrocity stories and released its findings to the public in a widely-distributed pamphlet.

Although the public trusted that the Bryce committee

had thoroughly investigated the matter, in reality it had not interrogated a single witness. Instead, it had relied solely on information collected by "trained staff investigators at Scotland Yard" (Wilson 185). None of the soldiers' diaries revealed any support for the atrocity stories, other than several accounts of executions and rough treatment of some individuals. By officially confirming the atrocity stories, however, the government confirmed in most peoples' minds the belief that the German soldier was inhuman and the German High Command was evil incarnate. Combined with the true accounts of Zeppelin raids, the sinking of passenger liners, and the use of poison gas against British soldiers, the British argument of being the defenders of civilization against "the hun" were given great credence. The Bryce Report was printed as absolutely factual by the American press as well (Vaughn 73).

In the United States, George Creel, who had "impeccable credentials as a fire-breathing progressive reformer," at first stated that his Committee would be committed to "information and disclosure" (Kennedy 60). Creel even instructed his "Four-Minute Men," speakers employed by the CPI, to refrain from litanies of hate and rumor-mongering. The CPI stated categorically that it was the German government, not the German people, which it denounced. However, the CPI quickly fell into the habit of exploiting fear and the cruel nature of "Prussianism in all its horror" (Vaughn 70-73). By early 1918, the Four-Minute Men were given instructions to make frequent use of the atrocity stories (Kennedy 62). Teachers were asked to teach "war study courses" in which students were taught that the German army had perpetrated horrendous acts on the people of Belgium and France and that the United States fought them to prevent such atrocities from being committed in other countries. The black-and-white analysis

of the conflict was consistent. No "universal" factors like nationalism or imperialism, which would have indicated shared blame, were open for discussion. It was stated categorically in propaganda that the Allies wanted peace but the Germans had repeatedly rejected this option (Kennedy 56).

It was this merciless portrayal of the enemy as evil that Adolf Hitler admired. He states in Mein Kampf that it was absolutely wrong to make the enemy ridiculous, as the German and Austrian comic papers did. . . .By contrast, the war propaganda of the English and Americans was psychologically sound. By representing the Germans to their own people as barbarians and Huns, they prepared the individual soldier for the terrors of war. . . .After this, the most terrible weapon that was used against him seemed only to confirm what his propagandists had told him. (181)

Hitler was not hypocritical about his use of propaganda--he openly stated that its task "is not to make an objective study of the truth . . . its task is to serve its own right, always and unflinchingly" (Mein Kampf 182). These views were also held by Goebbels, who regularly fabricated stories about the atrocities committed by the Jews and Bolsheviks. Particular weight was put behind stories concerning ill treatment of German nationals outside the borders of the Fatherland, increasing the hatred and xenophobia which many Germans already felt for their Slavic neighbors (Goebbels 14).

## METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

In disseminating such stories and other propaganda messages, the Nazis displayed the same desire as their

World War I counterparts to use every available means of communication to relate their message to the masses. George Creel described the efforts of his agency:

There was no part of the great war machinery we did not touch, no medium of appeal we did not employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the signboard--all these were used in our campaign to make our people and all other people understand the cause that compelled America to take arms in defense of its liberties and free institutions. (qtd in Bruntz 32)

The Propaganda machines of England during World War I exhibited a remarkable amount of flexibility in their efforts to relate information to their own people as well as to the citizens of foreign countries. Although information was largely confined in the first two years of the war to pamphlets, meetings, posters, and the regulation of the news media, the latter years of the war saw a rapid increase in the use of the motion picture, popular pictorial magazines, and other novel vehicles to convey the war message. Like the Nazis, the British and Americans came to prefer techniques which stressed emotionalism rather than contemplation.

A striking correlation between the British and Nazi propaganda efforts was the effective use of the mass rally. The British enjoyed their first major propaganda successes at the mass rallies organized by the Parliamentary Recruitment Committee. In the spring of 1915, the PRC adopted a policy of "aggressive open-air propaganda." The Committee staged great pageants using military bands, motorized military equipment and skilled speakers to "heighten the emotional experience" (Sanders 103). Great care was taken to avoid saturating the public with such events. They were only periodically staged, although a

constant "information campaign" was maintained to keep interest going in the issues. The information campaigns "provided the backcloth against which the shorter, more frenzied emotive appeals could be performed" (Sanders and Taylor 104). The speaking campaigns of the Nazis were conducted in a similar fashion, as a constant bombardment of small gatherings and literature prepared the stage for the famous mass rallies (Doob 279).

Another means of direct, visual propaganda was the poster. By the time of the first World War, the poster had already been established as a means of persistent direct appeal to the masses. The British, however, took the use of the poster to higher levels. The most effective posters of the World War I era were characterized by striking images and simple written messages which the eye could catch in a moment. Millions of posters concerning recruitment, war production, conservation, and other goals were placed "in every available place from shop windows to country gateposts, from taxi cabs to trains and railway carriages" (Sanders and Taylor 104). The Americans in World War I employed shocking images of a barbarous enemy in posters designed to focus hatred on the enemy (Keen 39, 76). The Nazis also learned the lesson that "less is more" in poster art, printing simple but effective posters with bold images and curt messages. For example, the 1932 poster portraying the chiseled profiles of three SA troopers and captioned "National Socialism: the organized will of the nation" in bold capitals was evocative of the artistic principles developed in World War I (Zeman 34).

A revolution in visual propaganda occurred with the arrival of the motion picture. It became the medium of choice for propagandists during World War I. It proved to be one of the best means of influencing the masses, for it captured the attention of the public like nothing else. The

propaganda value of the motion picture was first realized in World War I by the Germans, who felt that stirring footage of military activity would arouse the public into contributing more to the war effort. The British, however, forbade the taking of military footage, which they feared could give valuable information to the enemy, until late in 1915. They then scored a major coup with the release of Britain Prepared, a documentary which showcased the various activities of the British army and navy. Trevor Wilson states that "its impact lay simply in its faithful record of the endeavors, and the courage, of Britain's soldiers." This film, which was a success in Britain, the United States, and in many other countries, was, like most British wartime movies, based strongly on the truth, although naturally slanted. Few British films made use of the atrocity stories and sensationalism that captured the minds of the public. One notable exception was Heart of the World, made in England by American director D.W. Griffith. This movie portrayed a French village which suffered under the cruel hand of German occupation (Wilson 738-39).

The production of American war movies also began on a positive note. President Wilson and the CPI enjoyed a good working relationship with the already substantial Hollywood movie industry. Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane told a group of exhibitors in 1917 that "upon no single institution do we rely more than upon the motion picture" (qtd in Campbell 68). The government, in cooperation with the various movie companies, produced a number of informative films on subjects such as food and coal conservation, the importance of labor, and other aspects of the war effort. Newsreels, as in England, remained popular throughout the war period (Campbell 68-71). However, as the war raged on, the American public

demanding more excitement in its cinematic fare. In keeping with its tendency to spread increasingly negative information about the Germans in speeches and printed matter, CPI began to promote movies of a more sensational sort. "The Committee," writes David Kennedy, "which early in the war had produced upbeat films like Pershing's Crusaders and Our Colored Fighters, turned to promoting movies like The Prussian Cur and The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin" (62). By the end of the war, the CPI had severely strained its once-pleasant relations with the movie industry, insisting on a wide policy of censorship to be undertaken by government agencies (Campbell 81).

The Nazis assigned even more importance to the cinema. They first experienced the potential of the motion picture during Hitler's brief alliance with Alfred Hugenberg, one of Germany's three largest publishers and major stockholder of UFA, a film company which also produced a weekly newsreel and owned a chain of theaters. Hugenberg, who had recently become the Chairman of the German National Party, gave Hitler favorable publicity through his news agencies and theaters (Zeman 28-29). This exposure whetted the Nazi appetite for control of the film industry, which was established after Hitler's ascendancy through the establishment of the "Provisional Film Chamber" (Zeman 48). Goebbels took a personal interest in film making. He was concerned not only with the dissemination of propaganda, but also with preventing the influences of "decadence" and Socialism from entering the movies, as they often had in the Weimar years (Willett 15, 95). In addition to these propagandist values, the theaters also generated a handsome profit for the state, which pleased Goebbels greatly (Goebbels 38). The government, which had a monopoly on film production and distribution in Germany, produced provocative movies with

political themes, several of which were successful. Jud Suss conveyed an anti-Semitic theme, Hitlerjunge Quex glorified the youth organization, and Friesennot portrayed the trials of Germans living outside of the country's borders (Zeman 47).

## THE PRESS AND THE QUESTION OF CENSORSHIP

In the case of manipulating the print media, the Nazis clearly desired a system of control similar to that used by the World War I Allies, but were at a great disadvantage to achieve such a system. In 1914 the British government was in an optimal position to use the press for propaganda purposes. Fleet Street was the source of a global cable network in 1914 (Sanders and Taylor 19). Newspapers across the globe were in some way dependent upon the British news agencies for information. England was therefore in a position to slant reports of the war in its favor, but the regulation of news was problematic for the British in the early days of the War. John Terraine describes the situation in the English coverage of the first days of the war:

There were no accredited War Correspondents; all news, whether from official or non-official sources, was filtered through the Press Bureau, headed by F.E. Smith . . . an organization hastily set up, heavily over-worked, and by no means clear about its functions. (52)

The arbitrary censorship of news irritated the British press, who, although mainly supportive of the war, resented being kept in the dark. With no precedents to follow, the Press Bureau botched its efforts to manipulate the news in the early days of the war. After sugar-coating French losses in the initial German drive, the Bureau allowed a grossly pessimistic report known as the "Amiens

Dispatch," written by the new correspondent in France, to be printed in the Times. The report greatly exaggerated British losses and generally sent the reading public into a panic. The government assured the public that such incidents would not occur again, and from that point on maintained a more cautious policy of censorship, supported by the public and most of the prominent newspapers.

British publications which did not comply with censorship laws could be prosecuted under the Defense of the Realm Act, but few actually were. Faced with the threat of being shut down, fined, or imprisoned, even those papers which contemplated an anti-government line "voluntarily" censored themselves and faithfully reported the material handed to them by the Government. Where the government line ended and independent commentary began was often not clear to the reader (Terraine 56). Under Lloyd George, newspapermen like Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Northcliffe were entrusted with the official propaganda machinery, further blurring the line between government and the press (Beaverbrook 268).

Meanwhile in the United States, George Creel reported that the CPI opposed censorship and coercion. Some years later, he reflected that "We had no authority, yet the American idea worked. And it worked better than any European law" (Kennedy 60-61). The American system of control was, as Creel suggested, "voluntary," but if one printed material that was deemed subversive, the government did not hesitate to prosecute under the Espionage Act or the Sedition Act, or at the very least, to deny second-class mailing privileges. Shortly after the United States entered the war, the CPI informed editors that if they had any doubts about material to be printed, it should be submitted for approval (Schaffer 13). Censorship was not in reality a widespread problem, since

most newspapers and magazines were supportive of the war, echoing the opinion of the majority of their readers. As one author has noted, "unpopular causes, no matter how righteous, earned no money and received scant attention." Only the reform-minded and radical publications were seriously repressed. Action had been taken against seventy-five such publications (forty-five of them Socialist) by the fall of 1918 (Petersen 93).

In contrast to the relative ease of control and cooperation in the print media which the American and British governments experienced in World War I, the Nazis were faced with serious disadvantages in this area. For the Nazis to gain a level of cooperation from the press comparable to that which the Allies enjoyed in World War I would require a much greater degree of coercion. First of all, the Nazi movement did not attract very many writers or journalists who possessed any talent whatsoever. Goebbels wrote as late as 1932 that "only a few flames are burning in Germany. The others only reflect their light. With the newspapers it's worst: we have the best speakers in the world, but we lack nimble and skillful pens" (qtd in Zeman 24). The Nazi ideology did not translate well into the printed word, either. Without the presence of the crowd, without the visual and auditory experience which the meetings provided, Nazi rhetoric sounded pitifully hollow and devoid of meaning. Hitler himself felt it best to acknowledge the weak nature of the early Nazi press in Mein Kampf. He writes that "as a total novice in the field of journalism, I sometimes had to pay dearly for my experience in those days." And although he later attempts to impress the reader with the figures of the growing circulation of the Völkischer Beobachter, the largest Party publication, his praises sound hollow (Hitler 591).

Until the successful elections of 1930, the Nazi press

remained quite small. At that late date the party ran only six dailies in all of Germany, five of which were located in Bavaria (Zeman 23-24). By 1933, the Nazis still had only 121 dailies and periodicals, and most of these had low circulations (Zeman 43). It was not until Hitler was firmly in power, in 1933, that the Nazis were able to begin their campaign to control the press. It would prove to be a daunting task.

In 1933 there were 4,703 newspapers of various political affiliations located throughout the country (Zeman 43). The Reichstag fire provided the opportunity to destroy all Communist and Socialist publications in the name of national security. The remainder of the papers were then subjected to the slow but steady tightening of the Nazi grip on the press. Goebbels reasoned that the Nazi takeover of the German press should be undertaken gradually and out of the sight of the public, in order to prevent a sudden shock to the habits of readers. The German news agencies were first "brought into line," in an effort to regulate the nature of news at its very source--an action similar to that taken by the British in 1914. Next, the nature of official press conferences, which had previously been open discussion sessions at which the government explained its positions to reporters, became simply opportunities for Goebbels to issue orders to the press (Goebbels 16-17).

The final step occurred on October 4, 1933, when the Reichstag passed a law which declared the office of editor to be an official position, not to be held by a non-German, a Jew, or the spouse of a Jew. More importantly, the law also placed editors under restrictions. They were not allowed to print any matter which could harm Germany's defense, economy, or culture, or which broke the rules of "good conduct." In other words, the Nazi system of censorship, like those found in the Allied nations in World

War I, was "voluntary," but with punishment for printing subversive material (Zeman 45). The definition of what was "subversive" grew broader with each passing year of Nazi domination.

Dr. Goebbels' reasoning for these actions is worthy of notice. He argued that unchecked free speech could threaten the good of the state, and that the extent of personal liberty should be determined by the amount of freedom that

can be enjoyed by the nation, and the freedom of the individual will be the narrower the greater the dangers are that temporarily threaten the state. In 1942, Goebbels defined what he meant by "temporary danger": truly free expression of opinion could not be allowed until the German people reached the "maturity" of the British--he estimated that this maturity should be reached in about one hundred years. (Zeman 46)

Although Goebbels' view of "temporary danger" is ridiculously broad (and not very temporary) the basic premise of his argument is the same as that used by the American and British authorities to explain their curtailment of civil liberties during World War I: in times of danger, unrestrained freedom can potentially create a situation dangerous to the stability of the state and to the common good of the people--the common citizen may not be responsible enough to safely exercise these freedoms.

## EXPORTED PROPAGANDA

Many of the methods which the Nazis used to spread propaganda at home were also used in their efforts to influence the citizens of foreign nations. However, if the Nazis felt that they could duplicate the success which

England and the United States enjoyed during World War I with their propaganda abroad, they were sadly mistaken. As Leonard Doob explained in 1935,

non-Germans . . . possess non-German attitudes which make Hitler's tactics both incomprehensible and distasteful. Local patriotism, a hatred of intolerance and persecution, love of democracy or socialism, a belief in freedom, these and many others have been some of the attitudes which the Third Reich has aroused in other peoples. Such attitudes prevent the individuals who have them from being sympathetic to Nazi pleas for understanding. (290)

The Nazis clearly felt insecure in the sphere of foreign relations. Few members of the Nazi leadership had any experience outside of Germany. Alfred Rosenberg, who had spent time as a student in Russia, and Rudolf Hess, who had been educated in Switzerland, were considered to be experts in foreign policy (Zeman 54). The Nazis lavished attention on the English in the pre-war years, since Hitler felt that they were Germany's natural ally against the Russians (Hitler 619). However, they received a cool reception there, as they did in the United States (Doob 290-301). An ambitious broadcasting program and efforts by German nationals residing in other countries aimed to sway foreign opinion, but after several years of failure, Goebbels lost hope in these campaigns. Goebbels felt little need even to try to befriend foreign correspondents in Berlin. As Louis P. Lochner stated, "Goebbels ignored the foreign press . . . since the overwhelming majority of the newsmen from other countries on duty in Berlin were critical, to say the least, of Nazism" (Goebbels 21). Although the Nazi regime was

to spend large sums of money on such efforts, its propaganda was never as effective abroad as it was at home.

#### DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS--THE VALUE OF PROPAGANDA CONSIDERED

Although the effectiveness of propaganda is difficult to measure, many critics doubt the value of propaganda in any circumstances. These individuals point out that propaganda which is not supported by reality is doomed to failure. This analysis certainly holds true when one compares the effectiveness of Allied and Nazi propaganda.

In World War I, states Trevor Wilson,

Ultimately, British propaganda was dependent on Allied successes. . . . To treat propaganda as a significant element in the achievement of victories, rather than victories as the major element in the success of propaganda, is to engage in a serious reversal of cause and effect. (747)

Nazi propaganda, as well, was only convincing when there were victories to back it up. By 1943, there was simply little good news to relate. The public was critical of Hitler's speech of April 27, 1942, when he criticized conditions at home and called for a second winter campaign in Russia. As Zeman put it, "The public image of the Fuhrer had been that of a harbinger of success and of military glory. When there were no victories to announce, his powers as a speaker began to fail him" (173). Goebbels begrudgingly reveals a grim realization of the ineffectiveness of propaganda when the people see the evidence of defeat all around them. Traces of this realization can be found throughout his diaries, which cover the period of 1942-1943.

But what about propaganda's role in the Nazi rise to power? The Nazis did not experience significant success until the Great Depression drove many Germans to desperation. Propaganda helped them to gain support in 1932 and 1933, but even after the Reichstag fire, when the Nazis' rivals had been subject to repression and the regime had gained control of the airwaves, the Nazis were still not able to win a clear majority in the March 1933 elections--only with the addition of the National Party's fifty-two delegates were they able to control the Reichstag. It must be concluded that even the best propaganda machines, as advanced as those of the Allies in World War I and of the Nazis in the pre-World War II period, cannot work miracles. Illusion is ultimately no substitute for reality.

### CONCLUSION

The striking similarities between Allied propaganda in World War I and the propaganda of the Nazis may indicate a conscious effort on the part of Hitler and Goebbels to imitate a successful system of mass persuasion. However, a number of factors make this determination difficult. The Nazis sought to revolutionize society, whereas the Allies were primarily concerned with the war effort. The absence of professional literary talent in the Nazi ranks and the general distrust for the Nazis held by the German media meant that a tighter grip on the press was required to control it than in the Allied nations during World War I. The Nazis' peculiarly German message was difficult to convey to non-German audiences, but the Allies' goals of stopping militarism were easily translatable.

The similar methods of disseminating propaganda used by the Nazis and by the Allies may simply show a common desire to utilize every method available for this

purpose. However, the fact that Goebbels and Hitler were absolutely convinced that propaganda was essential to the success of the Nazi regime suggests that they would have studied the systems which they felt had defeated their "superior" armies in World War I. This assumption, when taken with the methodological similarities of Nazi and Allied propaganda, seem strong enough to suggest a definite correlation between the two programs.

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## Early Influences on the Personal and Political Development of Winston Spencer Churchill

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When examining the extraordinary life of Sir. Winston Leonard Spenser Churchill, one cannot help but wonder what factors contributed to the development of his extremely successful political career. Any examination of Winston Churchill, the politician, must begin with an examination of Winston Churchill, the individual. Accordingly, this paper will explore Churchill's early life, from his birth in 1874 until the eve of World War I in 1914, in an attempt to uncover the major individuals and experiences which influenced his personal and political development.

The world in which Winston Churchill grew and developed was the Late Victorian age, a chaotic and turbulent time in which the austerity of Victorian society was shattered by the trends of a rapidly changing world. Winston Leonard Spenser Churchill was conspicuously born into this era of change on November 30, 1874, on a pile of silk hats, velvet capes, and feather boas in the cloakroom of Blenheim Palace, ancestral home of the Churchill family. The child of Lord Randolph Churchill and Lady Jennie Jerome Churchill, an American from New

York City, Winston was born into one of the oldest and most prestigious families in Great Britain. Winston's father, Lord Randolph Churchill, was the younger son of John Winston Spenser Churchill, the Seventh Duke of Marlborough who was himself a direct descendant of John Churchill, the First Duke of Marlborough. John Churchill was a hero of Queen Anne's War who not only commanded British and allied troops against the armies of Louis XIV but who kept the Grand Alliance against the French together through his formidable diplomatic skills. In return for his services to the crown he was made the First Duke of Marlborough by Queen Anne in 1704 (Ausubel, The Late Victorians 192-240).

The reputation of the Churchill family was such that the fame of Lord John Churchill was often seen in stark contrast to the infamy of his descendant Lord Randolph Churchill, the father of Winston Churchill. Lord Randolph, a member of Disraeli's conservative government fell from grace due to an argument with the Prince of Wales, the future King Edward VII (James 47-72).

After a period of exile in Ireland, Lord Randolph returned to England to join the Conservative opposition in fighting Gladstone's new government which had come to power in 1880. However, Lord Randolph attacked not just Gladstone's Liberals but the leaders of his own Conservative party whom he felt had betrayed him. He and a small group of radicals known as "The Fourth Party" attempted to reform and rejuvenate the old Conservative Tory party. After surviving several political battles Lord Randolph was rewarded in 1886 by the new Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, with the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer. However, after only several months in office, Lord Randolph was shamefully forced to resign due

to tiff with Lord Salisbury over the size of the military's budget (Rowse, The Later Churchill 285-326).

Both the triumphs of John Churchill, the First Duke of Marlborough, and the political exploits of Lord Randolph Churchill had a great impact on the development of young Winston Churchill, influencing him in later life to turn first to the military and later to politics. In fact, throughout much of his early political career Winston maintained the same political views as his father, namely a belief in Conservative Victorian policies, laissez faire economics, isolationism, democracy, and a small military (Pelling 88-90). Lord Randolph's influence over Winston's personal and political development was so critical that Winston once stated,

The greatest and most powerful influence in my early life was, of course, my father. Although I talked to him so seldom and never for a moment on equal terms I conceived an intense admiration and affection for him; and after his early death, for his memory. . . . I took my politics unquestioningly from him. (Cowles 75)

Churchill's burning desire to emulate his predecessors is somewhat ironic, given his lonely upbringing where, in traditional Victorian fashion, he was separated from his parents (Cowles 28-29). Churchill's burning desire to emulate members of his family, despite their aloofness, revealed in him a strong sense of destiny. In a traditionally quixotic fashion Churchill believed that he was part of a great family and that, like his ancestors, he had a duty to achieve great things. He therefore developed a constant sense of urgency and destiny with which he pursued his political career (Brendon 4-5).

One of Churchill's greatest goals in life was to impress his father. However this goal was cut short by

Lord Randolph Churchill's death in January 1895. Nevertheless, Winston geared his political career in such a way that he supported many of his father's old issues and relied on many of his father's old political allies for advice. It was as if, even after Lord Randolph's death, Churchill still wished for his father to be proud of him (Pelling 297-98).

However, Churchill was not influenced by only the male members of his family. Two women played a large role in his life at this time, the first being his mother Lady Jennie Jerome Churchill. Lady Jennie was an American, whose father, Leonard Jerome, was a Wall Street investor and quintessential sportsman who made and lost several fortunes throughout his life. After her marriage to Lord Randolph, Jennie became part of the Victorian high society. She became heavily involved with both her husband's political career and the social functions of the British upper class and consequently had little time to spend with her son Winston. Despite her initial distance from her son, Lady Jennie played a critical role in Winston's life by using her social connections and influence to further her son's political career. As Churchill later wrote of her, "she [Lady Jennie Churchill] soon became an ardent ally, furthering my plans and guarding my interests with all her influence and boundless energy" (Churchill 62).

The other woman who heavily influenced young Churchill was his childhood nurse and constant companion, Mrs. Everest. It was Mrs. Everest who provided young Winston with the warmth and spontaneous love which he did not receive from his parents. Young Winston deeply loved Mrs. Everest and often disregarded Victorian morality by showing public displays of emotion for her. Her death in 1895 deeply affected him by hardening his character, making him grim and cynical, and heightening

his sense of ambition (Brendon 20).

In addition to his family, Churchill was also heavily influenced by his early educational experiences. After a somewhat lonely childhood spent first in Ireland and then in England, at age seven Churchill reluctantly began his formal education at St. James, a prestigious and expensive prep school. Much as his father had rebelled against the rigidity of the British political system, so young Winston rebelled against the conformity of St. James by making poor grades and refusing to learn subjects such as Latin or Greek. He was beaten frequently for his insolence but refused to give in, thus showing the stubbornness which would become a characteristic of his later political career (Cowles 28-41).

After two years at St. James, Churchill was sent to a much gentler school near Brighton where he was influenced by popular adventure novels such as King Solomon's Mines and Allan Quartermain by H. Rider Haggard (with whom young Winston personally corresponded) and Treasure Island by Robert Louis Stevenson, which presented glamorous pictures of imperialism. These books whetted young Churchill's appetite for adventure and influenced his decision to pursue a military career (Cowles 30-31).

Churchill continued to perform poorly academically, making it into the public school, Harrow, only because of his father's influence. At Harrow he was placed in English classes which taught him the writing and vocabulary skills which were to play a critical role in his later success as a war correspondent, biographer, and a politician (Cowles 33-37). Despite his academic failures and unpopularity with other students at Harrow, young Churchill continued to remain extremely self-assertive and stubborn. Like his father, Lord Randolph, young Winston remained an

ungentlemanly "cad" and a social outsider (Brendon 13-14).

In 1893, after five years at Harrow, Churchill decided to embark on a military career. With encouragement from his father, Churchill applied to Sandhurst, being rejected twice before gaining acceptance. The physical, athletic lifestyle of Sandhurst appealed to Winston, as did its military camaraderie. Although Winston enjoyed physical work, he disliked the endless drilling and regimentation of military life. Perhaps the single most important influence in Churchill's life at this time was his desire for military adventure. While at Sandhurst he came to dislike the peace and stability of the Victorian era and wished for adventure and excitement. Longing for military campaigns similar to those of the Napoleonic Wars, Churchill eagerly looked to the British colonies as a source of escapism (Churchill 43-45).

In 1895, Churchill graduated from Sandhurst with honors and was commissioned in the Queen's 4th Hussars regiment. Because of his desire to see live military action, Churchill went to Cuba in 1897 as a war correspondent for the *Daily Graphic* to witness the ongoing armed conflict between the Spanish military and the Cuban resistance forces. In Cuba, Churchill received his first military experience and began to develop and refine his conservative beliefs concerning imperialism and nationalism (Churchill 82).

Churchill returned to England with the unique distinction of having been one of the few young British soldiers to have seen recent military action. In 1896 Churchill's regiment, the 4th Hussars, was sent to Bangalore, India. Churchill embarked for India with a firm conviction in British imperial policy and "her [England's] high mission to rule these primitive but agreeable races for their welfare and our own" (Churchill

104).

While Churchill's regiment was stationed in Bangalore, he began to read voraciously in an attempt to make up for his lack of a formal, university education and to prepare himself for a future career in politics. He read and was greatly influenced by books such as Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Macaulay's The Lays of Ancient Rome, Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Malthus' works on economics and population, Darwin's Origin of Species, and Winwood Reade's Martyrdom of Man. Traditional British authors such as Gibbon, Macaulay, and Malthus reinforced Winston's already Conservative opinions of history and morality while intellectuals such as Reade introduced him to a more modern, secular, and materialistic philosophy which combined a faith in technology and a belief in evolutionary fatalism (Brendon 22-23).

It was during his participation in reprisal raids under the command of Sir Bindon Blood against Pathen tribesman in 1897 that Churchill began to see war as something more than a game. At one point he remarked, "I saw for the first time the anxieties, stresses, and perplexities of war. It was not apparently all a gay adventure. We were already in jeopardy; and anything might happen" (Churchill 146). He also began to see war not in terms of heroic cavalry charges but of attrition tactics. At this point Churchill began to develop a military philosophy based upon the ancient Roman belief of 'Spare the conquered and wear down the proud' (Churchill 331). Churchill came to believe that governments should use total force in times of war and exercise whatever means were necessary to insure victory, while remaining conciliatory to the defeated, thereby maintaining a system of redress for grievances but doing so only from a position of strength. Churchill

therefore came to believe that maintaining the general order was far more important than the considerations of individuals or groups of individuals. This newly discovered policy of total force in times of war and reconciliation in times of peace was to affect Churchill's strategic thinking in later wars. As Churchill once wrote, "I have always urged fighting wars . . . till overwhelming victory, and then offering the hand of friendship to the vanquished" (Churchill 330-31).

Churchill's next military campaign occurred in 1898, when he arranged a transfer to an expeditionary force in the Sudan under the command of Lord Kitchener. Kitchener, who considered Churchill a "pushy" young medal-hunter, attempted to keep him out of the campaign. However, Churchill won out in the end due to the influence of his mother with the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, who intervened on his behalf. Churchill participated in the Battle of Omdurman in the Sudan where he took human life for the first time, remarking later with casual detachment how easy it was to kill a man. The Sudan Campaign influenced Churchill because it showed him the advantage of superior military technology against a fanatical enemy and the virtues of a strong defense. The Sudan campaign also allowed Churchill to publish a book about the campaign entitled The River War whose success made him financially independent and allowed him to leave the army and turn to politics.

Churchill entered politics in 1899 as a Conservative member of the Tory Party. Although already famous because he was the son of Lord Randolph, Churchill was also popular because of his military exploits, the successes of his books, and his career as a war correspondent. However, despite his fame, Churchill lost his first political campaign, a parliamentary by-election in 1899 for the

district of Oldham, to a Liberal candidate. Although Churchill's first brush with politics was unsuccessful it was a beneficial experience for it taught him political skills, such as how to rely on pre-written speeches and how to manipulate crowds (Brendon 33).

Churchill's budding political career was interrupted when the Boer War broke out in the fall of 1899. Seeing the potential publicity the war could bring to his career, Churchill at once signed on as a war correspondent for the *Morning Post* and departed for South Africa. Although wiser from his experiences in India and the Sudan, Churchill still looked to the Boer War as a chance for adventure and fame. He was also driven by his sense of self-importance and destiny, which he felt compelled him to seek out adventure and conflict (Pelling 59-60).

Churchill found plenty of adventure in South Africa when, in November, 1899, he was captured by the Boers and imprisoned in Pretoria, the Boer Capital of the Transvaal. The boredom of prison life frustrated Churchill and he soon escaped and fled south. With the help of Pro-British sympathizers, he was able to rejoin British forces. The tale of Churchill's capture and subsequent escape made him famous. Although he became unpopular in some circles for newspaper articles in which he praised the fighting ability of the Boers, declared them to be superior to British troops, and called for a war of attrition in South Africa, Churchill emerged from the Boer War as one of the most celebrated men in England (Cowles 57-67).

Churchill's sudden fame allowed him to launch a new career as a lecturer and politician. During the "Khaki" election of 1900 in which the Conservative party defeated the Liberals and returned to power, Churchill again ran as a Conservative candidate for the Oldham district seat in Parliament and, with the endorsement of Colonial Secretary

Joseph Chamberlain, won by 260 votes. In 1901 Churchill took his seat as a "backbencher" in Parliament. He was inevitably compared to his father and many members of Parliament speculated as to whether or not young Winston would make the same political mistakes his father had. Despite attempts at moderation, Churchill's ambitious and unconventional personality (a trait which he shared with his father) combined with his sense of family piety eventually led him to embrace his father's political opinions. As Virginia Cowles states, "The only thing he [Churchill] lacked was a political theme, but this was easily remedied. He turned to his father's writings for guidance" (Cowles 76).

Churchill was so influenced by his father that he came not only to support Lord Randolph's political views but to try to emulate his father's personality and mannerisms. Although Churchill was one of the youngest, most energetic, and ambitious members of Parliament, he preached outdated, traditional Victorian political ideals such as a strong empire, a small military, an isolationist policy towards the rest of Europe, free trade, and no increases in personal income tax. His political views, like those of his father, were romantic, simplistic, classically Victorian, and behind the times. While defending Conservative policies such as the Boer War, Churchill became a rival of Liberal members of Parliament such as young David Lloyd George, who was later to have a tremendous impact on Churchill's political career (Pelling 68-70).

Churchill might have remained a Conservative backbencher throughout his entire career if his own ambition and desire for advancement had not outweighed his sense of family loyalty. The Conservative government at the time was dominated by well established political figures such as the Marquis of Salisbury, Sir Michael

Hicks-Beach, and Joseph Chamberlain who rigidly controlled party patronage and advancement. For newcomers, such as Churchill, there was little room for political advancement within the party ranks. Because Churchill was considered by many senior Conservatives to be an unconventional maverick and the son of the infamous Lord Randolph Churchill, his chances for advancement in the Conservative Party appeared slim (Cowles 89-91).

Therefore, from 1900-1904, Churchill's political loyalties began to drift from Conservative and Unionist to Liberal. Although Churchill and Conservatives quarreled over issues such as the size and strength of the British army (Churchill, like his father, supported a small military) the final split between Churchill and the Conservative party came about over the issue of free trade. In 1903 Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain argued over attempts to create a system of high tariffs but was opposed by Churchill who favored free trade. Consequently, Churchill was disowned by his Conservative Oldham district constituents and refused the Conservative Whip. By May, 1904, he had firmly joined the Liberal Party, infuriating many Conservatives in the process (Brendon 39-40).

In the general election of 1905 a new Liberal government came to power led by Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. In January 1906, Churchill ran for the North-West Manchester seat in Parliament as a Liberal candidate and, despite intense opposition, won the election and took his place in a Liberal-dominated House of Commons. Churchill rapidly began to advance through the ranks of the Liberal party, turning down the prestigious post of Financial Secretary to the Treasury in order to become the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies. In keeping with his personal philosophy of conciliation towards defeated enemies, Churchill supported

the subjugated Boer Republics in South Africa who had been defeated and annexed by Britain in 1900, by fighting for a policy which would give them fully responsible self-government within the Empire (Brendon 44-46).

Despite setbacks, Churchill's political career continued to develop. In 1907 he was made a Privy Councillor, and in 1908, with the death of Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman, became President of the Board of Trade. Churchill suffered a minor setback when he lost a North-West Manchester district by-election to a coalition of Conservatives and Suffragettes such as Emeline Pankhurst and her daughters, Cristabel and Sylvia, who correctly assumed that the traditionalist Churchill would never truly support their movement. However, Churchill was soon reelected to Parliament by winning the Parliamentary seat of the strongly Liberal district of Dundee in Scotland (Pelling 110-13).

Churchill's political accomplishments were paralleled by successes in his personal life in 1908 when Churchill became married to Clementine Ogilvy. Although Churchill's relationship with Clementine was very close and Clementine shared her husband's interest in politics, he seldom listened to her advice on political matters (Brendon 47-49). Churchill's life was also influenced by his friendship with F. E. Smith, a conservative Tory who supported Churchill several times against his own party. Smith, who later became Lord Birkenhead, wielded tremendous personal influence over Churchill and the friendship between the two revealed Churchill's ability to transcend party politics for the sake of friendship (Brendon 112).

The Liberal party of which Churchill was now a member continued to dominate the government from 1906 until 1915. This Liberal era brought rapid political change

including a decline in the power of the House of Lords and the rise of social democracy. At this time, the two most famous and controversial young radical members of the Liberal party were Winston Churchill and his former opponent, David Lloyd-George. Lloyd-George was a Welsh barrister, a self-made man, an advocate of social democracy, and a hater of the upper classes. He was the social opposite of Churchill who was by birth a member of the aristocracy, very conservative in terms of the role of the government in society, imperialistic in outlook, and romantic by nature (Cowles 121-22).

However, despite their different class backgrounds, Churchill and Lloyd-George were able to become close friends because of their similar natures, motives, and desires. What made the two men compatible was Churchill's amazing ability to adapt to the Liberal party without completely compromising his Conservatism. Churchill was able to do this for several reasons: he felt that the Conservative party had betrayed him (just as it had betrayed his father); his views on a small military coincided with the Liberal party's anti-imperialist views; and his political ambition allowed him to make the transition from a supporter of Social Darwinism to a social reformer.

Despite their differences Lloyd-George wielded considerable influence over Churchill because he had the amazing ability to convince the stubborn Churchill to support his liberal policies. Thus, Churchill's reputation as a liberal reformer came primarily from Lloyd-George's influence (Cowles 138-41). However, eventually, ideological conflicts between Lloyd-George and Churchill arose due to their different backgrounds and beliefs. While Lloyd-George was conscious of the tremendous gap between the wealthy and the poor in Great Britain and

wished to use social democracy to promote social reform, Churchill had more limited goals and saw himself as a savior of the poor who would fight poverty through charity and benevolence (Pelling 158-59).

The years 1908-1911 marked the height of Churchill's career as a Liberal radical, a reformer, and an isolationist. Aided by social reformers such as Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Churchill helped to create the Trade Boards Act of 1909 which set minimum wages and maximum hours for certain industries, founded a Labour Exchanges Board where the unemployed could register for jobs and employers could apply for workers, and introduced a government-sponsored insurance bill which provided relief payments for working-class laborers who lost their jobs (Dictionary of National Biography 195-96).

While fighting for funding for their social reform programs, Churchill and Lloyd-George came into conflict with Conservatives who wanted to appropriate money for military expenditures in an arms race against Germany, particularly for the development of huge armored battleships known as Dreadnoughts. Consequently, Lloyd-George created a budget designed to pay for both military and social reform programs by greatly increasing the income tax rate for the upper classes, particularly for the landed aristocracy who controlled the House of Lords. Despite his aristocratic background, Churchill supported Lloyd-George's budget by speaking out against the wealth and privilege of the upper classes. Churchill came to be hated by many members of the aristocracy who considered him a traitor to his class (Brendon 52-55).

As a result of Lloyd-George's budget, a huge political battle between the House of Commons and the House of Lords occurred in which the Lords resisted fiercely, capitulating only when the King personally intervened and

threatened to swamp the House of Lords with additional members who would be loyal to him. The result was the Reform Bill of 1911, which forbade the House of Lords to veto Bills involving money, allowing them to delay only non-money bills in passage (Arnstein 219-25).

Although the Reform Bill of 1911 allowed Churchill to strike out against the upper classes who had scorned him while still remaining true to his father's isolationist beliefs, he had too much political ambition to allow himself to be permanently labeled a Liberal extremist. Therefore, after 1910, Churchill became less radical and attempted to act as a moderator between opposing parties. His sense of ruthless ambition allowed him to avoid the political mistakes his father had made by becoming increasingly less radical as he advanced in power and office (Pelling 396-97).

Churchill continued to increase in political power and was appointed Home Secretary in February, 1910. As Home Secretary, Churchill ran into difficulties when his Victorian upbringing, which emphasized maintaining order and subordination of individuals, contrasted with the rights and needs of minorities. As an aristocrat, Churchill had never felt totally comfortable with social reform programs which stressed the rights and welfare of the individual as opposed to the ancestral privileges of the aristocracy (Cowles 107-8).

Churchill's views on public order were expressed in November 1910, when he called in military troops to help suppress a coal miner's strike in Wales. Miners, many of them Welsh and Irish, gathered in large groups to protest low wages and abysmal working conditions. Instead of attempting to deal with the issue diplomatically, Churchill treated the situation similar to a Pathan tribal uprising by calling in police and military forces to deal with the

situation. Fighting eventually broke out between striking miners and government forces who beat the miners with rolled-up Mackintoshes. Although his strong actions helped to contain the situation and prevent an excess of violence, Churchill was criticized by Liberals for using force against the miners and by Conservatives for not using enough force to crush the protesters. Churchill's sense of adventure and desire for excitement also got him into trouble during the "Siege of Sidney Street" incident in London in which he acted rashly by personally leading military troops in the capture of two anarchists. Churchill's impulsiveness and impropriety in these situations hurt his reputation by making him appear as a reckless, militant-minded adventurer (Pelling 130-46).

However, instead of curbing his reactive tendencies Churchill continued to take a direct role in causes he felt were important. Driven by his ever-present sense of destiny, self-importance, and desire for adventure, Churchill, in 1911, made one of his most radical political moves. Alarmed by the rapidly growing strength and power of Germany, Churchill broke away from the pacifist and isolationist ideals of his father and Lloyd-George and pushed for a military buildup. Whereas before, Churchill had seen his destiny to avenge his father politically, and, later, to help the poor of England, he now felt his duty was to defend England from the growing menace of Germany. Churchill was partially supported by Lloyd-George who, despite his anti-military tendencies, also favored a strong stance against German aggression (Cowles 151).

At this point in Churchill's personal and political career he appeared to have reverted to his old adventurous tendencies. He was exhilarated by the sense of danger brought about by the possibility of war with Germany and became obsessed with the growing conflict between the two

countries. Because of his sense of destiny and brash self-confidence, Churchill came to believe that the lucky circumstances of his political career had been building up to some great purpose and that the moment for which he was destined was rapidly approaching (Dictionary of National Biography 197).

In 1911 Churchill was made First Lord of the Admiralty. Despite severe opposition from the Naval High Command, he began reorganizing the British navy, so Great Britain would be able to respond to a German threat at a moment's notice. Some of Churchill's naval policies included the construction of sophisticated battleships known as Dreadnoughts and the conversion of British ships from coal to oil. In effect, Churchill created a modernized British navy which seemed to be only an extension of his own forceful personality.

Churchill's new militaristic policies cost him the support of many Liberals, including Lloyd-George, who wanted to negotiate with Germany before resorting to force. In an attempt to appease them, Churchill came out in favor of Irish Home Rule, a favorite Liberal issue. In this situation, Churchill's burning political ambition overcame his traditional beliefs of imperial unity and a dislike of Irish Home Rule extremism, causing him to speak out in favor of Irish Home Rule. However, his rashness hurt his public image, especially among Northern Irish Protestant MPs from Ulster who were afraid of becoming a minority if the Catholic Irish were to receive Home Rule (Cowles 167-70).

Churchill's involvement in the Home Rule movement was soon overshadowed by larger international events. On July 24, 1914, Serbian terrorists assassinated the Austrian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, and started a chain of circumstances which led to the First World War. Churchill

responded immediately in early August by mobilizing the British navy on his own initiative. While the British government debated whether or not to intervene, Churchill continually pushed for direct military action against Germany. On August 4, 1914, Germany invaded Belgium, and at midnight on August 4, Britain found itself at war with Germany (Arnstein 242-45). Churchill entered the war enthusiastically, becoming swept up in the torrent of the First World War which carried him forever away from the realms of Victorian politics and, subsequently, beyond the range of this paper.

Therefore, after analyzing Churchill's early life in an attempt to understand the factors which influenced his political development, we can detect a number of inherent personality traits and external influences which contributed his political and personal growth. By listing and describing these influences, some of which we have previously touched upon, we can gain a greater insight into Winston Churchill as an individual.

To begin, Churchill was definitely a social product of the time into which he was born. Through the influence of his family and friends Churchill came to accept the upper-class values of the middle and late-Victorian periods which included a belief in imperial unity, stability, order, honor, duty, patriotism, the sacrifice of individuals for the greater good of the Empire, and the inherent superiority of British civilization. However, although Churchill came to idolize the values and pageantry of the British upper class, he was never able to become a permanent part of this class. His relationship to his infamous father, his stubbornness and pride, his outspokenness, his dislike of conformity, and his ungentlemanly manner always kept him from becoming a full member of polite society. It is even possible that Churchill was infatuated with Victorian society because for

him it represented an unattainable goal. Certainly his dislike of those aristocratic Conservatives, whom he felt had betrayed him, was a definite factor in his switch from the Conservative to the Liberal party. In any case, although Churchill remained at heart an aristocrat, his detachment from the conservative Victorian elite may have been the factor which allowed his political career to continue long after the Victorian era had ended (Brendon 114-15).

Another set of major influences in the maturation of Winston Churchill were the people in his life. Members of his family such as Lord Randolph, Lady Jennie, Clementine, and his ancestor John Churchill critically affected Churchill both personally and politically. Whereas Lord Randolph and John Churchill provided the inspiration and sense of family loyalty which inspired Churchill to achieve greatness, it was Lady Jennie and Clementine who worked tirelessly to build his political career. Churchill was also heavily affected by close friends such as Mrs. Everest, Lord Salisbury, David Lloyd-George, F. E. Smith, Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Bindon Blood, and countless others. Even Churchill's opponents and rivals such as Lord Kitchener, A. J. Balfour, and Emmeline Pankhurst helped to shape Churchill's own personal and political beliefs.

However, Churchill's political career was not only influenced externally by others, but was affected by his own internal personality and beliefs. One of Churchill's strongest personality traits was his unquenchable desire for adventure and excitement and dislike of conformity and laziness which drew him first to the military and then to politics. As the Editor of the British *Daily News* once stated,

For with all his rare qualities, Mr. Churchill

is the type of "the Gentleman of fortune." He is out for adventure. He follows politics as he would follow the hounds. He has no animus against the fox but he wants to be in "at the kill" . . . not so much concerned about who the enemy may be or about the merits of the quarrel as about being in the thick of the fight and having a good time. (Cowles 119)

Churchill's sense of adventure revealed in him a strong streak of romanticism and drama. This idealism, inspired by Victorian ideals of adventure and his family's own fascinating history, led Churchill to develop a belief in personal destiny. By examining the sometimes lucky circumstances of his career, Churchill's sense of drama led him to believe that like his predecessors, he too was destined for greatness (Brendon 4-5).

This belief in destiny greatly influenced Churchill, for it caused him to pursue his public career with ruthless ambition. He was not above using any and every means at his disposal to advance his political career. Churchill used his father's reputation, his mother's social and even sexual contacts, his friends' generosity, and his rivals' mistakes to further his political career. He portrayed himself alternatively as a Conservative, a Liberal, a social reformer, an imperialist, a supporter of Irish Home Rule, an isolationist, and a militant nationalist, whenever it suited him to do so. Although Churchill at times overreacted and made irrational political mistakes, his overall career was managed with an almost Machiavellian sense of efficiency (Brendon 35-49).

Churchill's bluntness in political matters applied not only to his own career but to his military, political, and social policies. Although personally a compassionate person, he was not above sacrificing the rights and even

lives of other people for what he considered to be the greater good. This trend is shown in his decision to use force against the Welsh coal miners and his call for a war of attrition against the Boers. This sense of sacrifice and grim determination may have been one of the greatest influences of Churchill's political career, allowing him to lead Great Britain successfully through the Second World War (Dictionary of National Biography 195).

In conclusion, after an examination of Winston Churchill's personal life and political career we can see that his development was influenced by a variety of factors. Although random luck, timing, prestige, and family influence obviously played a critical role in Churchill's rise to power, his personal history reveals a general trend of hard work, intense ambition, and personal accomplishments which reveal him to be an extraordinary individual.

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## Creative Theory: Fictionalism as an Application

*Stephen Nickson*

*In fiction lies the truth.*

--Stephen Nickson's *Senior Seminar Journal*,  
Tuesday, September 29th.

"I don't ever feel obligated in my fiction to tell the truth."

--John Irving

"Which story do you like better?"

--T. S. Garp

"I want the truth," Helen said, sleepily. "What happened to the damn schnauzer?"

--Helen Garp

"I'll just cut to the quick; read the endnotes and you'll get more out of it."

--*Stephen Nickson, Creative Theory:  
Fictionalism as an Application*

It all started in my mind--these ideas of what to write

about. It is behind my eyes that truth, fiction, and all the other vaguely constructed boundaries of literature bash into the walls of my mind, like so many bugs who meet their maker after fusing their brains with the windshield of my 1965 Volkswagen Beetle. I flick on the wipers to clear the glass, but instead of improving my vision, the little rubber blades smear the splotches of moth, bee, and a variety of other fleshy bullets into a grey, opaque funk.

It happens so many times here, in my car--these ideas of what to write about. I almost mated my Beetle with a Ford Pinto at the 459 on-ramp while I was scribbling down these ideas. These ideas, these images--a beetle mating with a horse, or is it a restored, antique car crashing into an old rust-bucket with stale donuts for wheels and last week's newspaper for its driver-side window?--are here, on this paper, now in your mind.

It's convenient that you invited me in, otherwise my points wouldn't be made. As long as you are reading these words I'm here in your eyes, floating around, bouncing off the walls of your brain, spray-painting them with my linguistic graffiti. I have "imagized" myself into these layers of images and metaphors--*these letters and these words and these italics for emphasis*--and your mind makes them real.<sup>1</sup>

This penetration, especially when I as a male writer define it as such, is rather unsettling, is it not? To be made aware of the writer's cognizance of your reading is a rather eerie feeling. But it is all still fiction. I am not really aware of your reading right now; I am probably asleep, taking a shower, eating, or performing some other kind of civilized procrastination that helps me avoid working on a revision of this paper. But I was with you for a moment. I was there. It was *real*, but it was not *true*, and all within this, an academic paper. So it is with

fiction.

So can something be true but not real? What I really mean to say is that although I feel that all the things that have happened to me are fair to use in my fiction, *use* them is what I do. By that I mean I really use them very ruthlessly; I don't ever feel obligated in my fiction to tell the truth. The truth of what's happened to me is mostly irrelevant to what I write about. (Irving-McCaffery 2)

Thank you, Mr. Irving. Why should I go through the excruciating process of writing something about an idea when that idea has already been expressed so exquisitely, yet succinctly, by people like you. Now people understand what I was trying to get across and I can get on with what has so far been categorized as an essay.

Now let's go back to my car: I was pulling into a parking space near my apartment; two people were riding with me and we were discussing this paper, and because of the distraction, my left-front tire bit into the curb.

"I knew that was going to happen," I said.

"So that makes it all right," Garp said.<sup>2</sup>

"No, not necessarily. Just because you know something is going to happen, or because you know it's happening, and just because you are conscious of it, and you are able to make other people conscious of your awareness, that doesn't make it acceptable," I said.

"I know. That was my point," he said, rather irritated.

"Yeah, I know, and I really didn't know that it-- (speaking, of course, of the tire's unanticipated collision with the curb)--was going to happen," I said.

"Nor did you know that was my point," he said. "By the way, When did you learn to speak in parentheses?"

"I don't know. I just. . . I am starting to wonder if I know anything at all."

"Me, too," said Garp. "How can you expect people to take you seriously as a writer if you're such a know-it-all hypocrite? In my writing, I take a point and stick to it, driving it home like a nail between your eyes."

"I'm afraid you're not quite as effective under my omnipotence, Garpy. And you're terminal with Mr. Irving, thank God."

"That's right . . . now just a second you omnipotent bast. . ."

"Now what you said," interjected Helen, "that about the knowing and the being aware; that could be applied almost every text in post-contemporary fiction. It really irritates me that just because Fellini, Fowles, Kundera, and for that matter Hemingway and Irving come out and tell you that they know you think they are misogynists and bigots, that they even artistically admit it, then that it makes it all right."<sup>3</sup>

"Yeah, that bothers me, too," I said.

"You're just as guilty," Garp said. "See? The self-conscious hypocrite: A person who admits they are wrong, points out the wrong in others, and continues to do it, even to do it well, and thus somehow get away with it."

"Thanks," I said, feeling damned. "I suppose that's why they developed critical theory: to point out self-conscious justification of inherent inadequacies. The premise is that self-consciousness makes it all right. It's cow dung, and we all know it; it's just that sometimes we are suckered into forgetting that cow dung is still dung, no matter how many roses grow out of it."

"By the way, Garpy, have you read what critical theory says about you? I'm afraid you're not going to win the 'Mr. Congeniality' award from Janice Doane."

"Yeah, but that's o.k. Like you say, I only exist in your mind and in the world of the text. And that reminds me; isn't this violating some kind of copyright law?"

For me, all of this conversation is true, because I had it within my mind, but it never actually--that is, orally--occurred. Therefore it is not real; it is imagination. But it is true; that it to say, points of the conversation are true (they were actual utterances of living, breathing people) and could be applied to what some critic or reviewer might call "the truth." This is also the case with the opening scene of this paper which took place in my car. While it is true that I had the idea for this paper, and some of the words of the opening scene were the very thoughts of my mind at that time, I didn't write those words in my car while driving down Interstate 459. This proposition would hold the same validity as the claim that Chaucer implies: that he actually heard all those pilgrims tell their tales while their horses clopped along the stony roads towards Canterbury; maybe he just had a knack for taking their perfectly crafted speeches in poetic shorthand. Then again, maybe not.

So, what seems or is *momentarily* real is not always true, and what is true, or contains some of *the truth*, is not always real, and *can* be totally absent of reality. Of course there is also the interpretation: the names I gave to the characters<sup>4</sup> (lots of baggage), the fact that it was Helen who noticed and was offended by the misogynist and bigoted qualities of some post-contemporary texts, the fact that I left myself--the I-me in the story--feeling damned, yet with my writer-self being somehow absolved, which is exactly what the incident was about, and exactly why I as the character in the story felt damned. I am still attempting to get away with something just after I have pointed out its

innate hypocrisy. But it is me. It is reality, at least some parts of it. But it is still fiction. There has to be some way to bring these concepts to some kind of fruition, a way to define the interpretation of what is real and true yet often both or neither. I'll give Irving a shot at an explanation.

The story at this point: Helen and T. S. Garp are talking in bed (they have just had sex), and he is finishing the bed time story that he told his son earlier in the evening. She wants to know what happened to the dog in the story, and if the story is really true. Unfortunately for her, Garp is a writer who brings his mental typewriter to bed:

Garp never tired of playing this game, though Helen certainly tired of it. He would wait for her to ask: *Which* of it? Which of it is true, which of it made up? Then he would say to her that it didn't matter; she should just tell him what she didn't *believe*. Then he would change that part. Every part she believed was true; every part she didn't believe needed work. If she believed the whole thing, then the whole thing was true. He was a very ruthless storyteller, Helen knew. If the truth suited the story, he would reveal it without embarrassment; but if any truth was unsuccessful in a story, he would think nothing of changing it. (Irving 271)

But the reader, the listener, wants the answer: 'I want the truth,' Helen said, sleepily. 'What happened to the damn schnauzer?' (274)

Helen, we all want the truth. But the truth for Garp is what suits the story and what makes it the most believable, or the most plausible, yet still entertaining. That. . .

"[After all], art has an aesthetic responsibility to be

entertaining" (Irving-McCaffery 10). Thank you, again, Mr. Irving.

Now, as I was going to say, that is Garp's world, whether it is expressed through violent extremes, sentimental melodrama, or a simple story about a dog in an alley.

"Writers are responsible for writing about our most important behavior, and if we are soft or easy on our behavior, we are shirking as artists" (13).

Thank you, again, Mr. Irving. Now get off your soapbox for just a little while because I have a paper to write.<sup>5</sup>

These questions, these often indeterminable yet still constructed boundaries between truth and fiction, are the things at which Garp, and in turn what we, attempt a response. For the greater part of my academic career, I have been attempting an answer to these pestering ambiguities. Until recently, the dialogue was incomplete.

By jousting with Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, bearing the brunt of Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, wading through the beautiful, circular streams of Virginia Woolf, and just marching head down, eyes open, and jaw clenched into various works of detective and post-modern fiction, I finally just tripped over the truth.<sup>6</sup>

It occurred to me during a discussion of the now infamous Chapter 13 of John Fowles's *The French Lieutenant's Woman*.<sup>7</sup> The discussion from that day was dancing around this: what is the purpose of Chapter 13? Where, or what, is *the truth* in Chapter 13, is there any, or is there supposed to be? One of my classmates proposed that it was a kind of realism, a place where, by the definition of realism, Chapter 13 is a preoccupation with fact or reality and a rejection of the impractical and visionary, in addition to a fidelity in art and literature to

nature or to real life.

My palms began to sweat. A point of knowledge, possibly one of Virginia Woolf's moments of being, had been painted on a wall in my brain.<sup>8</sup> Its fumes were irritating my mind and aching in the depths of my throat; it was not realism at all. Fowles had presented a definition through his fiction, and it was neither realism nor fiction, but a blending of these idealistic blacks and whites: fictionalism.

Fictionalism is the point in writing where the reality of fiction, that is, the reality that fiction is an assumption of a possibility as a fact irrespective of the question of its truth, meets the fiction itself. It can be even further defined by stating that fictionalism is the point in writing where the reality of *self-conscious* fiction meets the fiction itself.

According to Michael Priestly, "A fine line can be drawn between writing fiction about fiction and writing fiction about writing fiction" (95). Fictionalism highlights this 'fine line'; it defines what it is. It is the reality of fiction, the point at which the reader becomes aware of the reality of fiction within a story, whose context can often envelope us into folds of blind acceptance. We must be aware of this fine line in order to step back from the vortex of fiction, to avoid being jerked up into the writer's imagination and mistaking it for something that is real.

The responsibility loomed for Garp, every time. What is the instinct in people that makes them expect something to *happen*? If you begin a story about a person or a dog, something must be going to happen to them. 'Go on!' Walt cried impatiently. Garp, caught up in his art, frequently forgot his audience. (Irving 265)

I am back in my car again. My breath is a thick grey, as if I were smoking a cigar. I am reading over this paper. There are very few quotes from other scholars. It is mostly my opinion, and I can feel my opinion fading. This idea of fictionalism was once so strong, but it seems to have whispered down into something that has the concreteness of the granite air easing out of my lungs. It made sense when I was walking to my apartment, driving down town, or taking a shower. I got an idea and I wrote it down with wet fingers and smeared the ink on the page. But when I am sitting (t)here, in front of the computer, dissecting my idea, thinking about the inescapable relativity of concepts such as truth, realism, fiction, and interpretation, and realizing that there must be more discussion than these words, it seems the only way to deal with them is in a self-conscious manner. I've never really considered myself much of an academic writer anyway. I have some academic, theoretical, and philosophical thoughts, but my creativity is what I like to explore the most. It is what makes me feel alive. It seems to me that the only way I can discuss my idea of fictionalism is through my own fiction, and through the fiction of others, but this seems risky in an academic essay.

But here lies my point. Fictionalism is present in the academic essay; it is not limited to what writers write creatively. It is the idea of writing creatively, academic or otherwise. To further simplify fictionalism: it is where the reality of writing meets the reality that what you are doing is writing. It is defined best by these very sentences, this very sentence, this word, this.

I pull myself out of the text and place myself in the text. When I made you aware of my overt presence in the text, I said I was "imagized" by the hyperbole, that I became the words. The writer's reality is in the art. But

art reflects reality. It is based on what reality is made up of, and for this essay, art is the text, not the context, of what is real. The text is real and the text is art.

Certain aspects of his work suggest that Irving has not yet achieved his goal of writing a novel whose structure does not to some degree obfuscate his stories, and a story whose exaggerated effects do not to some degree negate the validity of the truths he wishes to expound. (Priestly 94)

Certain aspects of his essay suggest that Priestly has not yet achieved his goal of writing an essay whose vague language does not to some degree obfuscate his points, and an essay whose desperately weak writing negates most of the truths he wishes to expound about John Irving.

"*Thank You, Stephen.*"

"Anytime, John."

"Now about this fictionalism. Do you really think it's applicable? Scholars have been trying to define these questions since humanity first blundered into thought; do you really think you can do it in just a few pages of an academic essay, even one that is somewhat creative?"

"Well, yes and no. I have defined it, but I don't really know if it's applicable."

"I'd say no to that one," says Garp.

"Shut up, Garp. Unlike Fowles, I have control over my characters."

"You are my character."

"Haven't you been listening to anything I've said in this paper?"

"What a minute; which 'I' in the paper are you talking about? We've got a lot of screens in here."

"That's what I mean to expose through the concept of fictionalism. We have to be aware of the screens, and be

able to recognize them as such."

"Such as the very words which you are putting in my mouth right now?"

"Exactly. . . .*exactly*."

"But I don't understand why you couldn't just write a straight-lined academic essay; why all this fictionalism about fictionalism?"

"Because that's what it's all about. I really don't know how else to express it, or where else to go with this. How better to explain something than use it by example. This way, I can explain things didactically, using my ideas, your ideas, scholar's ideas, theory's ideas: the idea of ideas."

"But don't you just add to the ambiguity of the art by setting up all these additional screens--you the writer, you as me, you as Garp, you as words, you as text, context, and sub-text? It's rather self-indulgent."

"Again, that's exactly the point. That is fictionalism. And when it has reached its end, you come up with some kind of creative ending and it's over."

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> John Irving, the writer of the eventual referential text for this paper, has a fascination with Flaubert and the trappings of written language as a means of expression because of its precarious dependency on hyperbole.

<sup>2</sup> At this point, I must interject that Garp is the main character of my primary referential text, John Irving's *The World According to Garp*. Helen, who speaks just a few sentences later, is his wife in the story. I make no claims of trying to follow Irving's characterizations of these people, although the way I write about them may closely resemble the way he presents them. To find out more, read the rest of this paper, and if you're really feeling cocky and rebellious, read the book.

<sup>3</sup> The pertinent texts she is referring to are Federico Fellini's *8 1/2*, John Fowles's *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, Milan Kundera's *Immortality*, and probably most of Hemingway. For a feminist discussion on John Irving's *The World According to Garp*, see Janice Doane and Devon Hodges's article "Women and the Word According to Garp" from *Gender Studies: New Directions in Feminist Criticism* (Judith Spector, ed. Bowling Green: Popular, 1986. 60-69.) Now, as far as the term "post-contemporary fiction," that's a mouthful that many scholars have choked on. To try to construct some boundaries for this literary black hole, I will try to limit the applicable body of knowledge to overtly self-conscious fiction, such as those mentioned above.

<sup>4</sup> For an interesting (although rather short and limited) study of names in Irving's works, see Jack D. Wages's article "Disappearing Letters and Breaking Rules: John Irving as namer" from *Literary Onomastics Studies* (v 15, 1988, 63-65) and Ann R. Morris's "The Importance of Names in Garp's and Irving's World" from *Notes on Contemporary Literature* (v 14, November, 1984. 3-4).

<sup>5</sup> I put this in here because sometimes when I read a bunch of articles, especially when the author is being interviewed, I will come up with a point and he or she will just yell out at me. Of course, it is out of its context, but that's academic writing.

<sup>6</sup> "Make your verbs active and alive, try to make them bite your reader's nose off." My tenth grade teacher said this, and I've never been able to get it out of (tear it from) my mind. The list of works which enabled me to employ these bulging verbs was analyzed in Susan Hagen's Senior Seminar in English during the fall semester of 1992.

<sup>7</sup> For those unaware: up to Chapter 13, Fowles has made the reader slightly aware of his presence in the novel, but at this point he breaks from the 'fictional dream' and tells us that he is the book's author and he is not sure what he is doing, but that he is basically the equivalent to a non-intervening, Judeo-Christian God; he has created the character and now they must choose their own yet still predestined course. See Barry Olshen's "The French Lieutenant's Woman" from *John Fowles* (New York: Fredrick Ungar, 1978. 63-89.) and Robert J. Begiebing's "John Fowles: The Magician as Teacher" from *Toward a New Synthesis: John Fowles, John*

*Gardner, and Norman Mailer.* (London: UMI Research P, 1989. 41-5.)

<sup>8</sup> See Lucio Ruotolo's *The interrupted moment: a view of Virginia Woolf's novels*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1986. Ruotolo discusses what Virginia Woolf articulates as "moments of being." These are the moments of epiphany that gradually fade into a kind of resolved reason.

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## The Blunders of Black September

*Clint Peinhardt*

Called Black September because of bloody Arab infighting, the Jordan crisis of 1970 saw the United States--mainly through President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger--mistake local Arab conflicts for Soviet attempts to change the balance of power in the Middle East. Their fundamental beliefs about the nature of the Soviet Union and their preoccupation with the Cold War affected their handling of the conflict, and some would argue that they brought us to the brink of a nuclear war.

American suspicions of Soviet manipulations in the Middle East began when Brezhnev began to supply combat aircraft and military advisers to Egypt during its War of Attrition with Israel in 1969. Patrick Seale writes that "Washington [saw] this development as evidence of Soviet designs on the Nile, whereas in fact the Russians were merely trying to shore up Nasser against Israel's evident attempts to bring him down with its deep-penetrating raids that year into the Egyptian heartlands" (159). As was frequently the case, the Soviet Union responded to United States action and did not initiate an acceleration of conflict.

On August 7, 1970, this War of Attrition was finally

stopped by a cease-fire, but the Egyptians complicated the scenario by violating the cease-fire with missile deployments and rearrangements on the front lines of the conflict. This furthered American distrust of the Soviets, who were believed to be behind the missile movements, and led Joe Sisco of the U.S. State Department to state that the Soviets "have got technicians, they have got advisers, they have got people there in an operational capacity. These violations could not have taken place without their knowledge and without their complicity" (qtd. in Kalb 198). The August 7 cease-fire also caused concern among Palestinians living in Jordan, a moderate Arab state under the leadership of King Hussein. Hussein was considerably more pro-Western than other Arab leaders, and Palestinians living in Jordan saw his pro-Western tendencies as detrimental to their own cause because the West generally supported Israel in its territorial claims against the Palestinians. These Palestinians, and especially the radical guerrilla forces which dwelt among them, had, according to Nadav Safran, "grown in popularity, numbers, and strength, and had established themselves as a virtual state within the Jordanian state" during the War of Attrition (451). These guerrillas, called fedayeen, were Palestinian refugees from Arab-Israeli wars, and they used their refugee camps in western Jordan as bases for launching raids into Israel and into the West Bank. Many of these guerrillas opposed the cease-fire because they believed that by agreeing to it, Jordan and Egypt were recognizing Israel's right to exist. The fedayeen therefore set out to destroy the peace process.

An emergency session of the Palestinian National Council was called in Amman, Jordan, in late August, 1970, to decide on a course of action toward the peace process (Quandt 110). At this conference, no consensus

was achieved: radicals wanted to declare war on King Hussein and take over Jordan, while conservatives wanted a less violent plan. The Palestinian National Council was not dominated by any one group, and so the conference was faction-ridden and suffered a lack of unifying leadership. This lack of leadership among the Palestinians caused one group, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), to attempt to gain leadership among Palestinians by upstaging other factions. They planned the hijacking of four Western planes to force a showdown and bring their group to international attention.

On September 6, 1970, the PFLP carried out the hijackings. All but one succeeded, and the one which failed--on an Israeli El Al jet--was discovered by Israeli security (Safran 451). The hijackers flew all three planes to an abandoned British airstrip called Dawson Field, an important choice because it was only 25 miles northeast of Amman. The PFLP changed the airstrip's name to Revolution Field, and with their actions they showed the world that they could stand up to the West and King Hussein, who had little control over his own country. The hijackers demanded the release of "all the Palestinians held prisoner in West Germany, Switzerland, and Israel as a result of previous guerrilla actions" (Safran 451). This was quite a demand, because according to Tad Szulc, 3000 prisoners in Israeli jails alone met the qualifications of the PFLP (321). Israel, however, had a policy of not giving in to terrorism, as did the United States. In all, only seven prisoners were released, and they were released by European governments, not by the Israelis (Spiegel 197).

The United States became concerned at this point because Nixon and Kissinger viewed Jordan as an important buffer state between pro-Soviet Egypt and Iraq and Syria, which also tended toward the Soviet camp. The

situation was further complicated by Iraqi troops left in Jordan since the end of the 1967 war with Israel. Iraq had threatened to use these troops--numbering 17,000--to protect the fedayeen before the hijackings had ever occurred, and they further challenged Hussein's authority (Kissinger 595). Syrian troops, which also supported the fedayeen, were only a two-day march away from Amman, and so any attempt by King Hussein to reassert control over his own country would most likely produce a response from either Iraq or Syria on behalf of the Palestinian guerrillas.

On September 9, three days after the first hijackings, another plane was hijacked by the PFLP, bringing the total number of hostages they held to over 500. Their position was further strengthened later that day when Syria and Iraq both offered assurances to back the fedayeen if Hussein tried to move against them. By this time President Nixon was gravely concerned that the Soviet Union was somehow sponsoring or encouraging Syria to provoke a conflict, and so he ordered contingency plans drawn up for unilateral American intervention into the situation.

Kissinger, however, believed that unilateral American action was not possible at a time when U.S. troops were in Vietnam and Cambodia. In his White House Years, he writes that "[n]obody relished another military involvement while several hundred thousand Americans were still fighting in Southeast Asia" (Kissinger 605). Besides, military intervention by the United States in the anti-U.S. Middle East could be Hussein's "political death sentence" in the Arab world (Kissinger 596).

He met with his crisis task force, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), and they decided collectively that unilateral American military action was not feasible. Kissinger devised two separate strategies for

action. If troops were to be used solely for hostage evacuation, then only American forces would be involved. If, however, Syria or Iraq took action to support the fedayeen, the United States would be forced to support Israeli military action and would try to prevent the Soviet Union from intervening (Spiegel 197).

Meanwhile the Palestinian guerrillas, frustrated that their demands were not being met, blew up all the aircraft they had hijacked and released all but 55 Jewish passengers, some of whom were American-Israeli dual-nationals (Kalb 197). These hostages were split up and hidden among Palestinian refugee camps near Amman.

Further complicating the situation was the Jordanian army. Kissinger received reports that they were in "virtual mutiny because of what they considered insults and provocations by fedayeen" (603). These forces were highly loyal to King Hussein, but they felt that he was not being strong enough in his handling of the situation (Kissinger 603). If Hussein did not act soon, even his own army would be beyond his control, and he would certainly lose all legitimacy in the eyes of his people.

On September 15, King Hussein decided that the time had come to control the Palestinian guerrillas and so he sent word to the British that he would form a government of generals and crack down on the Palestinian terrorists. He also made sure that the British passed the word along to the Americans. Kissinger received a call from 10 Downing Street at 8:30 p.m. that night, and he immediately flew from Warrenton, Virginia, to Washington and called a meeting of the WSAG (Kalb 197). Kissinger, who believed that Hussein's overthrow would lead to an Israeli attack against the Arabs, urged some U.S. troop movements in order to signal the Soviets that the United States was serious about not invading Jordan. The WSAG

decided to send the Saratoga aircraft carrier into the eastern Mediterranean, and they placed U.S. aircraft in West Germany on alert and sent more C-130s to Turkey (Quandt 113). These C-130 planes were not combat aircraft but cargo planes to be used to evacuate the hostages if possible. Despite this active troop movement, the WSAG also decided that the United States simply did not have the resources to take unilateral action (Quandt 113).

Throughout the next couple of days, during heavy fighting between the fedayeen guerrillas and the Jordanian army, President Nixon encouraged Hussein to fight and did his best to restrain Israel from getting involved. In Chicago Nixon met with a group of journalists in order to leak information about the seriousness of the situation. A Chicago paper quoted him as saying that the United States was "prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against the government forces loyal to Hussein" (qtd. in Quandt 114). This was a message to the Soviets to stay out of the game.

On September 18, Nixon met with Golda Meir in Washington. They failed to even discuss the possibility of foreign intervention in Jordan by Iraq or Syria because Hussein appeared at this time to have things under his control. After their meeting, reports began to surface that Syrian tanks had invaded Jordanian territory.

Soon after these reports began, according to Nadav Safran, the Soviet Union "denied any involvement on their part and supported the Syrian official story that it was a question of Palestinian units using Syrian equipment" (453). Of course, the Syrian official story was a lie, but it is unlikely that the U.S.S.R. backed or urged the Syrian invasion.

They must have known about it, however, because,

according to Galia Golan, meetings were held between the Soviet ambassador to Syria and Syrian President Atassi "just hours before the invasion" (144). In fact, Soviet advisers did escort Syrian units to the Jordanian border, but they never crossed it (Safran 452). Even if they did know about the Syrian move, however, they did not have to either support or back it. Golan goes so far as to write that it does not appear . . . that the Soviets supported the move [into Jordan], for they issued a statement less than twenty-four hours into the invasion expressing their opposition to any foreign military intervention. Moreover they informed the United States several times just prior to and during the invasion that they were trying to restrain the Syrians, publicly condemning the entire armed conflict in Jordan and any interference from the outside. (144)

Certainly the Soviets knew about the attack, but they were evidently powerless to stop it.

One man in Syria had a great deal to do with the Syrian attack on Jordan. His name was Hafiz al-Asad, and according to Patrick Seale, he was already "master of Syria" by the time the Jordanian crisis appeared (157). Seale writes that "the officer corps was almost wholly in his hands, as were Rif'at's elite strike force and the Palestine Liberation Army brigades stationed in Syria" (158). In short, Seale writes, "[t]here could have been no armed intervention in Jordan of which Asad did not approve. . ." (158).

In Syria, Hafiz al-Asad began receiving requests from the fedayeen for arms and military aid, and he urgently sent as many as his Syrian troops could spare (Seale 157-58). Patrick Seale writes that as the Jordanian army began to "pound" the fedayeen, "a stream of further anguished appeals reached Asad. In response, he sent still more arms

together with some volunteers" (158).

Nixon and Kissinger, however, knew that the Soviets had to be involved. Steven Spiegel writes that "both Nixon and Kissinger had no question; knowing the Damascus government's close relationship to Moscow, they saw [the Syrian invasion] as a test by the Soviet Union" (198). Certainly the Soviet Union did not help the case. Marvin Kalb records a September 18 phone conversation between Joe Sisco and a Soviet official in which the latter assured Sisco that Syria had not invaded Jordan (200).

On September 19, Secretary of State William Rogers issued a statement in which he used the word "invasion" and denounced it as an "irresponsible and imprudent" action (Safran 453). Rogers' use of the word "invasion" referred to Soviet assurances to Kissinger that no "invasion" would occur (Safran 453). The speech itself was written by Kissinger and Sisco, and it also stated the following:

The U.S. Government calls upon the Soviet Government to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present course of action and the need to withdraw these forces without delay from Jordanian territory. . . . The Soviet Government cannot be unaware of the serious consequences which could ensue from a broadening of the conflict. (Kissinger 619)

Again the message went not to Syria and its leaders, but instead to the Soviet Union. There was no doubt in the minds of Kissinger, Nixon, and other U.S. officials that the Soviet Union was behind the Syrian attack.

Throughout the rest of the day, the WSAG met "more or less continually" (Quandt 115). Later that day, King Hussein asked for American help against Syria.

The evening of September 20 saw Irbid, which Safran

refers to as an "important junction of roads linking Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Israel," fall to the Syrians (453). When Alexander Haig entered the WSAG meeting at 7:00 p.m. to report the news, Kissinger began trying to contact Ambassador Rabin and Meir, who were in New York at a fund-raising banquet. Around 10:00 p.m. Kissinger finally talked to Rabin, who told him that Israel had no current intelligence on the situation and soon after left for Washington to discuss possible Israeli intervention into the conflict.

Kissinger wanted Israel to respond to King Hussein's calls for air strikes against the Syrian tanks because again there were not enough American forces to do much damage (Safran 453). After asking for a reconnaissance flight over Jordanian territory, according to his memoirs, Kissinger told Rabin that the United States would replace any lost planes and that he would continue to prevent Soviet interference (623).

As far as United States policy toward the Soviet Union, Kissinger proclaimed at a midnight meeting of the WSAG that

we have two objectives: one, to get [the Soviets] to use their influence with the Syrians to get them to withdraw; two, to make sure they do not believe they can escape the dilemma of an Israeli move by putting the squeeze on Israel. . . . I think waffling now will give us more problems later. (Kissinger 624)

The United States was still committed to the idea that the Soviets were behind the Syrian attack.

The morning of September 21, Rabin called Israel, and officials there claimed a need for ground forces in any invasion of Jordan. Alexander Haig received this news from Rabin and woke Kissinger, who then called Nixon. Nixon quickly approved the use of Israeli ground forces,

but Kissinger held on to this information and called a meeting of the President's chief advisers. According to Kissinger's memoirs,

I was not about to let the President run the risk of a major confrontation with the Soviet Union without consulting his senior advisers. An Israeli ground operation could produce a Mideast War. (Kissinger 625)

The meeting of Presidential advisers led to a decision to increase to five the number of divisions in West Germany on alert, and the Sixth Fleet was expanded from two to five carrier task forces, but they still decided that U.S. forces were not numerous enough to act alone (Kalb 204). They authorized Kissinger to work out a plan with Rabin for a joint attack.

At a party that night, the Soviet charge d'affaires announced to Kissinger that the Soviets were doing everything in their power to restrain Syria, and that the United States should do the same with Israel (Safran 453). Later that night Syria committed more tanks into the Jordanian conflict, causing Nixon to make a second rash decision. He decided to commit United States forces to the conflict even if Egyptians or Soviets intervened (Safran 454).

The linchpin of this conflict now played his cards. Hafiz al-Asad of Syria refused to commit the Syrian air force to reinforce Syrian troops. This allowed Hussein to use his small air force against the Syrian tanks with no opposition in the air. Syrian tanks soon began withdrawing. Asad himself had kept the conflict from escalating into what might have become a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

Why did Asad do it? This fact cannot be explained in terms of Cold War politics, but instead must be

explained in terms of Syrian domestic politics. Patrick Seale documents it best when he writes the following:

From his own testimony and that of others intimately involved, [Asad's] intention was not to help overthrow [Hussein], as the guerrillas evidently hoped, but simply to protect the Palestinians from massacre, and as a result his intervention from the start was both reluctant and circumscribed. (158)

Asad never intended to use his air force, and Steven Spiegel claims that some U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials learned that Asad had sent messages to Hussein assuring him that the Syrian air force would not get involved (201).

The chances for U.S. and/or Israeli intervention had disappeared, and forces were soon taken off alert, and by the next day the Soviet representative in Washington was "making lame excuses about how matters had gone that far in the first place" (Safran 454).

By September 23 United States pressure on Israel had shifted entirely, now concentrating on keeping Israeli troops on their own soil and preventing an Israeli attack. Syrian tanks completed their withdrawal from Jordanian territory, and a cease-fire was arranged by September 24. The 1970 Jordanian crisis was over.

### ANALYSIS

Historians and political analysts have developed two separate analyses for this short period of intense international communication. Many agree with Kissinger's handling of the situation and see the conflict in terms of the Cold War. Others, however, have taken a deeper look into the regional politics at work throughout the crisis, and these analysts have determined that the Jordanian crisis arose more from the interplay of regional forces than from

the larger Cold War itself.

Nixon and Kissinger both saw the Jordanian crisis as a result of the Soviet and American power plays around the globe. This was, after all, the era of Vietnam and Cambodia. Because President Nixon and his advisor Kissinger were so rooted in the Cold War mentality, and because they knew that a relationship existed between Damascus and Moscow, they saw the Jordanian crisis as "a test by the Soviet Union" (Spiegel 198). Seale sums it up best when he writes the following:

From the start, Nixon and Kissinger viewed the Jordan crisis of 1970 through the narrow binoculars of the East-West contest and gave little thought to the stresses and strains in the Arab camp in the wake of Israel's 1967 victory or to the problems posed for Arab regimes by Palestinian impatience. (160)

I want to take a deeper look into the minds of these two gentlemen who had so much to say during this conflict.

Kissinger was a former Harvard history professor who idealized the nineteenth century and its balance of power politics. According to Hyland,

the balance of power presupposed a limited number of participants of roughly equal weight; each had to have the ability to affect the other, and there had to be a broad agreement on the purpose of the system and the legitimacy of domestic claims over foreign policy. (193)

Kissinger's desire for a balance of power system would be perfectly alright if the international political scene had met these prerequisites, but it did not. There were only two major powers in the world -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- and these two powers rested on their ability to use nuclear weapons.

The fact that only two powers existed inherently

prevented a balance of power system, but nuclear capability made the system obsolete. When any one power has the ability to destroy the entire world, no need for alliances exists. Kissinger, however, did not relinquish the idea of balance of power politics: "what he did was redesign it to accommodate the coexistence of two military superpowers with several important regional power centers" (Hyland 193). The two superpowers, in Kissinger's view, were to find regional power bases all over the world so that their influence could be felt, and these power bases would in turn serve as regional balance of power players. This is where the Jordan crisis fits into Kissinger's world view. Jordan was under attack from Syria, a regional power of the Soviet Union, and the United States turned to its regional power, Israel, to counteract the influence of the U.S.S.R. It was important to Kissinger to keep the regional power of the United States at least equal to that of the Soviet Union, and to allow Syrian troops to help the Palestinians overthrow the government of Jordan would be a major loss for the U.S. in the region. Jordan, in Kissinger's own words, "was a test of our capacity to control events in the region" (596).

Kissinger's nostalgia for balance of power politics was coupled with an aggressiveness that made him dangerous. His own memoirs reflect this aggressiveness:

In my view what seems 'balanced' and 'safe' in a crisis is often the most risky. Gradual escalation tempts the opponent to match every move; what is intended as a show of moderation may be interpreted as irresolution; reassurance may provide too predictable a checklist and hence an incentive for waiting, prolonging the conditions of inherent risk. (622)

Kissinger therefore saw a need for the threat of U.S.

intervention in the conflict in Jordan to prevent Soviet action. He did not believe, as did William Rogers, in the effectiveness of true diplomacy; indeed, Kissinger believed that "sometimes one can avoid the use of force only by threatening it" (596).

Nixon held much the same view in regard to the use of force, except that he found it exhilarating to be able to threaten the use of force. In a phone conversation with Kissinger, Nixon told the latter that "there's nothing better than a little confrontation now and then, a little excitement" (Spiegel 198). Such an attitude in the President of the most powerful country of the world is frightening, not to mention dangerous. Nixon's desire to use force, when combined with the worldview of Henry Kissinger, was looking for another outlet, and the Jordan crisis proved just the event in which to test their ideas.

Nixon was also absorbed in his ideas about the Soviets. According to George Lenczowski, Nixon's response to news of the Syrian military movements was, "It looks like the Soviets are pushing the Syrians and the Syrians are pushing the Palestinians. The Palestinians don't need much pushing." (qtd. 126) No allowance was made for the Syrians to act on their own or without Soviet orders.

In keeping with these beliefs, Nixon and Kissinger "concluded that Moscow must have urged Syria, which had a strongly anti-Hussein government, to incite the PLO revolt against the king" (Wicker 670). This assumption, according to Wicker, caused the two to take "actions risking war primarily in order to send the message to Moscow that its supposed geopolitical move in the Middle East was being stiffly resisted" (670).

When the crisis was over, Nixon and Kissinger saw the U.S. role as having put the Soviets in their place, and

they developed, according to Raymond Garthoff, an "exaggerated view of American ability to 'manage' Soviet policy in third world crises" (86). They also believed that Israel played a very important strategic role for the U.S. by allowing it to have a regional voice, and this led to an ever-increasing American support for Israel.

On September 25, Kissinger sent a message to Ambassador Rabin which read:

The President will never forget Israel's role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan and in blocking the attempt to overturn the regime there. He said that the United States is fortunate in having an ally like Israel in the Middle East. These events will be taken into account in all future developments. (Lenczowski 127)

Nixon was so impressed by the Israeli willingness to work with the United States that he later publicly told Golda Meir that "Rabin was one of the best ambassadors ever to serve in Washington and that Israel should make good use of him," and he also added that the United States would be glad to hire him if Israel could not find a place for him (Safran 455). In reality, however, Israel was probably motivated just as much by its desire to gain more territory than by any desire to keep King Hussein in power (Lenczowski 127).

Overall, the President and his National Security Advisor impressed their philosophies and ideologies onto the events of the day, and they saw things as they wanted to see them. They made no allowance for internal politics or the possibility that the Soviet Union did not have control over Syria. In fact, the United States had no good sources of intelligence in the Middle East at that time--no reliable agents and no satellite coverage in place--and so Washington got its sources from the Israelis and the

Jordanians, both of whom had reason to alter facts for their own advantage to increase U.S. involvement (Wicker 671). Nixon and Kissinger saw the Jordan crisis as they wanted to see it, and in doing so they risked military involvement and perhaps even nuclear war in a situation which was actually far different than they believed.

Syria had reasons to interfere in Jordan other than Soviet pushing. Syria had consistently been the leading proponent of the Palestinian cause, and in supporting the fedayeen rebels it was simply maintaining the relationship it already had with the Palestinians. Martha Neff Kessler writes that "Syria's consistent support of the Palestinian cause and the common historical identity and sense of shared injustice at the hands of European and Zionist powers created strong bonds between the two peoples" (94). Soviet influence had little to do with these strong bonds, and the Soviet influence could do little to control them. In fact, according to Kessler, people who judge Syria as a "cat paw" of the U.S.S.R. "seriously misjudge the relationship between client and patron" (106).

Not only did Syria have reasons for helping the Palestinians, but Syria itself was in the midst of a power struggle. As stated earlier, Hafiz Asad was the linchpin of the events of Black September. He had been the one to first give aid to the fedayeen groups, and had he been willing to use his air force to battle the Jordanians, Israel and the United States would probably have had to intervene, thereby causing Soviet involvement and a rapidly escalating conflict. Instead, Asad was involved in a power struggle in Syria which culminated in his ascension to power immediately after the Jordanian conflict.

Asad opposed the existing pro-Soviet government, formed by President Atassi in a coup d'etat in February, 1966. His chief rival for power was Salah Jedid, the Party

Chief who favored even closer ties between Damascus and Moscow (Golan 145). By February of 1969 Asad had, through his control of the military, "virtually taken control of the government" in a "semi-coup" (Sinai and Pollack 28). He was getting close to taking control of the entire country when the PFLP hijacked the four planes in early September, and he sent tanks into Jordan as a token show of force to support the Palestinians, something demanded by the sheer popularity of the Palestinian cause in Syria.

Because Asad was determined to subordinate the Palestinian cause to the needs of Syria, however, he kept the air force out of the conflict (Kessler 96-7). Asad used the Jordan crisis as the next step to power, for by keeping his air force out of the foray, he was sending a message to both Atassi and Jedid that he was in charge now. By November Asad completed his takeover of Syria and assumed the Presidency (Sinai 28).

Asad's ability to control the military at will was the symbol of a larger factor: Syrian ability to act without orders from Moscow. Soviet leaders had witnessed their Arab clients suffer tremendous defeats in the 1967 war, suffering a loss of prestige among the Arab states due to Israeli military supremacy over Soviet arms used by the Arabs. Their conclusion at the end of the war was "that they had more to lose than to gain from another full-scale war in the Middle East" (Spechler 333). They had learned that the costs associated with overcoming Israeli military supremacy were more than they were willing to pay, and so they unilaterally prevented any Arab country from being able to fight Israel alone (Spechler 333). Nevertheless, according to Ilana Kass, "Moscow embarked, in the immediate aftermath of the war, on a large-scale program that made Egypt the cornerstone of Soviet Middle Eastern policy" (38).

Egyptian policy met the requirements of the Politburo more than did the actions of the Syrian government or any other Arab government, and therefore the Soviets indeed focused their efforts on Egypt. The Soviets were preoccupied at the time of the Jordan crisis with keeping "an enfeebled Nasser afloat" due to his loss of prestige after the 1967 war (161). Egyptian prominence as a Soviet ally continued until Sadat expelled the Soviet military advisers in July, 1972, and it was then that the Soviet Union looked to Syria as a potentially strong ally because they no longer met their key needs in the region--naval and air bases to provide support to the Mediterranean fleet (Spechler 331). At the time of Black September, however, Syria took a back seat in the minds of Soviet planners.

All this is to say that in September of 1970, Soviets were not "looking for fresh Middle East adventures," and they certainly were not ready to back Syria in such a grand scheme as the overthrow of King Hussein (Seale 161). Wicker writes that

[e]ven in 1970, an unbiased analyst would have been hard put to explain why Moscow would want to risk setting off a Middle East war with such fatal consequences, and there is no evidence that the Soviets did--quite the opposite. Moscow quite obviously, for example, kept its own Mediterranean naval forces out of the war of the American task force. (671)

The Soviets have frequently deployed their naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea to show their support of events in the region, but the Soviet navy stayed far away from the American task force (Nogee 166). The Soviets made sure that they gave signals which in no way backed the Syrian invasion of Jordan.

In fact, Patrick Seale writes that Soviet "influence

over the shaky and divided Syrian junta was negligible and, insofar as it had any, it used it to restrain Asad rather than encourage him to intervene in Jordan" (161). Syrian independence from Moscow is further evidenced by the fact that despite Soviet influence, the Syrian Communist Party remained illegal throughout the Syrian-Soviet relationship (Golan 143). Overall, the Soviets were more concerned with holding onto their relationship with Syria than with pushing any issue, especially a militarily related one (Golan 144).

Kissinger and Nixon never saw any of this precisely because they never tried to see things as they were. Instead they tried to impose their ideologies on the events at hand, and the result could have been disastrous. In the end I must agree with Seale when he writes that the Jordan crisis "had little if anything to do with East-West rivalries. It was rather a result of the fraught triangular relationship between the Arab states, Israel, and the dispossessed Palestinians," a relationship which still shapes events in the region to this very day (161). Certainly the threat of American force helped deter Asad in using his air force, and this may have prevented further escalation of the conflict, but Kissinger and Nixon's idea that the Soviets were behind the attack was, in the words of Wicker, "more imagined than real" (672).

With the end of the Cold War, the possibilities for a repetition of the mistakes of the Jordan crisis are certainly reduced, but this incident provides an excellent example of the need to view international politics on several levels: the global level, the regional level, and the domestic level. All three interact to explain why political events happen, and to limit one's perspective to one or two of the three is to miss the entire picture. This was the mistake made by President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor

Henry Kissinger during the events of Black September, and it brought the world community perilously close to another major conflict between the two superpowers. This conflict would have been caused not by Soviet aggression but by American overzealousness to guard against such aggression. Fortunately for everyone, the one who stopped the conflict from escalating came in the unlikely personage of Hafiz al-Asad. Were it not for this Alawite general in Syria, the world might have faced a full-blown superpower conflict in the Middle East.

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## Isolation and Architecture in the Works of Michelangelo Antonioni

*Russell Rice*

Due to the highly ambiguous nature of his films and the varied critical responses which they generate, Italian filmmaker Michelangelo Antonioni deserves his high ranking among the most interpretive, frequently misunderstood, and thematically elusive modern film artists. However, Antonioni also deserves credit for the very rare achievement of creating a completely new and intrinsically cinematic form of discourse through his films. An early, telling scene in Antonioni's 1962 film L'eclisse hints with some subtlety at the essence of his unique film language. As his main character Vittoria attempts to break off an affair with her lover, Riccardo, she assumes a distracted fascination with the placement of objects on a table. As Antonioni's camera frames her, she organizes these objects within an empty wooden picture frame. The parallel between Vittoria's distraction and Antonioni's art is significant in its suggestion of the director's own careful manipulation of character and object within the shot. This type of preoccupation stems from a personal concern and even applies to the director's everyday life. Antonioni explains in an interview his discomfort when he is "badly placed" with someone in a room where, "instead of a wall with a picture on it behind the back of the man I am speaking to, I should like to have a window. . . .When I

shoot a film , that is all I am doing. I arrange things and people the way they ought to be" (qtd in Leprohon 100). This very effective process of arrangement, or what can be called the architecture of his shots, perpetuates the insistence on the image as the primary thematic vehicle in Antonioni's cinema.

The substitution of the term architecture for what would normally be referred to as *mise en scene*, or the composition of visual elements within the shot, is much more than an arbitrary one for the discussion of Antonjoni's cinematic style. The idea of architecture figures prominently in many of his films, and he admits that architecture, along with painting, lies second only to filmmaking itself among his passions (Amberg 231). Many of Antonioni's characters are architects or students of architecture, such as Sandro in L'avventura and the Girl in The Passenger. Architecture even figures prominently in the major conflict of Zabriskie Point, when Antonioni pits the banal, pop-architectural structures of Los Angeles against the beautiful, expansive desert scenery of the Death Valley area. He resolves this conflict and comments on the isolatory effects of cold cityscapes on the human psyche by repeatedly destroying architect Lee Allen's valley home in the film's final sequence.

More significant, however, are the symbolic roles which architectural structures themselves assume through their suggestive proportions in many of Antonioni's shots. During the break-up of Vittoria and Riccardo in the opening sequence of L'eclisse, Antonioni includes a point-of-view shot of a looming, mushroom-shaped building which Vittoria sees as she gazes out of the window. When the arguments are over and Vittoria leaves the apartment, the next long shot taken outside reveals an equally intimidating tree, and the two structures balance the screen

in directly proportional opposition. The strange tower which served as the dominant in the earlier shot yields to a structural division which underlines visually the parting of the lovers. The scene also foreshadows the ultimate dominance of such structures over the characters as subjects in the ominous final sequence of the film. Seymour Chatman observes that "for moments on end, it is the cityscape that is the true protagonist, and audiences used to empathizing or identifying with a human character must find their expectations strangely undermined" (102). Despite Chatman's slightly pejorative tone, this practice of undermining expectations becomes the most stimulating characteristic of Antonioni's cinema. Indeed, Antonioni's use of physical architecture augments rather than detracts from one's perception of his characters.

The association of architecture and Antonioni's cinematic language extends beyond the literal one involved with photographing buildings. There is also the metaphorical significance of architectural structuring in Antonioni's works, or more precisely, in the way he builds a scene. Antonioni the cinematic architect mixes many innovative techniques together to form the lyrical foundations for his character studies. The use of one of these components, the long take, evolves from Antonioni's instinctive desire to follow his characters while shooting. The extended length of these shots tends to invite the viewer into the emotional experience of his characters, and Antonioni admits that "it seems . . . important to catch those of the character's thoughts which appear--but are not at all--the least significant" (qtd in Leprohon 96).

In many ways his brilliant film *L'avventura* is a testament to this notion. When Claudia wakes up in the old man's island hut on the morning after Anna's disappearance, Antonioni neatly relates all thematic nuances

of the situation in one sequence shot. The action in the scene may initially seem trivial or routine. Claudia wakes up, checks to see if her dress has dried, and stares forlornly at a dark shirt which she has removed from her bag. The rising sun through the doorway and Claudia's discovery of Anna's shirt in her bag both capture the prevalent idea of identity replacement in the film. The brooding contemplation in the shot, both Claudia's of the shirt and the camera's of Claudia, prefigures her feelings of guilt later in the film about her affair with Sandro. Here Antonioni injects a certain amount of symbolic significance into the otherwise common actions of his character by simply extending the duration of his shot.

Antonioni's inclination to follow his characters also accounts for his virtual reinvention of the tracking shot. Antonioni affirms Claudia's feelings of shame in a later scene in *L'avventura* through a masterfully composed tracking shot. When Claudia waits for Sandro outside a hotel in Noto, she keeps her eyes on the dark void of the hotel's entrance while the camera attentively tracks her slow progress down the street. As she moves, her preoccupation with thoughts of Sandro and her anxiety about their relationship become evident in her stare, which remains fixed on the doorway he has just entered. Antonioni eventually crowds the screen around her with strange men who inspect her with lascivious, intimidating stares. Finally overcome by emotion, she runs into a shop to escape from the street. When Sandro catches up with her, she tells him: "I'm so ashamed . . . ashamed. Did you see? I tried to hide. I feel so cheap, I hate myself" (Amberg 104). This dialogue, however, only echoes a feeling which had already been induced in the viewer through the claustrophobic tracking shot.

While Antonioni films the movement of his

characters, his camera frequently abandons their images altogether in favor of the scene behind them. A panning shot, for instance, will often begin by framing an open form such as a landscape or a doorway and move to the character in question. Antonioni's manipulation of empty space becomes a signature cinematic phrase in his works and one which he expertly turns in a pair of shots from L'eclisse. In the first one, Vittoria waits for Piero on a street corner and the camera suddenly pans the rapid movement of a chariot down the street. As Sam Rohdie describes, "the attention of the camera is caught by something either peripheral to the narrative or utterly unconnected with it" (50). The camera stops following the narratively inconsequential chariot only when it passes Piero, who now walks briskly towards Vittoria in the center of the frame. The shot itself effectively captures both love's fortuity and its transience. The impact of the shot is doubled, however, when Antonioni repeats it in the final sequence of the film and incorporates the concept of empty space. Rather than passing the familiar form of Piero, the chariot now leaves behind it a desolate, empty street. The promising appointment made by the couple is not kept, and the conspicuously vacant street amplifies the absence of love.

The most controversial component of Antonioni's cinematic architecture stems from the same type of technique used in this brief chariot shot in L'eclisse. Labelled *temps mort* by the French, it involves either the lingering of the camera on areas which characters have just left or panning from a subject to an empty space. Rohdie clarifies and stresses the significance of such moments in Antonioni's films:

These are places which are openly non-narrativised, of a pictorial and visual interest which suddenly takes

hold, causes the narrative to err, to wander, momentarily to dissolve. They are among the most interesting places of Antonioni's films, at which everything and nothing takes place. (51)

Prevalent in many of Antonioni's films, the *temps mort* shot most effectively links with the thematic structure of The Passenger. Antonioni uses this technique in the opening scenes to introduce the identity crisis and struggle within John Locke, a shiftless reporter seeking out a story on a guerilla movement in North Africa. When Locke's jeep breaks down in the desert, Antonioni frames him in the lower left corner of the screen. As he drops to the sand, yelling in frustration, Antonioni begins a series of pans through the desert. The panning continues until one eventually expects to rediscover Locke, but the camera instead fixes upon the unsettling image of dark, jagged rocks in the sand. The barren desert and the dilatory pacing of the shot reflect Locke's loose grip on reality while the rocky terrain seems to foreshadow the ultimate breakdown of his identity. As Antonioni maintains, such a shot is technically objective in that the camera is free "to shoot that which was interesting to me, the reporter of my reporter, to watch, to fix, to record" (Bachmann 28). The subjectivity of the result is unquestionable, however, for the detachment of the viewer from the narrative essentially parallels Locke's disengagement from a stable reality.

In many of his later films, Antonioni colors the landscapes of his scenes with an equal amount of subjectivity. The grey hues of the mountains and the sky in Il Deserto Rosso reflect Giuliana's increasingly bleak outlook and mental instability. Antonioni stresses her perspective by frequently blurring the background and leaving the back of her head in focus to partially compose the foreground. Hence the viewer perceives the

environment as it is filtered through the twisted sensibility of a neurotic. The indefinite lines in the composition of these shots emphasize the symbolic colors in a manner similar to the paintings of the Impressionists. This manipulation of color allows Antonioni to "paint" both the orgy scene in Il Deserto Rosso and the neighbor's affair in Blow-Up with symbolically sexual shades of red. Antonioni also combines color with the subjective camera towards the end of Blow-Up when Thomas returns to the park and finds the dead body. Although earlier scenes in the park had been filled with vibrant greens, a point-of-view shot now casts black leaves of a tree against a white sky. The new chromatic scheme is dim and grey, and the color transition underlines the chilling effects of the body's discovery on Thomas.

An explication of a key sequence in Blow-Up may clarify some of the reasons and principles underlying Antonioni's enigmatic film techniques. In the first scene, Jane attempts to persuade Thomas to give her the negatives of the pictures which he had taken in the park. Thomas is rather hesitant to do so, and Antonioni stresses their momentary antagonism by placing them on either side of a conspicuous, chest-high line of feathers which is presumably one of Thomas's studio props. When they finally reach an agreement about the pictures, Thomas significantly passes under the feathers to join her on the far side of the frame. A few scenes later Thomas realizes that he is too curious and interested in this mysterious woman to let her leave anonymously, so he awkwardly asks for her phone number. This time Antonioni chooses a diagonal composition, and the characters stand on either side of a reddish-brown, wooden crossbeam. When she gives him the number, he crosses over and the two are framed together on one side of the beam. Antonioni composes a

visual accompaniment to each ensuing step towards genuine communication between the two characters.

Earlier in this sequence when Thomas asks for Jane's opinion about a large propeller which he has purchased as a decoration, she appropriately claims that he should definitely hang it on the wall to "break up all of the straight lines" in the room. The phrase not only echoes the visual progression of the sequence, but also Antonioni's common theme of man's constant struggle to overcome a natural state of isolation. To extend the metaphor further, one could accurately describe Antonioni's cinematic architecture as a practice of breaking up straight lines. While relating the ideas in his films, he constantly violates the classical concepts of linear plotting, explanatory dialogue, and linear character development. Instead Antonioni favors techniques which capitalize on the power of the image and emphasize the thematic prominence of the visual in the cinematic medium. Antonioni maintains in many interviews that he doesn't "believe in words. People use too many words and usually wrongly" (qtd. in Samuels 131). A new type of film discourse which relies primarily on pictorial communication evolves from this distrust of language. Antonioni's films draw attentive viewers into an intensely emotional visual experience through which they may investigate and fully comprehend the concept of human isolation and the insatiable desire to overcome it by honestly communicating with others.

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## Two Madonnas and Their Texts: A Study of Narrative and Image in "Like A Prayer" and "I Sing of a Maiden"

*Ellen Schendel*

In the Middle Ages, the image was perhaps the most important aspect to a work of literature. In "Chaucer and the Visual Arts," medievalist V. A. Kolve contends that visual images in the Middle Ages "seem to have been most important, the paradigmatic instance that shaped their theories, and which readers held foremost in mind" (Brewer 302). Kolve's definition of image is not limited solely to medieval culture; it is also the visual image which is key to post-modern society. Roland Barthes, in *Image, Music, Text*, seems to concur with Kolve when he defines contemporary image as "re-presentation, which is to say ultimately resurrection, and, as we know, the intelligible is reputed antipathetic to lived experience" (32). Both the medieval and post-modern definitions of image note the image's relationship to "lived experience"; the image can be created, but only within the context of the reality in which we live. Perhaps images in the Middle Ages were more cohesive, less fragmented than those of today which would reflect the cohesiveness or chaos associated with each period.

This "lived experience" is where image and narrative

meet, for self-conscious narratives link a text to the external world of the artist. Barthes is careful to point out that "*who speaks* (in the narrative) is not *who writes* (in real life) and *who writes* is not *who is*" (111). And yet a certain degree of self-consciousness within the text indicates that the images are controlled by the narrative and are thus ultimately controlled by the artist.

Careful analysis of narrative and image in Madonna's "Like A Prayer" music video uncovers the link between image and narrative and narrative and artist. In fact, what Madonna does with her video is not unlike what the poet does in the medieval religious lyric "I sing of a maiden," as they both introduce a certain degree of self-consciousness into the text, seeming to join together--even unify--the narrative and artist. In comparing these two texts which bracket the medieval and post-modern periods, an argument can be made that links between image, narrative, and artist are much in conflict with Camille Paglia's views of Madonna.

In her latest book, *Sex, Art, and American Culture*, Paglia states,

Playing with the outlaw personae of prostitute and dominatrix, Madonna has . . . rejoined and healed the split halves of woman: Mary, the Blessed Virgin and holy mother, and Mary Magdalene, the harlot. ("Madonna II" 11)

Paglia's view is based on the assumption that these "split halves of women" are inevitable sides to every woman and presupposes that the unity of these two contrasting images within Madonna's texts is facilitated solely by her desire to show how women can be both "pure" and sexual. While Paglia (at least, in this quotation) acknowledges that Madonna has ultimate control over her narrative and images, she implies that the narrative voice is unimportant

in bringing the images together; that Madonna the image has no relationship to Madonna, controller of the narrative, and discounts that the narrative in this case is a result of manipulated images.

Thomas Jemielity's analysis of the "I sing of a maiden" lyric undercuts Paglia's line of reasoning. He points out that in the lyric

it is Mary, not God, who commands the entire situation. . . .The language of the poem enhances the paradox it hymns because the poem must speak simultaneously of virginity and fructification, of God as lover and as seed. And Mary so clearly commands the moment of sexual and redemptive union that the poem is suffused throughout by the reverent, yet serenely confident tone of the voice. . . .a voice so sure in its faith that it finds no unseemliness in its gentle punning about Mary's virginal conception of Jesus. (325-26)

Both of these critics confront the individuality or the power of the narrative in relation to the artist. However, Paglia's view seems to limit the power of the narrative Madonna to control images, while Jemielity's points to a strong persona as parallel to strong images of the Virgin Mary.

"Like A Prayer's" narrative is significant in that it is three-fold--and Madonna has control over all three plots. The content of the video is a religious and sexual narrative framed within a narrative of social injustice, all framed within the "production" of these narratives and interwoven by the merging of religious and secular images. The lyrics of the song contain religious images within the context of a sexual narrative. For example, Madonna compares the power of her lover's voice to the power of a prayer when she sings, "Just like a prayer, your voice can take me there." This sentence changes in meaning with the

different images it is paired with: a sexual fantasy (her sexual encounter with the statue of a saint), a religious understanding (she receives the stigmata), or a new social awareness (she helps to free the innocent man). However, this very line demonstrates the power of a self-reflexive narrator. Her voice "takes us there"--"there" being the world of her images, and a world in which various images come together through the narratives in a cohesive form. She, within the context of her own lyrics and images, reaffirms the power of her own narrative. This self-reflexivity of the narrator is directly parallel to the self-reflexivity of the text: the video concludes with the reaffirmation that the viewer is, in fact, watching a production.

There are instances in which the narrative voice of Madonna is reaffirmed. The very fact that what she sings seems to command the images is one way in which her voice (musical and narrative) commands the images we see. At one point she implores, "Let the choir sing!" and a large gospel choir immediately joins her in the chorus. She also sings, "Just like a dream, you are not what you seem," and, at this point, neither is her video. It is surreal, dream-like when she receives the stigmata. However, there is also a definite dream sequence when she falls asleep briefly in the church, invokes "Heaven help me!," and falls from an artificially blue sky only to be caught by the lead gospel-singer and thrust back into the narrative; implying a certain degree of reality to the surreal narrative of the church--a narrative much more unrealistic than the racial narrative.

In discerning what the "main" narrative might be in the video, the viewer should notice that there seem to be two Madonnas in this video: the first is the one who witnesses another woman's attack and the subsequent arrest

of an innocent man--arrested, it is suggested by the constant fragmented image of Madonna dancing among burning crosses, because he is African-American. The second Madonna is, within the context of the narrative, the "church Madonna," the one who is religiously and sexually transformed by her experience with the choir and saint. At the end, the significance of each transformation seems to culminate in the merging together of the two Madonna characters as she aids in the release of the innocent man. It might be best to note here that the character of the saint/Jesus figure is played by the same actor who plays the unjustly-arrested man, further emphasizing the link between the racial, religious, and sexual themes of the video. Likewise, in examining the self-consciousness of the narrative, the pairing of the name Madonna with her seductive appearance further merges the religious and secular together.

In essence, a case can be made for a third Madonna in the text, as even though the racial narrative frames the religious narrative, the production narrative frames both. At the end of the video, Madonna and her cast take bows and dance together as a curtain drops in front of them and the words "The End" are scrawled on the screen. This is the voice--obviously self-reflexive--of the work. This third Madonna is the "realistic" one, the one who returns from surrealism to "reality" and makes us believe she was in control of her images all along.

This narrative voice of the text links together the imagery of these three plots with their respective images of racism, religion, and sex. Images of the crucifix are prominently displayed by Madonna throughout the video, whether she dances among burning crosses, receives the stigmata, or suggestively positions a crucifix between her protruding breasts. Bars are another image which link the

three narratives together. Madonna emerges from behind bars (possibly representing her own moral imprisonment in deciding what to do about the injustice she has seen) at the start of the video. The statue of the saint is behind bars in the church--the same bars (as both the justice and religious narratives use the same set and props) that the wrongly-accused man is behind. Because the same actor plays both the part of the saint/Christ figure and the imprisoned man, an overwhelming visual parallel is drawn between the two characters, mingling the persecution and innocence of the two men into essentially one image.

Even though the context of the lyrics change with the different images (from racial to religious to sexual), the images work together in the narrative. Even in the most external narrative, the one about producing a video, these images culminate in the crucifix-clad Madonna dancing in front of bars with the victim/saint/lover in front of the choir on the single set accommodating all the imagery of justice, religion, and sex. This is where the reality of the text meets the fiction--Madonna is still in character as the producer, as it is obvious that the video production is still continuing even though the "production" within the video is complete. The narrative voice confronts the fiction, interacts with it (as Madonna dances with the cast on the set of the video), and therefore merges into it. The narrative voice becomes an image.

The way in which image and narrative function in "I sing of a maiden" is not so different from the way they function in the video. An obvious difference between the two texts is that, while the music video's narrative uses religious imagery and sexual lyrics, the medieval lyric uses sexual imagery in conjunction with a religious narrative. A second difference is that the music video provides both oral and visual imagery which sometimes seem to undercut

each other and create a "new" image; the lyric poem provides the reader with one sexual, visual image that, while seeming to contradict the religious narrative, actually supports it.

"I sing of a maiden" compares the incarnation of Christ in Mary to a knight coming to his lady, or, more specifically, to a man coming to his lover. Just as the video's religious imagery shows the pop Madonna evolving into a woman who reaffirms justice, this narrative demonstrates the Madonna to be more good, more pure, and stronger than other humans through her contrast with sexual imagery. Thomas Jemielity carries out the metaphor for Christ's incarnation in the lyric by suggesting that

the anxiety in [the] sexual approach is God's because the poem focusses on her willingness to be the mate and the mother of the divine. Approaching Mary as seed and as lover, Christ awaits her word like a knight awaiting his lady. (325-26)

In this poem, Mary is the Virgin--but that is only half of what she is. She is pure and has no carnal knowledge, but she is undeniably the mother of Jesus. The natural, human process of pregnancy and childbirth seems to be present throughout the poem, simultaneously undercutting and drawing parallels between the supernatural conception of Christ and a natural sexual act.

Jemielity justifies this seemingly contradictory link of Mary to sexual imagery, and acknowledges a unique power that she possesses within the context of the poem, by writing,

this celebration of Mary's intercourse with the divine is suffused with a serenity and confidence of tone that is, perhaps, the most remarkable achievement of . . . the poem. God does not

overpower Mary. . . . Mary commands the moment, and God's reverential hesitation and anxiety appears throughout. For the plan He seeks to effect, after all, involves this woman in the most physically intimate of relationships and He regards her willingness as indispensable to the consummation of his plan. (329-30).

The bottom line is that the Madonna is just as human as the pop Madonna. The narrative voices of both works do not limit these women; they do not dictate the imagery to be solely religious or secular. The images are indeterminate, fluctuating in meaning *with* the narrative, not in conflict with its theme.

As the poem is written in first person, a certain amount of unity between the narrative voice and the artist is established. The narrative voice "sings" of a maiden, just as the artist creates or "sings" the poem. Discerning exactly who is presenting the reader with the images is as complex as it is in the music video. Just as this poet creates an "I" as the narrative voice, in presenting her video as a production, Madonna establishes an "I" in her narrative voice.

Penny Schire Gold, in her "Preface" to *The Lady and the Virgin*, discusses the function of image within a text:

The relationship of an image to the reality of it is more complex than simple reflection; images can also embody fears, fantasies, and wishes. An image is an *interpretation* of reality, an interpretation achieved through a selective emphasis on particular aspects of lived experience; through such reshaping and exaggerating images may not only report but also distort reality. (xviii-xix)

According to Gold, then, an image is created from what is known through reality, encompassing aesthetics of reality,

but also creating a fiction. In both of these texts, it seems to be the combination of the reality and fiction of the image that leads to a certain tone within the work.

In the "Like A Prayer" video, images physically interspersed among each other (fast-paced clips of the saint, the burning cross, Madonna dancing) or on top of each other (lyrics implying one interpretation; visual images another) connect these images and create a disjointed, yet functional narrative voice for the work--an intentional narrative. The three plots concerning social injustice, religious transformation, and sexual fantasy connect, not because of any intrinsic link between the three, but because the symbols, the images, are fused together in one text by one framing narrative--that the video is a self-conscious production.

In the medieval lyric, much the same thing is happening. Sexuality ironically describes the incarnation of Christ in Mary. The Virgin Mother (an oxymoron in itself) did not have sex in order to become pregnant with Christ. The imagery that describes her is ambiguous. She is "makeles," a pun on being both a maiden (an emphasis on the sexual) and incomparable in purity (an emphasis on the spiritual) to any other human. The narrative voice recognizes her power, both to "ches . . . [the]King of alle kinges" and to be both "moder and maiden."

The connection between the two texts might be the relationship between the artist and the image. The artist creates the images in the music video, arranges them, and from that a narrative voice evolves. When a reader separates the image of lady and lover from what the image represents in the medieval lyric, the common image of Mary as Virgin becomes strengthened because of the very tension between her portrayal as Virgin and courtly lover. The images of the video are forced to connect in some type

of unity, although the narrative voice never explicitly connects them for the viewer. Images with which the viewer physically interacts--visual and audial--create a unity by their physical placement next to or on top of each other. The connection between the sexual imagery and the religious message is never explicitly stated in "I sing of a maiden" by the narrative voice, either.

The image and narrative voice are interconnected within these two texts. These vehicles for communication are as important as the messages of the texts themselves. The self-reflexivity established within the images and the narrative voice of these texts demonstrates the close connections between fiction and the reality of the fiction and, ultimately, between the artist and the image he or she creates. This relationship between artist and text is in the structure--the image, the narrative--of these works and becomes a new meaning for it. In a way, both texts become statements on creating texts: the manipulation of images, the creation of a narrative voice, and a creation of a unique "reality" which roots itself in the absence of limitations of time and interpretation. Freedoms that an artist has with his or her work are not limited solely to the fiction of the text. Artists themselves can create illusions between their texts and reality, and this very illusion can become another interpretation of the text.

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## Renaming the Rose in the Work of Louisa May Alcott

*Deneen Senasi*

O! Be some other name!  
What's in a name? That which we call a rose  
By any other name would smell as sweet;  
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo called,  
Retain that dear perfection which he owes  
Without that title. Romeo doff thy name,  
And for that name, which is no part of thee,  
Take all myself.

from William Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet

Be some other name. Juliet's proposal is a provocative suggestion that goes beyond a naive girl's solution to inconvenient adolescent love. In these famous lines, Shakespeare's inexperienced maiden instinctively grasps the powerful implications of a name and the new possibilities that might exist if it were possible to escape from those implications. Of course, Romeo and Juliet do not escape. The major events of the play are set in motion because of who they are, and their fates are largely determined by the names they bear. Romeo and the rose will not be renamed, but the question raised during Juliet's moonlit musings remains. What's in a name? More often

than not, what is or is not in a name goes a long way toward determining the opportunities afforded the individual who bears it. Obviously this is as true for authors as it is for the fictional characters they create. A manuscript bearing the name Chaucer or Shakespeare, Emerson or Eliot, will probably be perceived very differently from the work of writers who are less known.

Still, the obstacle of obscurity can sometimes be overcome. The idea of "making a name for oneself" has become a cliché in American culture. But what if that name is a woman's? In societies steeped in centuries of patriarchy, gender is a decisive factor in examining the implications of any given name. Like Romeo and Juliet, women writers have often found their ambitions and desires thwarted simply because of the group they are born into (in this case a gender rather than a family) which is inevitably revealed by the names they bear. Faced with the seemingly insurmountable obstacles placed between a woman writer and literary achievement, many have resorted to the subterfuge of an assumed name, and more importantly, an assumed gender.

Gifted nineteenth-century women like Charlotte and Emily Brontë began their careers publishing under male pseudonyms, and the original names of George Eliot and George Sand are now remembered by only a few. These are the authors most often associated with the use of male pseudonyms, but there is another, less well-known example. Generations of American children and adults have read her famous novels, completely unaware of the distinctly different work she published under an assumed name. Louisa May Alcott, the author of Little Women, has become an American literary icon associated with traditional assumptions about the home and womanhood. Nevertheless, there is another side to her work that most

readers have never seen. In Writing A Woman's Life, Carolyn Heilburn addresses the allure of this kind of secret double life for women writers:

I believe that women have long searched, and continue to search, for an identity "other" than their own. Caught in the conventions of their sex, they have sought an escape from gender. A woman author who was not content to expound the titillations of romance, or live out Freud's family romance, had two means of escape. One was to hide her identity as an author within the shelter of anonymity, the safety of secrecy, to write while protecting the quotidian self leading her appropriate life. (112)

Heilburn's second option for escape will be important later, but it is easy to see how perfectly the description in this passage fits Louisa May Alcott. She will always be known as the author of Little Women, but she was also a writer who literally made another name for herself, and in doing so, evaded the implications of her obviously female (and eventually quite famous) name.

In her introduction to a collection titled Alternative Alcott, Elaine Showalter offers some valuable insight into Alcott's other side. According to Showalter, "modern critics have generally seen her enormous output (at least 270 works in every genre from poetry to tragedy) as divided between conflicting literary impulses" (ix). Little Women (1868), Little Men (1871), and Jo's Boys (1886) represent what Showalter describes as Alcott's "domestic and moralizing side" while she also "inscribed her passion, anger, and satirical wit, producing a series of pseudonymous sensation stories."<sup>1</sup> The title of one of these stories is especially appropriate in an examination of

Alcott's authorial duality. "Behind a Mask" was published in 1866 under the sexually ambiguous name of A.M. Bernard. According to Showalter, this was Alcott's first attempt to conceal her gender (xxix). This tale, subtitled "A Woman's Power," provides a whole range of fascinating contrasts to, unexpected parallels with, and sometimes outright contradictions of Alcott's best known description of the lives of women, the now famous March sisters in Little Women.

Works of literature, like the authors who create them, are affected by the names (in this case, the titles) they bear, and the significance of the name in Alcott's work extends to the text itself. Take for example, the distinctly different titles chosen for the novel and the sensation story under consideration here. The implications of a title like Little Women are obviously far removed from those of "Behind a Mask." The former is diminutive and therefore unthreatening, while the latter calls to mind images of mystery and danger. When the subtitle, "A Woman's Power" is added, the name of this story becomes an incredibly overt feminist declaration. This thematic difference is also reflected in the names the author chose for many of the characters. The names of the March sisters have either been reduced to diminutives, Margaret becomes Meg and Josephine is Jo, or the names are small words to begin with as is the case with Beth and Amy. However, in their literary group, The Pickwick Club, the girls each adopt the name of a famous male author:

At seven o'clock, the four members ascended to the clubroom, tied their badges round their heads, and took their seats with great solemnity. Meg, as the eldest, was Samuel Pickwick; Jo, being of a literary turn, Augustus Snodgrass; Beth, because she was round and

rosy, Tracy Tupman, and Amy, who was always trying to do what she couldn't, was Nathaniel Winkle. (Little Women 94)

It is important to note that this gender appropriation occurs only during the meetings of the club, and that the literary activity in which the girls engage is only a children's game.

Ambiguous gender is always present, however, in the names of Laurie and Jo whose nicknames imply the opposite of their actual genders. This is an interesting parallel to "Behind a Mask" in which the heroine's name, Jean Muir, is also sexually ambiguous. Alcott's use of such names in her work is obviously not accidental, and it is important to recognize that in both works, the characters with sexually ambiguous names throughout, Jean Muir, Laurie, and Jo, are the most vibrant and/or powerful individuals in the text. In Chapter Six of Writing A Woman's Life, Heilburn addresses this connection between power and names that conceal or obscure gender, and as she points out, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar refer to the pseudonym as "a name of power, the mark of a private christening into a second self, a rebirth into linguistic primacy" (qtd. in Heilburn 110). Through the elusive ambiguity of their names, Alcott provides at least some of her characters with the same kind of heightened possibility she seems to be searching for through her own sexually ambiguous pseudonym.

Alcott's preoccupation with power and possibility, especially female power, continues in her characterization of women. One of the most startling differences between Little Women and "Behind a Mask" is the drastically different portrayals of women they contain. The March sisters, except Jo, all represent some aspect of conventional femininity. Meg is sensuous, earthy beauty, Beth is an ethereal saint, and Amy is an exquisite, ambitious, and

refined china doll. Mrs. March is the quintessential devoted matron who lives to nurture her husband and her daughters. Of course, Jo is something altogether different:

Fifteen-year-old Jo was very tall, thin, and brown, and reminded one of a colt, for she never seemed to know what to do with her long limbs, which were very much in her way. She had a decided mouth, a comical nose, and sharp, grey eyes, which appeared to see everything, and were by turns fierce, funny, or thoughtful. Her long, thick hair was her one beauty, but it was usually bundled into a net to be out of her way. Round shoulders had Jo, big hands and feet, a flyaway look to her clothes, and the uncomfortable appearance of a girl who was rapidly shooting up into a woman and didn't like it. (*Little Women* 6)

Jo is a talented tomboy who stalwartly refuses to abandon her "boyish" pleasures and pursuits--running, skating, playing the hero in her own plays, and most importantly, writing. While it is true that she is the most androgynous (her "masculine" traits are combined with a very "feminine" tendency toward compassion and nurturing of the sisters), it is important to recognize that Jo is still an anomaly who is indulgently tolerated by an ideal family. It is also essential to see Jo within the context of her conventionally feminine sisters and mother. Not surprisingly, it is those aspects of her personality that would traditionally be called "masculine" that usually get Jo into trouble:

Jo's ambition was to do something very splendid: what it was she had no idea as yet, but left it for time to tell her; and meanwhile, found her greatest affliction in the fact that she

couldn't read, run, and ride as much as she liked. A quick temper, sharp tongue, and restless spirit were always getting her into scrapes, and her life was a series of ups and downs, which were both comic and pathetic.

(Little Women 36)

Jo's "boyishness" is portrayed as a basically harmless eccentricity, something she is certainly expected to grow out of. This portrayal is in stark contrast to the heroine of "Behind a Mask," who represents an altogether different definition of androgyny, for she combines traditionally "masculine" and "feminine" aspects in ways that are compelling and powerful rather than merely eccentric. Jean Muir is first introduced to the reader in the guise of an impoverished but accomplished young governess who has come to join a wealthy family. Indeed, the opening section of the story reads like a chapter from Jane Eyre (Charlotte Brontë's well-known Gothic tale of the adventures of a spirited young governess),<sup>2</sup> until the last lines startle the reader with a brutal surprise more reminiscent of Jonathan Swift's darkest satires:

Still sitting on the floor she unbound and removed the long abundant braids from her head, wiped the pink from her face, took out several pearly teeth, and slipping off her dress appeared herself indeed, a haggard, worn, and moody woman of thirty at least. The metamorphosis was wonderful, but the disguise was more in the expression she assumed than in any art of costume or false adornment. Now she was alone, and her mobile features settled into their natural expression, weary, hard, bitter. ("Behind a Mask" qtd. in Alternative Alcott 106)

Jean Muir, like the author who created her, is obviously not always what she appears to be. Jean is actually a destitute divorced actress of great intelligence, resourcefulness, and daring. She has come, not to tutor the family's youngest daughter Bella, but to marry herself into security, comfort, and power. The story actually presents two very different characterizations of Jean. The first is the role she plays in front of the Coventry family of the stereotypically demure, passive, and unimpeachable governess. In this disguise she infatuates the youngest, impressionable brother, his lonely, old, but titled uncle, and finally the elusive, older brother Gerald, master of the estate. This incarnation of Jean is present throughout the major part of the story. The other side of Jean is more realistic and more complicated; she is forced to be cunning and manipulative by circumstance, but she is also compassionate and warm when she attains her goal. The reader is given only occasional glimpses of this aspect of Jean's nature, but throughout, her apparently conventional femininity is tempered with intelligence and competence surpassing that of the men in a variety of situations, as well as a cool head under pressure. In her creation of Jean, Alcott appears to be employing Carolyn Heilburn's second alternative of escape for the woman writer. Indeed, Heilburn might well be describing this alternative in relation to Alcott and Jean when she writes,

The other way was to create in her writings women characters, and sometimes male characters, who might openly enact the dangerous adventures of a woman's life, unconstrained by female propriety.<sup>3</sup>

While some readers might question some of Jean's actions, she is without question a gifted and powerful woman whose

story might certainly be called a "dangerous adventure" (Heilburn 112).

For Jean Muir and Jo March, the dangerous adventure will end in marriage. While this statement might imply a similarity in plot resolution in the two works, nothing could be farther from the truth. The implications of what happens to Jean and what happens to Jo are very different. Jean sets out to accomplish marriage from the beginning. She succeeds in marrying old Uncle John in spite of the fact that she is constantly in danger of being exposed in the final sections of the story. Even the elusive Gerald, master of the estate, banishes his younger brother and abandons his long-time love to win her. Sensing approaching victory on several fronts, Jean writes exultantly to her friend,

The enemy has surrendered! Give me joy Hortense; I can be the wife of this proud monsieur, if I will. Think what an honor for the divorced wife of a disreputable actor. I laugh at the farce and enjoy it, for I only wait till the prize I desire is fairly mine, to turn and reject this lover who has proved himself false to brother, mistress, and his own conscience. I resolved to be revenged on both, and I have kept my word. ("Behind a Mask" qtd. in Alternative Alcott 199)

Not only does Jean succeed in her quest to become Lady Coventry, she is also in a position to enforce her own, very individual sense of justice.

Jo's relationships with men are quite different from Jean's. For Jo, marriage is not a hard won victory; it is something she has strenuously tried to avoid (and she succeeds until almost the very end of the novel). It is important to remember Jo as she was in the earlier sections

of the novel. She wanted to "do something splendid" (Little Women 36). Marriage was absolutely not what she had in mind; the dream she described was altogether different:

I want to do something splendid before I go into my castle--something heroic or wonderful that won't be forgotten after I'm dead. I don't know what, but I'm on the watch for it, and mean to astonish you all some day. I think I shall write books, and get rich and famous: that would suit me, so that is my favorite dream. (Little Women 135)

In spite of all these aspirations, what is waiting for Jo is marriage, children, and no more writing.

Jean gets what she wants, Jo doesn't, but the unequal fates of the two go further. Although both women marry significantly older men, the dynamics of the relationships are very different. Even before Jo marries her professor, his opinions are given precedence over hers. This point is illustrated in Jo's response to Friedrich's disapproval of her sensation stories:

He did it so quietly that Jo never knew he was watching to see if she would accept and profit by his reproof; but she stood the test, and he was satisfied, for though no words passed between them, he knew that she had given up writing. (Little Women 335)

It is at this point in the novel that the "old" Jo begins to disappear. To quote a line from Restoration drama, she will soon "dwindle into a wife" (Congreve Act 4, lines 246-47). It is hard to imagine Jean Muir dwindling into anything; the force of her personality remains strongly in control even in the face of strident disdain and open disapproval. In the story's final lines, she unabashedly

acknowledged her dramatic tour de force when she reminds her now rejected lover of his first impressions of her. Gerald, who in the beginning was harder to fool than the rest of the family, immediately sensed something dramatic--not quite to be believed--about Jean. He wondered aloud whether her exit would be as compelling as her entrance. As the story ends, Jean appears to answer his challenge when she turns and "fixing on Gerald the strange glance he remembered well, she said in her penetrating voice, 'Is not the last scene better than the first?'"<sup>4</sup>

The dramatic conclusion to "Behind a Mask" is reflective of the significant role of drama in Alcott's work. Jean Muir is obviously a gifted actress, and who knows what kind of playwright Jo might have been if she had been allowed to continue her childhood productions. However, the implications of Alcott's dramatic aspects go beyond characterization. In the theatre, on stage, everyone is in disguise; everyone adopts a different name, just as Alcott has done through the use of her ambiguous pseudonym, A.M. Bernard. The text is filled with veiled characters, just as the woman writer veils herself in her pseudonym. And it is important to use the term woman writer because if this idea is extended to the text itself, Little Women and "Behind a Mask" become a metaphor for Alcott's literary career. In an analysis of Chaucer's sexual poetics, Carolyn Dinshaw makes a connection between the act of writing and gender that is essential here:

The poem's last word points out that literary activity has a gendered structure, a structure that associates acts of writing and related acts of signifying--allegorizing, interpreting, glossing, translating--with the masculine and that identifies the surfaces of which these acts are performed, or from which these acts

depart, or which these acts reveal--the page, the text, the literal sense, or even the hidden meaning--with the feminine. (9)

The text, Dinshaw argues, is a veiled woman.<sup>5</sup> Scholars often speak of the "body" of a text, and Alcott makes this connection in Little Women when Jo sets out to edit her novel according to everyone else's specifications:

So, with a spartan firmness, the young authoress laid her first-born on her table, and chopped it up as ruthlessly as any ogre. In the hope of pleasing everyone, she took everyone's advice, and like the old man and his donkey in the fable suited nobody. (Little Women 255)

If the text is indeed a woman, then the kind of invasive procedures Jo is forced to perform could be equated with rape, mutilation, and disfigurement. Jo's text is inevitably altered and tainted by this critical "penetration." The virgin has been deflowered, but as everyone knows, women are always expected to be pure and true--regardless of who or what is really responsible for that loss of innocence.

How then can Jo and, by extension, Alcott preserve the purity of the text? Alcott's answer is an ironic one. To understand that answer, it is necessary to look again at "Behind a Mask" and Little Women, at Jean Muir and Jo March. Plot resolution is the key. Jean, the woman who lies, manipulates, and who, most importantly, conceals her true identity, is rewarded at the end of Alcott's story. Honest, straightforward Jo ends up with a destiny far removed from the one she hoped for. Again, Showalter provides valuable insight into Alcott's authorial interests when she writes,

at the request of her publishers, Roberts Brothers, she set aside her own literary projects to write a 'girl's story'. Little Women--a book

she had not particularly wanted to write--  
ironically made her not only famous, but  
famous for womanly goodness. (xxii)

The significance of Showalter's information lies in the idea that Little Women was not the kind of fiction Louisa May Alcott was really interested in writing. In order to write the way she wanted, Alcott resorted to what is in effect, a kind of social lie. Society at large would probably disagree with Juliet's assumption that the name and the individual are not irrevocably bound. Using Alcott's characters as a model, it appears she had little choice. Jean is rewarded for her ability to hide her true nature, while Jo's dreams are dismissed because she is so open. This observation seems to imply that truth is a dangerous thing for women.

Traditionally, society and scholars have assumed that women and texts are supposed to be true, but Alcott's morally "true" Little Women is not an honest reflection of the author's vision. How then can a woman writer express her truth instead of merely serving as a pawn in the perpetuation of patriarchal stereotypes of women's lives? How could she stop patriarchal society from using her woman's voice against her? Juliet and Jean Muir knew the answer--be some other name. Louisa May Alcott might be forced to confine herself to the creation of the March sisters with Jo as her one doomed, eccentric indulgence, but A.M. Bernard is free to write of anything and anyone. Juliet tells her lover, "That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." For Louisa May Alcott, that "other name" was much more than a simple exchange; it was indeed something far sweeter. Only by renaming the rose was Alcott finally free to speak of the other side of its existence--not the tender petals and softness, and sweet smell, but the thorns.

## Notes

1. Alcott's other side also includes four novels for adults--Moods (1864), Work (1873), A Modern Mephistopheles (1877), and the unfinished Diana and Persis (1879), as well as Transcendental Wild Oats, and a number of historical and feminist essays.
2. In Alternative Alcott, Showalter points out several similarities between the narrative conventions in "Behind a Mask" and Jane Eyre and Vanity Fair. (Introduction, xxx)
3. Heilburn is actually discussing nineteenth-century women writers such as Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, and Willa Cather. See Writing A Woman's Life, 112.
4. These lines, found on page 202 of Showalter's collection, echo an exchange between Jean and Gerald in the first section of the story. When she collapses shortly after arriving at the Coventry home, Gerald intuitively senses that he is witnessing a theatrical performance. On page 101 of the text, he tells Jean, "Scene first, very well done" and she replies by promising that, "the last scene shall be still better."
5. In her discussion of the significant role of truth in love in Chaucer's work, Dinshaw makes a point that applies to Alcott's characters as well when she writes, "unlike a man's fidelity, a woman's truth in love, as I shall argue in my discussion of Troilus and Criseyde, constitutes her function within the structure of patriarchal society" (7).

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## The Waste Land in Two-Hearted River (Style and Theme in Hemingway and Eliot)

*Spence Taylor*

"It got larger and larger and larger and then smaller and smaller. Then everything commenced to run faster and faster as when they speed up a cinematograph film. Then he was dead"

Ernest Hemingway  
(excerpt from interchapter 14)

"Son of man/ You can not say, or guess, for you know only/ A heap of broken images"

T.S. Eliot  
(excerpt from *The Waste Land*)

Combining the above quotations is not extremely challenging. Possibly a suitable mesh between the two could be, "a film of broken images growing larger and larger, then smaller and smaller with increasing speed." These visions fit together without difficulty, because they reflect the similar styles and themes of Ernest Hemingway and T.S. Eliot. Both of these writers shared a tragic vision of their era--that of a waste land--a collage of barrenness,

infertility, failed relationships, failed initiations, isolation, and inevitable death. Hemingway uses it to structure Nick Adams, the hero in many of Hemingway's short stories, as he develops from pre-adolescence in "Indian Camp" to a post-war veteran in "Big Two-Hearted River." Similarly, Eliot creates these images to accompany Tiresias in *The Waste Land* during his blinded search for the meaning of life, and specifically in his attempt to find understanding in marriage and desire.

Through the waste land collage, Hemingway and Eliot paint a timeless picture of desolation and the need for rejuvenation. However, both have used their art to address personal opinions and beliefs rather than to offer solutions. Eliot at a lecture at Harvard University called *The Waste Land* a "'relief of a personal and wholly insignificant grouse against life'" (qtd. in Gish 44). Eliot had written most of *The Waste Land* while undergoing treatment in Lausanne for emotional trouble that he described as "'an aboulie and emotional derangement which has been a life long affliction'" (qtd. in Lynn 247). In the same respect, Hemingway viewed life so tragically that he wrote *The Sun Also Rises*, calling it "'a damn tragedy with the earth as hero abiding forever'" (qtd. in Williams 40). Later his depression could no longer be fully ventilated through his fiction. Once this instrument of relief was gone, he ended his life on July 2, 1961.

Hemingway and Eliot could express their hopelessness through their writing. Often, they would use natural elements such as wind and rain or the absence of these elements to add dreary overtones to their fiction and poetry. In chapter XXVII of *A Farewell To Arms* the word "rain" appears twenty-four times (Schneider 264). Catherine sees herself dead in it, and the rain follows her until this fear becomes a reality. Several of the

interchapters from In Our Time depict death through muddy, rainy evacuation or execution images. For Eliot it is the lack of rain that drains life out of the land. *The Waste Land* speaks of the absence of rain and a desert-like dryness that symbolizes the sterility of life. Both writers express that birth is surrounded by death. Hemingway sets the boundaries in "Indian Camp" when Nick sees his father deliver an Indian baby and immediately following witnesses the remains of the Indian husband's suicide. The same holds true in the opening lines of Eliot's *The Waste Land* when April breeds lilacs out of the "dead land." These common motifs extend from a method that the two contemporaries used to project powerful points across to the reader.

Stylistically, both writers subscribe to what Eliot calls the objective correlative. F.O. Matthiessen explicates the correlative saying, "'His design is to give the *exact* perceived detail, without comment, and let that picture carry its own connotations'" (qtd. in Adams 242). Hemingway explores this method as well, only he calls it the iceberg theory. In an interview with George Plimpton, he describes this theory by saying, "I always try to write on the principle of the iceberg. There is seven eighths of it underwater for every part that shows" (Plimpton 35). The cinematograph and broken image quotations are metafictional in that they describe these similar styles. In many ways *The Waste Land* is a heap of broken images. The poem is a mixture of memories and desires that can only come into focus in the general impression that they leave on the reader. Likewise, Hemingway's vignettes from In Our Time are composed of simple pictures of an event or scene that require reader discourse for interpretation.

It is not hard to find possible influences that may

account for these similarities. Richard Adams writes, "There has seldom been a literary generation the members of which were in closer communication than the American, French, and British writers of the 1920's" (Adams 241). Hemingway read and re-read Eliot's poetry and paid close attention to literary journals to determine its intellectual origins (Lynn 246). Because Eliot used his authority to influence some of the policies of the *transatlantic review*, Hemingway resented him enough to attack him personally in "Mr. and Mrs. Elliot," the story of a poet who recently graduated from Harvard and is experiencing infertility in his new marriage (247). This certainly suggests that Hemingway and Eliot were familiar with one another's styles, methods, and themes.

The thematic similarities peak in Hemingway's short story "Big Two-Hearted River" and Eliot's *The Waste Land*. By the time Hemingway's Nick Adams reaches the two-hearted river, Nick is carrying a guilty conscience inflated by his experiences in earlier short stories. When Nick finds himself in the burned and abandoned town of Seney, a waste land emerges that suggests he is dealing with the ruins of his life as well. The emptiness of his interior and exterior environment is felt early in the narrative:

There was no town, nothing but the rails and the burned-over country. The thirteen saloons that had lined the one street of Seney had not left a trace. . . . Even the surface had been burned off the ground. (Hemingway 209)

Already, Hemingway has demonstrated the destruction of fire--a reminder to Nick of his war experience. The land is dry and barren, indicating the loss of fertility. Emptiness and destruction are the pervasive motifs in this scene. However, these symbols are soothed when Nick

sees the river, a symbol for fertility and rebirth. In the river, Nick can find the answer to many of his troubles and begin to recover from the pain of his past (Stein 557). In this respect he is his own redeemer, similar to the tradition of *The Waste Land* myths (556).

Like this opening scene of "Big Two-Hearted River: Part I," *The Waste Land* begins with a devastated country. It opens, "April is the cruellest month, breeding/ Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing/ Memory and desire" (Eliot 29). In the first section, titled "The Burial of the Dead," Eliot describes the barrenness of a land and the quest of the fisher king. Jessie Weston's book From Ritual To Romance gives insight to the first few lines of *The Waste Land* and elaborates on the grail legend. The myth follows that an arid and waterless land is blighted by a curse that relates to the sexual impotency of the fisher king. A knight must begin the quest and search for the meaning of the Grail and the Lance, which in Christian terms represent the lance that pierced Christ's side at the Crucifixion and the cup that Jesus and the disciples drank from in the Last Supper. If he discovers the answer to these symbols, the spell of the fisher king and of the devastated ground will be dismissed, restoring fertility to the land (Drew 61).

Similar to the task of the knight, Nick must search for life and rebirth in the river. The river provides him with a source for rehabilitation and allows the land the possibility of revitalization (Stein 557). In this light, the reader must perceive Nick as the knight and the fisher king, because he is the instrument for the recovery of the land and his own mental health. As can be seen in any of the Nick Adams stories leading up to "Big-Two Hearted River," Nick is an observer, a mere spectator of events, not unlike Tiresias, who is recognized in *The Waste Land* as the "old man with wrinkled dugs" who "perceived the

scene" (Eliot 38). The scene that the androgynous Tiresias observes is a sexual one, and after it is finished he notes that the woman is glad that it is over, indicating the meaningless nature of love and the relationship.

On his way to the river, Nick Adams carries a burden partially made up of his own failure with relationships. Nick deflects the feelings he has for Marge in "The End of Something" and finally tries to numb them in a sequel story, "The Three Day Blow." William Stein claims that the dissolution of Nick Adams' ability to love "reflects the decay of the ideal of selfless love in Western culture" (555). This is what *The Waste Land* is precisely about: "the mass of people who live lives of empty routine and emotional isolation" (Gish 41). Nick, like Tiresias, is an observer throughout his experiences as protagonist in Hemingway's stories. Tiresias' attempt to make understanding of the sexual relationship mentioned earlier is unbiased because Eliot's character is androgynous. As a union of man and woman, Tiresias is able to note the breakdown of communication between the sexes:

'My nerves are bad tonight. Yes, bad. Stay with me. 'Speak to me. Why do you never speak. Speak. 'What are you thinking of? What thinking? What?' I never know what you are thinking. Think.' (100)

The quotations indicate that a female persona is talking. Through this dialogue, the same dissatisfaction that enters the man and woman after sex uncovers itself even further in the problem the woman has in understanding her lover. Tiresias as an androgynous being illustrates a common theme that Hemingway uses in his fiction. For example, Hemingway addresses androgyny and failed relationships in some of his short stories from In Our Time and in his novels The Sun Also Rises and A

Farewell to Arms. These thematic similarities partly stem from Hemingway's and Eliot's own failed relationships.

Hemingway was married four times, and his first wife, Hadley Richardson, was similar to the androgynous characters that he portrayed in his short stories. Her hair was extremely short, and her personality began to duplicate Hemingway's. This bothered him so much that he disguised his own frustration in a female voice in "Cat in the Rain," a story in which communication breaks down between an androgynous wife and her husband (Lynn 253). Similar to Hemingway, T.S. Eliot was frustrated with his relationship with Vivien Haigh-Wood, whom Ezra Pound summarized as "'an invalid, always cracking up, & needing doctors'" (qtd. in Lynn 247). *The Waste Land* stemmed largely from the sterility of Eliot's own marriage and captured the barrenness and fruitlessness of his life and his generation. Fiction and poetry, and Tiresias and Nick Adams, were tools that these writers used to voice their frustrations.

For Nick and Tiresias, the similarities not only exist in their environments, but they are apparent in their characters also. In the same respect that Eliot's Tiresias is "throbbing between two lives," so is Nick Adams. As mentioned earlier, when Nick is carrying his burdensome backpack upon his shoulders, he is symbolically bearing a culmination of guilt and hardship reserved from his past experiences. At this point he is in his first life approaching inevitable death. However, the river can be a place of baptism to Nick, where he can experience rebirth and begin a new, spiritually refreshed life. The water is holy to him, and the shock that he receives when he enters it indicates a baptismal occurrence. Up until this point he had prepared for this rebirth with his ritualistic mechanisms of setting camp and making dinner and coffee. All of these

ritualistic preparations precede Nick's entrance into the water--his entrance into a new life.

The ritual of baptism introduces Christianity to "Big Two-Hearted River." As Nick begins to make coffee, he remembers Hopkins, a friend who demonstrated the art of making coffee to Nick and Bill on a previous camping trip. Nick recalls Hopkins' departure and his promise to visit them again. Jack Stewart finds the leaving of Hopkins to be similar to the last supper of Christ in that Hopkins gives away his gun and camera to his disciple-like friends. Then Hopkins promises reunion with Nick and Bill, but never returns (Stewart 195). The coffee scene is also thought to be representative of Christ's communion. Nick is drinking "the gospel according to Hopkins" (195).

If Stewart's criticism is taken seriously, then *The Waste Land* myth brings forth another striking similarity. Madame Sosostriis is unable to find the hanged man. The hanged man represents, among a few things, "the crucified Christ." As she prophesizes about the future, she sees no evidence of the crucified Christ--no return of the savior and no rebirth of the waste land. Hopkins has deserted Nick, leaving him with only a few rituals to cope with the waste land. Nick and Bill "never saw Hopkins again." If Hopkins is perceived as a Christlike figure, then his failure to return is comparable to the hopelessness created by the hanged man's absence. Religion fails in Hemingway's and Eliot's waste lands, and the grail quest ends unsatisfied.

The hopelessness of the grail quest is largely alluded to in "Big Two-Hearted River: Part II." The swamp that Nick fails to enter represents the core of his fear and guilt. It is the inner waste land that he turns away from, similar to Tiresias' retreat from the hyacinth girl. In this instance the retreat demonstrates the failure to initiate and the inability to break away from the curse of infertility.

These thematic similarities more and more appear to derive from a source. Although many critics have tried to deny a direct relationship between Hemingway and Eliot, the similar mythic relationships indicate that Hemingway more than likely did borrow from Eliot. In a critical comparison of The Sun Also Rises and *The Waste Land*, Richard Adams claims that Hemingway does owe a debt to Eliot (Adams 245). Adams writes,

He agreed with many of Eliot's principles; he used many of the same techniques. . . .I see no reason in the evidence not to suppose that we have a typical case of direct, formative literary influence. . . .My theory is that Hemingway found what he needed in *The Waste Land* and took it. (245)

Even though Richard Adams is drawing this conclusion based on the similarities between The Sun Also Rises and *The Waste Land*, "Big Two-Hearted River" shares many of the same stylistic constructions. The words not only explain an action, but they cause the reader to feel the movement. In an essay on the poetic nature of A Farewell To Arms, Daniel Schneider claims that Hemingway's style takes a lyrical form rather than an epical one (Schneider 252). His writing is "a poetry of inclusion or synthesis" which contains among other things, "jagged rhythms" (252). The word "rain" is mentioned consistently, leaving an overall dreary hopelessness that pervades the novel (264). Schneider argues that in A Farewell To Arms episodes of the novel act upon readers in many ways that *The Waste Land* does. Dialogue, narrative, and description are perceived as expressions of fear and desire (258).

Of course this is the case in "Big Two-Hearted River: Part II." The river is "shocking" to Nick. When he first enters, "It was a shock. . . .The water was a rising cold

shock" (224). In this narrative the reader should associate the shock with Nick's inward struggle in his first direct confrontation with his fears. If it is read as a baptismal entrance, then this struggle is the necessary redemption that Nick must undergo. Nevertheless, the words "cold" and "shock" are the expressions of the "fear and desire" that Schneider is describing when regarding A Farewell To Arms. These feelings recur when Nick loses the big trout: "Nick's hand was shaky. . . .The fear had been too much. . . .He felt vaguely, a little sick, as though it would be better to sit down" (226). The language becomes a symbol for Nick's inner emotion and is an example of the impure poetry that Schneider is describing.

These images of fear and desire are evident throughout *The Waste Land*. Eliot depicts the emotions when Marie sleds down the mountain. He was "frightened" and holding on "tight" going "down" the mountain. Largely this emotion trailed from the emptiness after the war. For Eliot's Tiresias, "The river bears no empty bottles. . . .The nymphs are departed. . . have left no addresses (36). The war follows Nick throughout his retreat to the two-hearted Black river. When he baits the grasshopper on to his hook, the reader is reminded of the bayonet piercing the soldier in World War I as he crosses the waste land:

He was getting his front legs out of the bottle  
to jump. Nick took him by the head and held  
him while he threaded the slim hook under his  
chin, down the thorax and into the last  
segments of his abdomen. (224)

The hooking of the grasshopper is later changed to the hooking of a lizard in "Now I Lay Me," and it has a painful effect on Nick. This action reminds Nick of the post-war anguish and pain that he has carried on his back

to the river. Here, Hemingway's lyrical language, like Eliot's, distributes the emotion and the thought by revealing only images. The power is underneath the surface of the iceberg, like the strength to Eliot's poetry is found in his objective correlative.

Hemingway's thematic and stylistic devices can be traced to Paris in early 1922 where he met Ezra Pound, who had recently edited *The Waste Land* (Adams 245). He was well aware of *The Waste Land*, along with other works, like James Joyce's *Ulysses*, which focused on the "mythical method" (the method in which art makes sense of the disordered futility that contemporary history always presents) (245). Eliot insisted that others would have to follow Joyce's method to fully express their art (245). More than likely, Hemingway combined his own experiences of futility with this necessary philosophy to create his fiction. Nick Adams is trying to overcome the futility of Seney and of his inner consciousness in the same way that Tiresias is attempting to make some conclusion towards the meaning of traditional values. In these two stories especially, the writing of Ernest Hemingway and T.S. Eliot unveils the waste land of their generation and their perceptions of the emptiness and hopelessness that engulfs men and women in our time.

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## Nationalism and National Security Policy-Making: Lessons From U.S.-Brazilian Military Relations

*Gamaliel Perruci, Jr.*

*After* World War II, aspiring powers such as Brazil had to face a new international arrangement favoring the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Making a choice between the two sides entailed both costs and benefits. Political and economic dependence imposed a severe cost in terms of diplomatic flexibility, while a superpower's "incentives" (arms, trade, economic assistance) rekindled hopes of domestic improvements in economic and military capability. For weaker nations, the structure of the international system in the 1950s not only dichotomized policy alternatives (East versus West), but it also in some ways supplied the "preferred" alternative. In the Brazilian case, located as it was in the U.S. sphere of influence, the immediate post-war period fostered the politics of "uneven attraction" (the U.S. power to control the national security agenda of Brazil) rather than the politics of choice which had predominated in the interwar period (choosing between competing alliances--Germany or the United States--according to locally developed national security goals).

The principal casualty in the politics of uneven

attraction is the taming and molding of nationalist objectives so as to conform to external requirements. Nationalism plays an important role in national security policy making, as countries face the two processes of uneven attraction and choice. The tight bipolar system constrained nationalism by reorienting it toward U.S. Cold-War objectives, with an emphasis on the geopolitical threat of Communism. The U.S. power to promote its policy objectives became quite evident in Brazil after the war, when the United States used its leverage to redesign defense policy in Latin America. In Brazil's case, a 1952 military assistance agreement solidified the country's close alliance with the Cold War objectives of the United States. This agreement gives us important insights about the way the politics of "uneven attraction" operates in a situation of clear asymmetry.

During the 1950s, under influence from U.S. Cold War aims, Brazil developed a sophisticated Doctrine of National Security (NSD), which closely linked development to security conceptions. This article argues that the tight bipolar structure of the 1950s downplayed the developmental application of this doctrine, while encouraging traditional geopolitical conceptions of asymmetrical power relations. In particular, this article seeks to explore the transformation of nationalism in the Brazilian military into a conservative force in favor of U.S. Cold War aims.

#### Antecedents to Brazil's Cold War Military Cooperation

In the interwar period, Brazil benefited from the power vacuum in the international system to reap economic and military rewards. The United States worried about Germany's interest in South America's raw materials because they would provide an opportunity for the

emerging European power to expand its sphere of influence. Gerson Moura correctly points out that the appearance of Germany in the interwar period as an avid consumer of Brazilian raw materials greatly expanded the market alternatives for Brazilian exports.<sup>1</sup> Britain feared the Nazi trade thrust in South America, but its bargaining position in Brazil was weak.<sup>2</sup> It had to rely on the United States to frustrate Berlin's trade strategy.

Brazil was able to capitalize on this rivalry by carefully pitting one side against the other, extracting commercial benefits in the process. The interwar period possessed two systems of power, each seeking alliances, which allowed the Brazilian foreign policy-makers to establish what Moura calls a "pragmatic equidistance."<sup>4</sup> Even as political events in the late 1930s forced President Getúlio Vargas' Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-1945) to oppose Germany's belligerent intentions, Brazilian national security policy continued to be one of closer ties with any nation that might help its military and economic capability. Brazil used the possibility of German arms purchases to encourage the United States to abandon its traditional policy of restraint in arms sales to Latin America.<sup>5</sup> In the process, Brazil used both sides to build its own military capability.<sup>6</sup>

Brazil's bargaining power in the interwar period rested not only on its strategic location but also on its raw materials. As long as centers of power vied for them, Brazil benefited. World War II forced Brazil to take a position since both sides of the conflict needed raw materials for the war effort. In addition, the Allies' naval embargo against Germany seriously crippled Brazil's trade with that country, including the supply of German weapons to the Brazilian military. The international conflict thus had

a direct impact on Brazil's security relations, shifting the patterns of dominance from Europe toward the United States. In 1939, Brazil welcomed an American Military Mission to train its army.<sup>7</sup> Military cooperation between Brazil and the United States was formalized in 1942 with an agreement that served as the basis for the former's entry in the war.

Vargas, intent on capitalizing on Brazil's seemingly enhanced role in the world, reminded President Roosevelt when the two met in the northeastern city of Natal in 1943 that since Brazil was in the war, cooperation with the United States should be "complete." FEB, as a result, became not only a clever Brazilian military strategy (gaining access to American armaments) but also an attempt to score a political victory. Since it would supposedly enhance the status of the nation in Latin America and the rest of the world, Brazil's role would not be simply one of resource supplier and of "way-station to the battlefields." <sup>10</sup>

The benefits of an "enhanced" prestige, however, failed to materialize. While the 1942 agreement had as its basis Brazil's participation in the war, the emergence of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the late 1940s gave way to new patterns of alliance in world affairs. Two aspects of the late 1940s changed the bargaining position of Brazil, thus exposing its national security policy-makers to the politics of "uneven attraction." First, the destruction of Britain as an actual hegemon and of Germany as an aspiring one broke the traditional linkage that had existed between Brazil and Europe in previous decades. Second, the Soviet Union did not have any previous strong ties with Brazil. Therefore, its influence in Brazil was certainly viewed as "foreign." This break with Europe gave the United States an opportunity to directly influence Brazil's post-war

security doctrine.

### The Post-War National Security Doctrine

World War II had a contradictory effect on the Brazilian military. While it elevated its pride and sense of self-worth because of its participation with the United States in Italy, it also made the Brazilian military realize the gap in capability between the two countries. This gap reinforced the view in military circles that security could not be addressed without being linked to development. This realization led some of the key organizers of FEB, such as the artillery commander, General Cordeiro de Farias, to think of this linkage in institutional terms.

The word "doutrina" (doctrine) appeared in Brazil's national security policy circles after World War II with a heavy emphasis on militancy: a disposition toward influencing one's environment.<sup>12</sup> McCann suggests that upon their return from the war, FEB officers realized that "to convert their army into a modern one, they would have first to change Brazil."<sup>13</sup> It was under this conception that the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, ESG) was founded in 1949 and from which came the military's National Security Doctrine. ESG's main purpose was to create an elite which could define the national interests of the country in the areas of security and subsequently translate them into concrete policies.<sup>14</sup> The first organizers of the ESG understood the following principle: the security of a nation depends more on the general potential of a nation than the military expression of its power. The military conception of power is linked to aspects of defense, but security is a much wider concept.<sup>15</sup>

General Cordeiro de Farias, the ESG first commander, recalls in an oral history interview that the

expression "national security" first appeared in Brazil after the war within the context of an increasingly technological age (e.g., air power). Prior to 1939, the term used had been "national defense." During a visit of American officers to help General Farias organize the ESG, the Brazilian officer placed the context of ESG to the visiting officers along domestic developmental lines. While officers in the United States viewed security along global strategic lines, General Farias told his American guests that Brazilian officers were concerned with Brazil's underdeveloped state as a major national security issue.<sup>17</sup>

In the first document published in 1949 by the ESG, entitled "Princípios fundamentais da ESG," (Fundamental Principles of ESG), Lt. Colonel Idálio Sardenberg argued that "National security is a function more of the general potential of the Nation than of its military potential."<sup>18</sup> A corollary follows that the institutions in charge of national security have the duty to ensure the development of the general potential of the nation. This conception of national security is a politico-military phenomenon in which military leaders take it upon themselves to actively participate in "national construction" in the political and economic senses, involving the military institution as "an instrument of a strategic vision."

ESG sought to expose both officers and civilians to the major economic and political problems facing the nation. In the 1950s, they studied inflation and banking, among many other economic topics. Its alumni association, Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra, served as a center for research and meetings, which gathered ESG graduates from many key sectors of the country's power structure. Heavily sponsored by the United States, ESG became the main intellectual center within the military in defining the country's National Security

strategy.

If the need to view national security in developmental and local terms became such a central part of Brazilian strategic thought after the war, why was it not closely implemented in the 1950s? The answer to this question lies in the politics of uneven attraction. In the first decade of the Cold War, geopolitics dominated the character of the U.S.-Brazilian alliance, with General Golbery do Couto e Silva as its master. ESG's strategic thought reflected the U.S. program throughout Latin America of a continental defense against international Communism. As a key country in the region, Brazil's geopolitical mission was to secure U.S. interests in Latin America. In return, Brazil hoped to obtain preferential treatment among the local players.

The geographic importance of Brazil was recognized within the military as an essential component of U.S. global strategy. Admiral Dodsworth Martins of the Brazilian Navy, for instance, reminded his audience in a speech given in December 1956 that Brazil could no longer be isolated from global issues. Its geographic position gave the country natural command over the entrance to the North Atlantic through the Recife-Dakar "corridor." Admiral Martins warned his audience: "Either Brazil's foreign policy seeks to defend that space, what it ought to do, or world interests will try to do it on its own."

The United States and Brazil differed, however, on their conception of geopolitics. While the former viewed Brazil's geographic position as part of a hemispheric defense system, the latter saw itself as an important player in the new world scene by virtue of its geographic location. Developmentalism, therefore, could be used as a supplement to geopolitics because it would enhance the military preparedness of the country, given its geographic

importance. In the politics of uneven attraction, however, the views of the powerful often prevail. It is not surprising to see Stepan argue that initially ESG's developmentalist doctrine was not pervasive within the military. Because of the central importance of a hemispheric interpretation of geopolitics in the U.S.-Brazilian military agenda, developmentalism did not receive top priority in national security policy-making.

### U.S.-Brazilian Military Relations

After World War II, the United States knew it could count on the Brazilian military for strong support against communism. Military officers, however, were divided in the way the two countries should fight communism. Many in Brazil feared that the commitments established in the late 1940s would lead to Brazilian troops being sent to Korea. In reality, Brazil was in no financial and military condition to engage in another conflict overseas. Therefore, some were interested in securing foreign assistance to build Brazil's military capability, without worsening its domestic economic position.

Since the early 1940s, the two countries had considered economic assistance, but with no concrete steps. In 1950, following a proposal from Brazil, the two countries began considering the creation of a bilateral commission ("Comissão Mixta") to consider recommendations in the area of development projects. Within this context, Brazil also considered the supply of strategic raw materials (monazite and rare earth compounds) in exchange for economic aid from the United

States. There was also interest from the Brazilian side for the United States to develop industries in Brazil that could process these minerals before they were exported to the United States. On January 31, 1951, the same day President Vargas took once again the oath of office, he held private discussions with U.S. Ambassador Herschel Johnson and Nelson Rockefeller in which the new president expressed his interest in speeding the negotiations for the commission.

Brazil argued during a 1951 consultation meeting with the United States that military defense would be useless if the countries could not achieve a level of development that could allow them to overcome basic internal difficulties.<sup>26</sup> In his first message to the Brazilian Congress in March 1951, President Vargas called on the government to take up the responsibility to alleviate the economic hardships due to World War II, while instituting policies that shielded the local economy from the economic crisis the world had faced since the end of the war. Vargas hoped that the United States could take a leading role in supplying financial resources to reverse Brazil's worsening economic condition.

During the negotiations for the establishment of the Bilateral Commission, the United States explicitly requested Brazil to send troops to Korea, equipped, trained and paid for by the U.S. Treasury, but Brazil declined. The United Nations on June 27, 1951, also sent Brazil a request for troops, which precipitated a meeting by the Brazilian National Security Council in July during which a consensus was reached to make a vague commitment to send troops. Vargas, however, changed the official notification and argued that despite Brazil's interest in participating militarily against "the totalitarian aggression in Korea," Brazil did not have the capability to make a significant

contribution.<sup>28</sup>

Therefore, Vargas argued, further negotiations were needed to discuss the Brazilian contribution to the war effort. His position was well received both in the United States and in the Brazilian political and military circles, which allowed the negotiations on economic assistance to proceed.

The "Comissão Mixta Brasil-Estados Unidos" (CMBEU), was formally installed on July 19, 1951, with a U.S. promise of foreign aid for projects in the areas of energy, transportation and agriculture. However, the emphasis on geopolitics rather than developmentalism in U.S. national security policy took its toll on CMBEU, even as the two countries negotiated the military assistance agreement. The Commission lasted only until December 21, 1953--a little over two years.<sup>30</sup> For many Brazilians, this represented a blow to their developmental aspirations. The Brazilian Marshal, M. Poppe de Figueiredo, a military assistant in CMBEU, vividly recounts his reaction in his memoirs. As he asserts, the Foreign Minister Fontoura announced the following to the Brazilian representation: "Gentlemen, we have just received a punch, without being able to fight back. The American government, without giving the slightest reason, has just pulled its representation in the Bilateral Commission." <sup>31</sup>

The word punch ("bofetada" in Portuguese) stuck in Marshal Figueiredo's mind, as he recorded his feelings in his memoirs. He says he did not know at the time if it was anger or sadness. He recalls, however, that he reminded himself that: "we have to do everything, us Brazilians, leaving resentment aside and working hard, to make Brazil very economically strong so as not to allow these circumstances to be repeated."

Sérgio Besserman Vianna points to the change in

U.S. administration as one of several critical factors influencing the U.S. decision to abandon the Bilateral Commission arrangement.<sup>33</sup> The Eisenhower administration suspended Truman's Point-IV Program, which served as the driving force behind economic assistance to the Third World.<sup>34</sup> The new administration, instead, turned to Europe and Asia as the main focus of the evolving Cold War. As the dominant player, the United States was able to set the hemispheric agenda. Divided over the issue of regionalism and globalism, the United States opted for the latter, thus steering the inter-American community to the U.S. global security scheme.

Brazil had made security commitments in relation to its Western allegiance through the Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the 1947 Rio Treaty) and the IV Consultation Meeting of the Foreign Relations Ministers of the American States in March 1951. They, in turn, set the stage for a bilateral agreement with the United States. Under the direction of General Pedro A. de Góes Monteiro, the Brazilian Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces (EMFA), the first phase of the negotiations took place at the end of 1951 in Washington. In the second phase, negotiations proceeded in Rio de Janeiro in the beginning of 1952 under the supervision of the then American ambassador to Brazil, Herschel Johnson. In Rio, the Minister of Foreign Relations, João Neves da Fontoura, headed the Brazilian negotiating team, while General Góes Monteiro served as chief advisor.

During the negotiations, the United States showed no interest in addressing issues of military industrialization, as it had with Western Europe through technology transfer agreements. Rather, the agreement reinforced the old division of labor under which the developed nation specialized in manufactured products, while the

underdeveloped country supplied the raw materials. Paulo Kramer suggests that in the opinion of the Brazilian High Command (Alto Comando), the 1952 agreement, signed within the context of the Cold War and the Korean War, had actually served to block the transfer of technology, thus becoming<sup>36</sup> an obstacle for the modernization of the Armed Forces.

Such an exchange (export of raw materials and import of weapons) faced loud opposition within the nationalist sectors of the military, particularly in the Clube Militar, an organization that served as a political forum for the Brazilian military. Through its meetings, publications, and debates, the military let the civilian circles know the political climate within the military. The Clube Militar was created in 1887 amid a general debate about the role of the military in Brazilian political life. The participation of important military leaders in the organization had turned it into a "political barometer" of the Army, whose leanings the civilian political leadership closely observed before embarking on any policy direction.

Every two years elections were held for the leadership of the organization. After World War II, elections became contentious battles for the definition of Brazil's national security interests. The organization became the center of conflict as to the country's place in the new Cold War order. Nationalist military officers were particularly interested in such issues as ownership of Brazilian oil reserves, development of steel production, and economic sovereignty. General Francisco Teixeira, a Vargas supporter associated with the nationalist movement within the organization, argued in an oral history interview that much of the nationalist aspirations of the group came to be mistakenly associated with the communist position (i.e., anti-imperialism). This association, in turn,

strengthened the conservatives, particularly FEB veterans, who favored closer links with the United States. Some conservative officers, such as Antônio Carlos Murici, attacked the nationalists as advancing a "false nationalism" as a cover for their real communist leanings.

The first test of the clash between the two sides came in 1950 during that year's election for the Clube leadership. The nationalist side counted on the candidacy of General Estillac Leal for president and General Horta Barbosa for vice-president of the organization. The nationalists' victory set the stage for a ESG conservative reaction which would have serious consequences to the stability of the political system. In fact, when Vargas was elected in 1950, the ESG-inspired conservative side in the military considered intervening against his inauguration. Aristides Leal, a leader in the organization in the late 1930s, recounts that after Vargas was elected, Estillac called a meeting of the club's leaders and declared "Candidato eleito é candidato empossado!" meaning that a candidate who was elected would indeed take office. Aristides adds that the conservative generals "had to swallow" that decision. Supporting Vargas paid off for Estillac, as he was appointed Minister of War. That appointment, nevertheless, brought the Vargas regime closer to the nationalist military camp, which supplied even more ammunition for the conservative officers to use against the president.<sup>41</sup>

The Vargas government was increasingly under pressure from both sides (nationalists and conservatives) to develop a post-war national security policy. While courting the nationalists with the appointment of Estillac for the Minister of War, the terms of the military agreement gravely upset the same group. Estillac came to experience the same pressure, as he formulated national security

policy. He found himself associated with the nationalist group, a motive for suspicion by the ESG conservative officers, while at the same time participating in a government that was slowly pulled into the U.S. sphere of influence. Paulo Pinto Guedes recalls that many nationalist officers came to resent Estillac's association with the Vargas regime because of the government's support for a military agreement with the United States.

Foreign Minister Fontoura argued at the time that what made the new military agreement distinct from the others was the availability of funds by the U.S. government for the purchase of military equipment, while Brazil committed itself to supply the United States with essential strategic raw materials. The Brazilian minister argued in his annual report to the president that the agreement would greatly benefit the recipient nation in the field of military supplies and economic development, although the latter was never fully elaborated.

While Brazil welcomed the possibility of increasing the supply of weapons to a weak military, its linkage to the export of strategic minerals constituted a source of suspicions and division within the Brazilian political and military circles. In addition, the reference in the agreement (Article 4, Paragraph 1) to the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 committed Brazil to follow an American law, without any determination as to the limits and consequences of that commitment. Caught between the two sides, the governmental national security policies favoring the conservatives and the nationalist opposition in the Clube, General Estillac resigned his position as Minister of War in March 1952, alleging that he had been deliberately kept out of the negotiating process, which was not far from the truth. In April 1952, during a brief interview with reporters at a Brazilian airport, General Estillac publicly commented:

"Besides, I never knew anything about the commitments, even the military ones, of Brazil with<sub>45</sub> other nations, regardless of which [nations] they were."

Estillac's resignation only intensified the pressure applied on President Vargas to choose sides in the ideological battle between nationalists and conservatives. Feared by the United States in the 1930s and early 1940s for his relations with Germany, Vargas sought to strike a balance between nationalist tendencies and conservative positions. The ambiguity reflected the fact that the two positions formed the dual military support for the government.

The weakening of the nationalist position within the government due to Estillac's resignation indicated the inroads of the conservatives in defining Brazil's Cold War foreign policy. During the same month of his resignation, the conservatives conducted a purge of suspected communists within the military, which included many nationalists mistakenly identified as Soviet sympathizers. What we see in Brazilian military politics in the early 1950s is the slow drift toward an alliance with the U.S. Cold War aims. The establishment of this new relationship became evident during the elections to the leadership of the Clube Militar in May 1952. Generals Estillac and Horta Barbosa ran for reelection, while the conservative generals Alcides Etchegoyen and Néelson de Melo ran under the "Cruzada Democrática" (Democratic Crusadé) slogan. Among the Cruzada's leaders were Castello Branco -- FEB's operations officer--and Golbery, close associates in the ESG. The conservative victory delegitimized the nationalist position within the military, setting the stage for a more concerted conservative pressure on the Vargas government toward closer relations with the United States. The Cruzada group established itself as the intellectual

center of Brazil's national security policy.<sup>47</sup>

Despite nationalist objections, the military assistance agreement was signed on March 15, 1952.<sup>48</sup> During the signing ceremony, Fontoura exalted the agreement as a solid step toward the defense of the hemisphere. Much of what he said reflected U.S. concern with defending the continent against the threat of international Communism.<sup>49</sup> The nationalist-conservative debate spilled from within the military into the Brazilian Congress, which had to ratify the agreement. Supporters began their own effort to speed the process. The following day after its signature, General Góes Monteiro publicly reassured the country that Brazil had no obligation under the agreement to send troops to Korea. As he pointed out, "Everything that was agreed upon and signed is entirely in accordance with the note of the National Security Council [meeting] of July 30 of last year. And nothing else."<sup>50</sup>

On the diplomatic side, Fontoura reminded the Brazilian congressmembers of the urgency in approving the treaty so that the country could receive the promised aid from the United States. In turn, some members of Congress accused the minister of being an "agent of foreign interests."<sup>51</sup> Fontoura fought back by accusing some of the legislators of playing the "Communist game" in criticizing the treaty. In the Chamber of Deputies, Lobo Carneiro vehemently objected to what he called the subordination of Brazil to U.S. interests in the former's commitment to ship strategic raw materials.

President Vargas did not actively become involved in the Congressional debate for fear of placing his prestige and leadership on the line, tied to the success or failure of the treaty in the Brazilian Congress. Instead, he ironically relied on Afonso Arinos, leader of the conservative UDN

party in Congress, to gather support for the final vote. In his message to the Congress in the opening legislative session in March 1953, Vargas only underlined the fact that the treaty would represent the receipt of badly needed technical assistance for its armed forces. In exchange, he argued, Brazil would supply under "normal commercial transactions" certain raw materials for the defense of the continent.<sup>52</sup> After much debate in the Brazilian Congress, the agreement was finally approved in March of 1953, without a single amendment to it.

If the main purpose of the agreement was to modernize Brazil's armed forces, its impact went beyond security considerations related to territorial integrity. With the growing sophistication of the weapons after the war, Brazil found it increasingly difficult to replace parts without depending on U.S. supplies. By the end of the 1950s and beginning of the early 1960s, practically all of the equipment used by Brazil's military was supplied through the 1952 agreement, with the exception of locally produced light armament and ammunition.<sup>53</sup> The successful passage of the agreement granted the United States the strong position of aligning the Brazilian military more closely with U.S. foreign policy objectives. While Brazil did not send troops to Korea, the nationalist movement within the military was effectively tamed.

It is important to note that the decline of the nationalist faction did not necessarily mean the immediate ascension of the ESG's conservatives to important posts. President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) picked General Henrique Lott as his Minister of War, a centrist figure within the military. Gen. Lott was responsible for placing strict controls over the political activities of the Clube Militar, thus demobilizing any tendency toward a golpe (coup attempt). During the 1956 elections in the Clube,

Gen. Lott circulated a "ministerial notice" forbidding any campaigning during work hours in military establishments, while reaffirming his Ministry's neutrality.<sup>54</sup> As a result, the Clube's role as a "political barometer" of the Army declined in the second half of the 1950s. The control over the military gave President Kubitschek the necessary stability to implement his own developmentalist policies, albeit at a much more ideologically subdued level than those advocated by Vargas. President Kubitschek was adamant about Petrobrás, reaffirming the nationalists' "O Petróleo é Nosso!" position,<sup>55</sup> but the conservatives had clearly established their control over national security policy-making through the signing of the military assistance agreement.<sup>56</sup>

#### Concluding Remarks: Dependency and Nationalism

Both conservative and nationalist factions in Brazil shared a common concern over the weak economic condition of the country. They differed, though, on how to tackle the economic problems. While the former hoped that closer relations with the United States would reap economic benefits, the latter was suspicious of U.S. influence over Brazil's economic sovereignty. As the post-war order unfolded, both factions jockeyed for position in the national security policy apparatus. The outcome of that confrontation was closely linked to the policy preferences of the United States.

Conservatives were able to undermine the nationalist position by portraying it as communist inspired. The collapse of the nationalist faction, in turn, allowed the United States to dictate the terms of a military assistance agreement with Brazil. Conservatives, however, were never rewarded with significant economic benefits. In some cases, as in the U.S. unilateral cancellation of the CMBEU

in 1953, economic assistance was cut back. The United States continued in the 1950s to emphasize the geopolitical dimension of the new world order. Brazil, as all of Latin America, played a marginal role in that Cold War scenario. Therefore, it came as no surprise--albeit painfully recognized in Brazil--that the region received little economic assistance in the early years of the Cold War.

Once the nationalists were pushed aside--particularly after General Estillac's resignation--the patterns of dependency were clearly established, with Brazil's international role diminished, and with it its aspirations of "grandeza" (greatness). The 1952 military assistance agreement made Brazil into a critical supplier of raw materials for the Cold War effort without addressing the developmental aspirations of the country.

While Brazil sought the agreement because of its potential economic returns in the form of assistance to build the country's military capability, its role was relegated to one of support, rather than that of an ally. Even this supporting role was dependent on the United States shifting interests. With the discovery of large deposits of monazite sands in Idaho and California in the 1950s, for instance, the United States lost interest in additional purchases of rare earth compounds from Brazil. This shift, in turn, undercut the real need for the 1952 agreement.

So intent was Washington on promoting a hemispheric initiative, that the United States undermined its special relationship with Brazil. "By courting Argentina and treating all American republics equally," Gerald K. Haines suggests, "U.S. officials offended Brazilian leaders and weakened the traditional bilateral ties between their nations."<sup>58</sup> Ironically, it was the conservative faction that took up the nationalist mantle in the 1960s and reasserted

Brazil's political and economic sovereignty.

While a full account of the events following the 1950s goes beyond the scope of this article, we should mention that the conservative faction that took over the government in 1964 fully implemented many of the prescriptions found in the ESG's National Security Doctrine, including military industrialization and diversification of trade partners.<sup>59</sup> The previous discussion about nationalism and national security policy-making helps explain why the conservative faction broke away in the 1970s from its military alliance with the United States. Development took center stage under the military regime in the 1960s, replacing geopolitics as conceived by the United States. In 1977, Brazil cancelled the 1952 military assistance agreement, arguing that it no longer reflected Brazil's security reality. Geopolitics by then had become subordinate to development, as the military generals attempted to improve the country's position in the international system.

Notes

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1. Gerson Moura, Autonomia na Dependência; A Política Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980), 56.

2. See Stanley E. Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975). Germany's aggressive strategy included mainly barter and compensation-mark trade arrangements, which used the private sale of weapons to win vital raw materials.

3. Roberto Gambini, O duplo jogo de Getúlio Vargas: influência americana e alemã no Estado Novo (São Paulo: Edições Símbolo, 1977). For a guide to the literature on the politics of industrialization during the 1930s, see Gamaliel Perruci, Jr., and Steven E. Sanderson, "Presidential Succession, Economic Crisis, and Populist Resurgence in Brazil," Studies in Comparative International Development 24 (Fall 1989): 30-50.

4. Moura, Autonomia na Dependência.

5. Gambini, O duplo jogo, 139.

6. Ibid., 121; Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 187. As late as March 1938 and August 1939, on the eve of the world conflict, the Brazilian government signed two agreements with the German weapons manufacturer, Krupp, for the purchase of armaments. The 1938 agreement was part of a five-year rearmament effort. Five secret decree-laws by Brazil in the same year opened new credits for the military to buy armaments. See Frank D. McCann, Jr., "The Brazilian Army and the Problem of Mission, 1939-1964," Journal of Latin American Studies 12 (May 1980): 117; and Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 189.

7. The Mission came after the visit of March 25-April 7, 1939, of the U.S. Army Chief-of-Staff, General George Marshall, who arrived in the country along with General Matthew Ridgeway--later the U.S. commander in the Korean War. The Mission trained the Brazilian army until 1945. For a good source on this shift in dominance, see Cláudio Moreira Bento, "Getúlio Vargas e a Evolução da Doutrina do Exército (1930-45)," Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro 339 (April-June 1983): 63-71.

8. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Força Expedicionária Brasileira, or FEB) first arrived in Italy on July 2, 1944, with 5,075 troops. By 1945, Brazil had sent a total of 25,334 troops. See Teixeira Soares, O Brasil no Conflito Ideológico Global (1937-1979) (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1980), 143.

9. Ibid., 149.

10. McCann, "The Brazilian Army and the Problem," 119. During World War II, the United States used the Northeast of Brazil as a base for launching attacks on Northern Africa. The city-port of Recife became the base for one of the U.S. fleets.

11. Ibid., 120. The Brazilian military's dependence on the United States became quite evident, as the former fought in Europe. The United States not only supplied the weapons, but it even provided food and the uniforms that Brazilian troops used.

12. Jorge Boaventura, "A Doutrina de Segurança Nacional," in Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, ed., Militares: Pensamento e Ação Política (Campinas, SP: Papirus, 1987), 46.

13. McCann, "The Brazilian Army and the Problem," 126.

14. See, for instance, Antônio de Arruda, ESG--História de sua Doutrina (São Paulo: Edições GRD/INL/MEC, 1980); Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Shiguenoli Miyamoto, "Escola Superior de Guerra: Mito e Realidade," Política e Estratégia 5 (January-March 1987): 76-97.

15. Boaventura, "A Doutrina de Segurança Nacional," 47. See also Stepan, The Military in Politics, 179.

16. Rocha Lima, Getúlio: uma história oral (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1986), 231.

17. Stepan identifies two main themes behind the ESG's doctrine. First, national security and development are closely interrelated. As he points out, "National security for the ESG was seen to a great extent as a function of rationally maximizing the output of the economy and minimizing all sources of cleavages and disunity within the country." See Stepan, The Military in Politics, 179. What this prescription entailed was the need for strong government and planning. The second theme is the internal pressures Third World countries face, both as a product of underdevelopment and the global ideological conflict. This theme underscores ESG's close ideological commitment to the U.S. containment policy.

18. Translation from the original Portuguese cited in Boaventura, "A Doutrina de Segurança Nacional," 63.

19. *Ibid.*, 65.

20. See, for instance, Golbery do Couto e Silva, Planejamento Estratégico (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1955); and Golbery do Couto e Silva, Conjuntura Política Nacional; O Poder Executivo e Geopolítica do Brasil, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1981).

21. See, for instance, Gerald K. Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), 33, in which the author argues: "[Brazilian officials] aspired to a special position in U.S. foreign policy and believed that they had earned such a position through their 'undeviating record of friendship for the United States.'"

22. Translation from the original Portuguese in Revista Marítima Brasileira, "O Compromisso da Defesa Mútua do Continente Americano," 77 (January-March 1957): 196.

23. Stepan, The Military in Politics, 180.

24. Maria Celina Soares D'Araújo, O Segundo Governo Vargas, 1951-1954 (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), 143.

25. Luthero Vargas, Getúlio Vargas: A Revolução Inacabada (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1988), 197.

26. Soares D'Araújo, O Segundo Governo Vargas, 141.

27. Vargas, Getúlio Vargas, 196.

28. Ibid.

29. Soares D'Araújo, O Segundo Governo Vargas, 143.

30. Brazil's National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), created in May 1952 as part of CMBEU's many projects, took over the Commission's functions in providing technical support to national projects under U.S. financing.

31. Translation from the original Portuguese in M. Poppe de Figueiredo, Brasil, um gigante que despertou (Rio de Janeiro: Símbolo Agência de Comunicação, 1973), 211.

32. Ibid.; translation from the original Portuguese. The title of his memoirs, Brasil, um gigante que despertou (Brazil, an awakened giant), is indicative of his concern with Brazil's vulnerable position in the international system.

33. Sérgio Besserman Vianna, "As relações Brasil-EUA e a política econômica do segundo governo Vargas," Revista Brasileira de Economia 40 (July-September 1986): 197.

34. President Eisenhower, who had during the campaign trail accused Truman of neglecting Latin America, did little to build a developmentalist agenda toward Latin America. After taking office, President Eisenhower issued a new policy for the region, NSC 144/1, in which U.S.-Latin American relations were interpreted solely

within the Cold War geopolitical context. See Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America; The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 32.

35. Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), 189.

36. Paulo Kramer, "As Relações Militares Brasil-Estados Unidos," Política e Estratégia 4 (January-March 1986): 45.

37. Maria Victoria de Mesquita Benevides, O governo Kubitschek; desenvolvimento econômico e estabilidade política, 1956-1961 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1976), 159.

38. Rocha Lima, Getúlio: uma história oral, 223.

39. Ibid., 224.

40. Ibid., 225.

41. Ibid., 226.

42. Ibid., 229.

43. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Relatório (Brasília: Serviço de Publicações, 1952), 189.

44. Clóvis Brigagão, "Cancelamento do Acordo," Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 21 (1978): 106. Eager to secure allegiance to its Western bloc, the United States had developed a Military Assistance Program (MAP) which helped many Third World nations improve their military capability. According to the MAP policy, a nation qualified to receive U.S. security help after ratification of a bilateral agreement of mutual assistance, based on the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951. One basis of MAP was that the aid recipients would supply the United States with strategic minerals and raw materials. Brazil's alliance with the United States sprang from this new policy toward military cooperation vis-à-vis the Third World. The Brazil-U.S. military agreement signed after the war reflected this evolving arms transfers policy.

45. Translated from the original Portuguese as quoted in Affonso Henriques, Ascensão e Queda de Getúlio Vargas, vol. 3. (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo: Distribuidora Record, n.d.), 114.

46. Soares D'Araújo, O Segundo Governo Vargas, 155.

47. For a good guide to the secondary literature on the conservative-nationalist debate during this period, see Haines, The Americanization of Brazil.

48. At that time, Brazil was the fourth Latin American government to sign such an agreement, after Ecuador, Peru and Cuba.

49. "Assinado o Acordo Brasil-E.U.A." O Estado de S. Paulo, 16 March 1952, p. 1.

50. Translated from the original Portuguese as quoted in "O Acordo Entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos," O Estado de S. Paulo, 18 March 1952, p. 1. General Monteiro was making a reference to the NSC meeting following UN troop requests, as discussed earlier.

51. Soares D'Araújo, O Segundo Governo Vargas, 153.

52. Ibid., 154.

53. Brigagão, "Cancelamento do Acordo," 107-8.

54. Benevides, O governo Kubitschek, 158.

55. Ibid., 173. The nationalists also influenced Kubitschek's decision to allow the United States the use of the Fernando de Noronha Island as a missile tracking station only if Brazilian officials were allowed in all sectors of the base.

56. Such hegemony became quite evident in the 1960s, as the military overthrew the Goulart government in 1964. Not surprisingly, Marshal Castello Branco became the first president under the military regime.

57. Haines, The Americanization of Brazil, 103.

58. Ibid., 25.

59. For a guide to the literature on Brazil's military industrialization, see Patrice Franko-Jones, The Brazilian Defense Industry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

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